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
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Giving Russia Its Due

Stephen Sestanovich

"All that you have said so far is interesting and encouraging," I concluded, "but it does not answer the question I asked at the very beginning and which I said was uppermost in the minds of all the American people: 'How far is Russia going to go?'"

Looking directly at me, Stalin replied, "We're not going much further."

—Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (1950)

"It wouldn't be correct for Russia to set forth special conditions...[or ask for] a warmer place in the sun. A civilized nation would never set such conditions."

—General Pavel Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, *New York Times*, May 26, 1994.

MOST PEACE settlements collapse quickly. Let a couple of years pass after the end of hostilities, and the ideas that inspired the peace are widely considered fatuous, the institutions created to preserve it are seen to ignore the real issues, and everyone knows that unless something is done to revise the postwar order great dangers lie ahead.

This was the mood of 1947. By then, the policies of 1945—and insulting answers like "We're not going much further"—were no longer adequate. It was, to a lesser extent, also the mood of the early 1920s, when Versailles had already lost much of its legitimacy. And it is clearly the prevailing mood today. The world we live in looks so different from that of 1991 that many of the ideas, institutions and strategies that first appeared at the end of the Cold War have already been pitched over the side.

In wrapping up a large war, almost everyone mishandles Round One; the more important question is whether you mishandle Round Two as well. The real failure of the Versailles peace, after all, was not that it was so much more foolish than what was agreed at Yalta and Potsdam (it wasn't), but that the great powers never put anything more workable in its place.

Now the "second settlement" of the Cold War is upon us, propelled by a widespread sense that Russia, like the Soviet Union of the late 1940s, is at work subduing its neighbors and building an empire. There is no doubt that we need a clearer understanding of where the Russians are headed. But much of today's discussion will only mislead us. The very term "empire" obscures the diverse and open-ended character of Russia's changing relations with other former Soviet states. And it carries

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with it the near-automatic implication that U.S. policy has to oppose, indeed stop, what's happening. At just the moment when something new and very different is emerging, talk of empire invites us to fight the last war all over again.

The Importance of the "Near Abroad"

THE INITIAL settlement of the Cold War had four main elements: the overthrow of Communist rule inside Russia; a sharp stand-down from military (especially nuclear) confrontation; freedom for the East European empire; and the break-up of the USSR into more than a dozen sovereign states.

The first three of these elements had been the traditional objectives of Western policy over several decades; the Cold War could not end for good until they were achieved. Yet, oddly enough, they are not really at the center of the debate about the durability of the settlement as a whole. Increasingly this discussion revolves around the fourth element—the possibility that Russia will manage to restore some sort of dominance over its new neighbors. This problem makes all the other elements of the peace look considerably more precarious than they otherwise would.

As a step toward democratic stability, for example, Russia's parliamentary elections of December 1993 had many positive consequences: they left in place a highly reformist government, strengthened its control over economic policy, and gave Russian politics a constitutional foundation. They did not in any sense put Zhirinovsky and his ilk in positions of power. Yet the strong nationalist vote did push the issue of Russia's relations with the "near abroad" much higher up the political agenda, and increased the pressure on Russian democrats to pursue policies that could ultimately have an anti-democratic result. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has memorably put it, "Russia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both."[1]

The uncertain future of relations among the post-Soviet states also makes the second part of the Cold War settlement—the changed military relationship—look less secure. The army remains one of Russia's most troubled institutions, and the country's overall military capabilities have continued to decline. Still, how one rates the potential future threat that the successors to the Red Army could pose depends in substantial part on whether there will be fifteen of them, or just one.

The future of East Central Europe is also linked to the future of the "near abroad." No one seriously suggests that there is now a Russian threat to the states of the old Soviet bloc. There aren't really even signs of pressure. Moscow does not warn—publicly or privately—that troop withdrawals from Germany and Poland (now almost complete) might be interrupted if these countries do not show it proper deference. There has been no Russian demand for military bases on the territory of the old Warsaw Pact; no extortion of economic privileges; no proposals to create new, Russian-dominated regional organizations; no allegations that the KGB is covertly at work trying to manipulate political outcomes in the lands it once ruled.

Far from exercising (or aspiring to exercise) control over the region, Moscow in fact has little influence of any kind. Nevertheless, and despite the lack of any immediate danger, NATO conducted a protracted debate last year about whether to extend alliance guarantees to some East European states, and a large part of the reason for it was the possibility that Moscow might regain control over the "near abroad." Russian power is a very different problem for Europe depending on whether

[1] "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1994, p. 72.

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it is exercised from behind its own, now distant, borders or at closer range, from the territory of neighbors whose independence is being steadily whittled away.

Whether the Cold War stays settled, then, seems to depend on whether the Soviet Union stays broken up. This is a highly ironic result, since of all the elements of the peace, the liquidation of the USSR was by far the most accidental. One could search a lot of Cold War history without finding a Western leader who suggested even once that the other side had to be territorially dismantled, piece by piece. And when it actually happened, as Russians like to point out, the president of the United States himself seemed to be against the idea. The break-up emerged almost fortuitously, with the December 1991 agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus to form a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); except for the Baltic states, which had won their independence immediately after the August coup, all other former republics of the USSR subsequently became CIS members. Clearly the Cold War could have ended without this transformation. Yet, once it occurred, it too became an element of the post-war order. Whatever its origins, it could no longer be challenged without threatening peace, stability, and the rights of sovereign states everywhere. It became the most important measure of the kind of international actor Russia intended to be.

Given this history, it is hardly surprising that the status of the post-Soviet successor states is viewed in radically different terms by Russians and Americans. Russians have many different complaints about the "near abroad," but they are of one mind in finding the *status quo* unsatisfactory. It is, for them, a source of trouble for Russia. As Boris Yeltsin himself described the situation in his "State of the Union" message to parliament at the end of February,

> The centers of conflict close to [Russia's] borders and the protracted chaos of the economy and indeed of the actual state system in a number of the CIS countries do pose a serious threat to our country's security.[2]

This view (which most Russian democrats share) has it that the fragmented, often backward "near abroad" jeopardizes Russia's own, hard-won stability. Brzezinski's judgment (shared by many Western analysts), that it is Russia that is subverting and destabilizing its neighbors, could hardly be more different. There is a similar gap between Henry Kissinger's claim, that the use of Russian peace-keeping forces is "often indistinguishable" from an attempt to rebuild the Russian empire, and Yeltsin's version:

> In all CIS countries where Russia is involved in peacemaking operations, it is doing so at the request and with the agreement of its neighbors, on the basis of international legal documents, and in full keeping with the sovereign rights of states as enshrined in the UN Charter.[3]

The new alarmist tone of so much American analysis of Russian policy does not necessarily mean that it is wrong, any more than the Russians' cool legalese means that they are right. Nevertheless, the large gap that is opening up between our perspectives and those of the Russian politicians who have most earned our trust ought to make us look more closely at our own thinking. If the emerging second settlement is to have a solid foundation, we have to be more precise about two issues in particular. First, about the starting point: what kind of Russian policy are we dealing with now? Second, the end point: what will be the result of this Russian policy, and what interests ride on the outcome?

---

[2] *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, February 25, 1994.

[3] Ibid.

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AS PORTRAYED IN one Western account after another, the principal features of contemporary Russian policy in the "near abroad" are intimidation and destabilization. Economic muscle is being used to squeeze concession after concession out of weaker neighbors. In military affairs, the generals enjoy near-complete autonomy, most recently demonstrated when they allegedly forced Yeltsin to agree to a new doctrine that asserts their right to intervene at will in the "near abroad." Meanwhile, it is alleged, the presence of 25 million Russians in other former Soviet states has become a handy lever for interfering in their internal affairs.

Most of the particulars of this indictment are, however, simply wrong. Economically, for example, 1993 trade figures place Russian "aid" to CIS states (that is, exports for which no payment was received) at approximately $10 billion, two-thirds of it in oil and gas that could have been sold elsewhere. Had Moscow cut off its single biggest deadbeat, Ukraine, and sold the energy on the world market, the revenues *in just one year* would have equaled the total amount of aid that Russia has ever received from the IMF and World Bank.[4] In monetary policy, what is sometimes described as a bid by Russia to take over the central banks of its neighbors was at bottom an attempt to keep the anti-reform policies of these states from re-igniting inflation in Russia itself. Similarly, the oft-cited "right to intervene" does not appear in the military doctrine adopted last year, and other authoritative Russian statements clearly renounce any such right.[5]

As for manipulation of Russian minorities in the "near abroad" (the alleged Sudeten Germans of the 1990s), Russian complaints on this subject are indeed loud and self-pitying, but they have not had many consequences. Estonia and Latvia are said to be the scenes of unbearable anti-Russian "apartheid," but troop withdrawals from both are continuing, and Estonia's president says he has no doubt they will be completed this summer. Although Moscow has proposed to grant "dual citizenship" to ethnic Russians living in the CIS, it has seemingly accepted the rejection of this idea by almost all CIS governments. (Turkmenistan has agreed, but only to a five-year trial.) There is a steady flow of Russian migrants leaving the "near abroad" for Russia, and the result over time will be to reduce Moscow's leverage over its neighbors as well as its stake in their affairs.

Russian officials and commentators speak endlessly these days of their determination to defend their "national interests," and they do so in an edgy, chip-on-the-shoulder way that makes it easy to conclude that they must mean something terrible by it. Their actions, however, suggest that the dominant interest now guiding Russian

[4]It is hardly a response to these facts to say that cutting off Ukraine would have had dangerous, destabilizing results. "Destabilization" is precisely the crime of which the Russians stand accused. If instead they shy away from actions having such results, then we need to describe their policies differently.

[5]The military doctrine is a much abused document, and one case of abuse appeared recently in *The National Interest*. According to James Scherr ("A Dubious Partnership," Spring 1994) the doctrine expresses fear that outside powers might "use local war in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as an 'excuse' to launch general war against Russia." The document, one would think from this, is the product of a belligerent, paranoid, Stalinist mindset. But the passage in question actually says something totally different (and not at all paranoid), that conflicts on Russia's periphery "may be used as an excuse for other states' interference in its internal affairs...." See "Voennaya Doktrina Rossii," in *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, November 18, 1993.

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policy is stability. For now, the picture of an expansionist juggernaut is—at the very least—far ahead of the facts. The task confronting U.S. policy is not to turn around a Russian offensive that is already in full swing, but to make sure that a basically constructive line of policy stays that way.

Doing so requires that we sharpen our thinking about where Russian policy is likely to lead. Even if some Russian actions are "indistinguishable" from those that would be part of a strategy to restore the empire (and most are in fact pretty easy to distinguish), this hardly establishes that restoring the empire *is* Russian strategy. If we elide the two, we only confuse ourselves. Similarly, the fact that there is a revisionist consensus in Russia about the "near abroad" does not mean there is an *irredentist* consensus. Dissatisfaction with things as they are is not the same thing as a demand to reconquer everything that has been lost.

As a gauge of how deep Russian revisionism is, one might think that there would be widespread support for restructuring the Commonwealth as a confederation, giving it more meaningful central institutions and thereby moving it up a notch in international legal terms. But doing so is not the policy of the Russian government, and the idea is not heard all that often outside the government either. Still less does one hear proposals to upgrade the CIS *two* notches, to a full-blown federation; and open support for actually restoring the Union marks one immediately as part of the Russian political fringe. When president Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan recently called for a new, more tightly bound grouping of former Soviet states, to be called the Eurasian Union, the Russian government barely dignified his proposal with a reply. Official Russian policy remains what it has been for some time, to promote "integration" of the Commonwealth, to make it a more effective institution able to meet the various needs of its members. (Anyone who wants to find harbingers of expansionism in the goal of "integration" should remember how few of its other goals such as bringing crime under control, improving tax collection, and attracting foreign investment, the Russian government has made any serious effort to meet.)

What is most likely to take shape on the territory of the former Soviet Union is not a restored empire, or a rough copy of the old Soviet bloc, but a Russian "sphere of influence." The latter term encompasses such a wide spectrum of political relationships that it is easy to misuse, but the main point is that they are relationships neither of full equality nor of outright imperial subordination. The sovereignty of those within it is not merely nominal. Finland was part of the Soviet Union's sphere of influence; Bulgaria was part of the Soviet empire.

For the states of the "near abroad," being part of a Russian sphere will have no single meaning—and certainly none of the institutional and ideological uniformity imposed on members of the old Soviet bloc. Each relationship is likely to present a different, and changing, mix of political, economic, ethnic, military and other ties. By some measures, Russia's position may grow stronger; by others, weaker. Over time, for example, a large, robust, successfully reformed Russian economy might actually draw many of the states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus closer to it. The resulting trade patterns would be very different from the days of the USSR, but they would still be unequal—and dominated by Russia.

By contrast, even with mutual defense pacts and basing agreements, the military establishments of the "near abroad" are likely to move toward greater independence. Generational turnover will mean that the officer corps of the Central Asian states, at this point still heavily Russian, gradually will start to "look like Uzbekistan." The change will give political sovereignty stronger psychological under-

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pinnings.

What geopolitical impact would a Russian sphere in the "near abroad" have on the rest of Europe? It is truly fantastical to compare it with the impact of the old Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. The Cold War originated in (and was perpetuated by) the fear that, having extended its control halfway across the European continent, the Soviet Union would then be able to make *Western* Europe a sphere of influence—not by invasion, but by intimidation. A full-blown Russian empire in the "near abroad" might well have a comparable intimidating effect on Poland and the other states of East Central Europe, bringing them ineluctably into a Russian sphere—and if this started to happen, it would be a powerful argument for extending Western protection to them. But the mere fact of Russian influence in the "near abroad" is hardly likely to have the same effect. A sphere of influence is created by the proximity of power that cannot be ignored. It is not created by the proximity of influence.

The difference is crucial for designing Western security policy. Until we see what Russia's relations with the rest of the former Soviet Union will be, it will be hard to fashion a Western strategy that is in proportion to the real security problems that the Poles, Czechs, and others may face. Last year's debate about extending NATO eastward was, unfortunately, conducted largely without reference to the "near abroad." The potential adverse impact on Russian politics loomed very large in the discussion (with the administration plainly fearing that pro-Western reformers would be weakened by the perceived isolation of Russia). But there was much less attention to what was at stake for Ukraine, Moldova, and others. Would a decision to expand NATO into East Central Europe have hindered the reassertion of Russian control in the "near abroad" or helped it? One can make a strong argument that, if anything, such a step would have lessened Russian incentives to respect Ukrainian independence. Precisely because the kind of position Russia re-establishes in its own neighborhood matters so much to the rest of Europe, this should have been the crucial question.[6]

Legality and Stability

IF A "SPHERE of influence" presents some unfamiliar conceptual issues for American foreign policy, it presents even more unfamiliar practical problems in carrying that policy out. Since we want to keep Russia's new sphere from turning back into Russia's old empire (and, however unlikely, this is not inconceivable), how do we keep things moving in the right direction? How do we encourage Russia to be a constructive force in its own neighborhood, the kind of "regional influential" that Zbigniew Brzezinski used to say should be favored by U.S. policy?

Henry Kissinger has addressed this problem by granting that Russia has a "special security interest" in adjoining regions, but he insists that the rest of the world must make sure that the pursuit of this interest is "subject to accepted rules of foreign policy."[7] What this would mean in practice is a bit unclear, of course: foreign policy doesn't have a universally accepted rulebook. At a minimum, however, it surely refers to the legal norms—like respect for international boundaries, the unacceptability of military or other forms of coercion, etc.—that always shape American assessments of the legitimacy of any action and that Russia's leaders themselves invoke to

[6]Two years ago Brzezinski himself argued that "Russia should not be made to feel that a new *cordon sanitaire* separates it from the West." "The Cold War and Its Aftermath," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1992, p. 49.

[7]*Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 816; "Be Realistic about Russia," *Washington Post*, January 25, 1994, p. A19.

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defend their policies.

These legal norms are not mere niceties; acceptance of them is one further feature distinguishing a sphere of influence from an empire. The West should therefore treat playing by the rules as a principal measure of whether a stable and legitimate order is being created in the "near abroad." Since the Russians actually boast of observing the rules, they can hardly object to this. No harm (and possibly even some good) will be done if Russian representatives in international forums are periodically obliged to explain why the 14th Army is still in Moldova, or whose help enabled Abkhaz insurgents to overwhelm Georgian government forces last summer.

Yet something of a surprise lies in wait for us if we begin to adopt a more rigorous legal approach to Russian policy in the "near abroad." The cases in which Russian actions give the clearest grounds for legal complaint are also the ones with the least strategic significance. By contrast, in those cases that really matter—to the peace of Europe, say—Russian policy usually has a strong legal basis. And, which is more important still, it reflects a key interest that is shared by the U.S.: to ensure that respect for legal norms serves international stability rather than (which is a genuine danger in the former Soviet Union) subverting it.

The issue of border changes illustrates the problem. The "accepted rules of foreign policy" involve an obvious preference for stable international borders, but they leave a loophole for peaceful adjustments, particularly if these are based on democratic political processes. (The reunification of Germany was possible only on this basis.) Unfortunately, in the former Soviet Union, the very challenges to existing borders that would most easily pass these formal tests of legitimacy are the same ones that pose the most serious threat to peace.

The majority of ethnic Russians living outside of the Russian Federation are concentrated in contiguous areas—in eastern Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan—and a desire to be restored to Russia could easily take root among them without outside interference. It could develop even if, as now seems to be true of Russian separatists in Ukraine, it were actively discouraged by the Russian government. Communal violence, or the threat of force, might not figure at all in the process.

The ground on which we stand, then, in resisting transfers of territory will have little to do with the law and everything to do with the likely devastating impact on the dismembered states. Changes that might be manageable in more normal circumstances, by more normal states, could be fatal to newly-created entities like Ukraine and Kazakhstan. If shaving off a little of their territory led these states to disintegrate—and it's not hard to imagine both Ukraine and Kazakhstan breaking into several pieces—the result would be great regional disorder no matter how the Russians responded.

Because we are still in the middle of a vast international upheaval, the safest strategy is, take no chances: unnecessary changes are to be avoided, and those that cannot be avoided must be as orderly, limited, and predictable as possible. Fortunately, these seem to be the guiding considerations of Russian policy as well as our own. The weakness of Russia's neighbors—the same weakness that opens the door for Russian influence—is a powerful motive for Russian caution. No one in Moscow argues that Russia's interests would be served by the violent dissolution of states on its periphery. Last January's trilateral agreement with the U.S. and Ukraine—which committed Russia to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity—was not the action of a state seeking legal loopholes for expansion, but of one prepared to close them off.

Supporting Russian Self-Restraint

WHERE IT MATTERS most, Russian policy in the "near abroad" has been—and still remains—more

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responsible than the "accepted rules" actually require. Yet over the long run Russian self-restraint needs a more secure foundation than simple fear of instability. Given the turbulence of the "near abroad," there will be times when doing nothing seems to involve bigger risks for Russia than taking action. Whether restraint becomes a broad strategy for dealing with the "near abroad," or turns out to have been only a temporary reaction to uncertainty, depends on how successfully Russia deals with its security interests in general. Two such interests have received special attention from those in the West who consider the expansion of Russian influence inherently dangerous. In each case, the effort to thwart Russian policy now could undermine Russian restraint in the future.

The first is the issue of Ukrainian nuclear weapons. How we view Russia's legitimate interest in keeping Ukraine from becoming a nuclear power obviously depends on how we read Moscow's overall policy toward Kiev. Americans don't want their traditional interest in non-proliferation to be used as one more lever in a Russian campaign to break down Ukraine's sovereignty. But if, as argued here, Russia is making a credible effort to promote stability in the face of Ukrainian policies that tend to weaken it, then the importance Russia attaches to keeping Ukraine non-nuclear looks like simple prudence.

By the same token, the suggestion that the United States should assign a lower priority to the goal of a non-nuclear Ukraine looks like simple short-sightedness. What would it communicate about how we view Moscow's legitimate interests that, when it comes to keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of a government that has pursued as many senseless, self-destructive policies as the Kiev government has, we insist on seeing both sides of the question? Nuclear weapons are highly unlikely to be the insurance policy Ukraine feels it needs against Russian expansionism. Instead, these weapons will keep both states suspended in a permanent confrontation that poses far greater dangers for Ukraine than it does for Russia. Trying to have it both ways on this issue may jeopardize broader American efforts to keep the post-Soviet peace.

A second case in which the West is asked to reveal its view of Russian interests involves the status of the CIS. Moscow has sought UN recognition of the CIS as a regional organization eligible to conduct peacekeeping operations on former Soviet territory. It's easy to make this idea sound extremely ominous, as though the Russians wanted blanket authorization in advance for wide-ranging military actions of which the world community will be informed only after the fact, when their conquests are complete.

The reality is much tamer. To win UN blessing, any deployment of peacekeeping units would still have to be brought, one case at a time, before the Security Council for a vote—basically the same procedure that Russia and other CIS members are now following in trying to get approval for a UN force in Georgia. Publicly, U.S. officials object that the CIS lacks the "clearly defined structures, charters, procedures, regular meetings" needed to win recognition. Privately, they say that within the CIS the Russians are simply too dominant for truly consensual decision-making. For the time being, the organization will have to live with status as UN observers.

Setting a high standard for the CIS to meet is no more than common sense. But doing so should not be a cover for more sweeping, categorical objections to a Russian peacekeeping role of any kind in the "near abroad." Russian troops are far more likely to become the entering wedge for neo-imperialism if they are deployed outside a multilateral framework, without the discipline imposed by Security Council mandates, non-Russian troops and commanders, on-the-ground monitoring, and so forth.

For Russia's democrats, it should be

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added, the idea of imposing international restraints on the military has an appeal that goes beyond foreign policy. As Andrei Kozyrev regularly points out in discussing Russia's security policy, the Soviet Union's legacy included an army and a military-industrial complex with "disproportionate influence." This problem, he says, cannot simply be wished away; it can only be solved by an ongoing transformation of these institutions. Partnership with the West can contribute to this process, particularly in the area of peace-keeping, which will play such a large role in defining Russia's sphere of influence in the "near abroad."

Because Kozyrev was once so vocal in sounding the alarm about what he called the "party of war," his support for expanded peacekeeping has been portrayed as a concession to the neo-imperialists. Certainly his rhetoric sounds different. Two years ago this is how he described the dangers of "playing at patriotism:"

> Democracy at home and national-communist methods abroad are incompatible. Trying to combine them...will lead to the uncontrollability of the power structures—the army and state security—which will sooner or later throw off their unnecessary, bothersome, democratic shell.[8]

Rhetorical differences aside, however, the problem that Kozyrev was wrestling with in the past is the same one he wrestles with today. How can Russian foreign policy be kept free of the "national-communist methods" of Soviet-era institutions? His argument comes to this: Russia will have a sphere of influence in the "near abroad" no matter what, and "national-communist" institutions will seek to play a role in maintaining that sphere. But this need not be an opening for a "national communist" revival—if, that is, multilateral cooperation can help to hem these institutions in and bring them under democratic control.

Democracy and Empire

IT SEEMS A VERY long time ago that Mikhail Gorbachev used to say that the Soviet Union's domestic preoccupations obliged it to pull back from overextension abroad. Yeltsin still echoes the thought when he speaks of the role that foreign policy plays in "guaranteeing favorable conditions for internal development and the continuation of reforms," but overextension is no longer the problem on his mind. Continuing democratization, so goes the current argument, can be assured only by *enhancing* Russia's place in world affairs. "To agree to a minor or subordinate role," Kozyrev insists, in an appeal for Western understanding, "would be both unjustifiable and politically dangerous."[9]

How should we react to this fundamental change in the connection between Russian politics and foreign policy? Skepticism is understandable. Henry Kissinger rightly points out the family resemblance between today's arguments about embattled reformers and yesterday's imagined doves-in-the-Politburo. By worrying so much about the harm that our policies could do to their politics, he says, the administration has "elevated the radical critique of Cold War policies into the operational premises of contemporary American foreign policy."[10] For Kissinger, Russian anxieties about diminished international status cannot be the basis for a sensible calculation of American interests; he considers the attempt to minister to the inner needs of adversaries an absurd and unworkable "psychiatric school" of diplomacy.

These are forceful points, but they can hardly persuade us to ignore the domestic backdrop of Russian policy. The collapse of

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[8] *Izvestiya*, July 1, 1992, p. 3.

[9] "Russia and the U.S.: The Partnership is not Premature, but a Little Late," *Izvestiya* March 11, 1994.

[10] "Be Realistic About Russia," p. A19.

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the Soviet dictatorship means that Russian politics has acquired a genuine strategic significance for the West. We know that the domestic debate about Russia's course involves fundamentally different alternatives, and we don't have to rely on scholarly or journalistic conjecture to know what is going on. We know who is on what side. They say so daily, publicly. Given how much we know about Russian politics, it would be unthinkable to formulate U.S. policy without reference to how it affects the transformation that has done more to improve our strategic situation than any event of the last half century.

The crucial question, then, is not whether we take the connection between domestic and foreign policy into account, but what the true connection is. Brzezinski and others suggest that Russian democrats may simply be wrong in thinking that a more assertive foreign policy will help them prevail at home. The only result of legitimizing nationalist sentiment will be to delegitimize themselves. If so, we can ignore their appeals with a clearer conscience. For it is the democrats themselves who, by flirting with neo-imperialism, are putting their revolution in jeopardy.

There is no doubting the rhetorical force of this case. It is both morally satisfying (compromises of principle don't succeed), and seemingly disinterested (the Russians, alas, don't understand what's good for them). But is it true?

In its extreme form, the argument can hardly be questioned.[11] Who would deny that an all-out war of conquest to regain uncontested sway over the entire territory of the USSR would have very negative repercussions within Russia proper? It would be hard for Russia to maintain its imperial dominion without limiting the political rights of the large non-Russian populations of the former Soviet Union (except in dealing with that rare modern phenomenon, the nation without nationalism; Belarus may turn out to be one of these). Free elections, freedom of the press, freedom of association, all the elements of free government would be put in question, first in these new areas, and eventually in Russia itself. This would be bad for Russia's neighbors, bad for Russia, and bad for us.

The question is not whether this extreme case is plausible, but how much it tells us about non-extreme cases. Is it, for example, any more relevant than the exact opposite point of view, which warns us (also correctly) that democratic government can not survive if it is held responsible for unending national humiliation and defeat?

As these formulations suggest, the most meaningful cases aren't the extreme ones at all, but those in the middle. Some concessions to nationalist sentiment strengthen democratic institutions; others can start one down a slippery slope of dangerous and violent chauvinism that will put democracy in jeopardy. Which of these middle cases is likely to fit Russia best?

Short of forcible re-incorporation of substantial amounts of former Soviet territory with hostile indigenous populations, it is hard to imagine any significant internal consequences from a Russian sphere of influence in the "near abroad." Is there a real threat to democracy in, say, Russian acquisition of treaty rights to military bases in Azerbaijan and Georgia, or in the effort of Russian oil companies to acquire large holdings in the Caspian Sea and refineries in Ukraine, or even in the involvement of Russian troops in a long, nasty, pointless civil war in Tadjikistan?

These may all be undesirable developments, but we should worry about, and

[11]In fact, history raises some doubts about even the extreme formulation. Both Britain and France acquired and extended their overseas empires at the very time that they were becoming more democratic at home.

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object to, them on grounds other than the damage they do to popular government. If we lecture the Russians about some implausible threat to democracy, our influence on them will be less: they will think we simply do not understand the situation or have an ulterior motive. (And sometimes we will: there is no reason to be embarrassed that U.S. oil companies also want a piece of the action in the Caspian, and equally little reason to pretend that something more important than money rides on the result.)

If Russia is able to put together some kind of sphere of influence across most of the territory of the former USSR—and if that is all it does—the impact on Russian domestic politics will prove to be relatively minor. Some of the effects may even turn out to be positive. For example, stable relations between Russia and the "near abroad" are likely to keep the homeward migration of ethnic Russians slower than it would be if these relations were confrontational and Russian minorities were seen as a fifth column. A slower flow of immigrants will mean a smaller bloc of voters with a grudge against Russian democracy.[12]

The closer one looks, the more varied and complicated the connections between Russian foreign and domestic politics look—too complicated, perhaps, to provide a precise justification for any individual policy decision. But they do provide an indispensable basis for understanding Russia's strategic direction. They enable us to distinguish between policies that embody a basic challenge to our interests and those that do not threaten us even though they reflect a style unlike our own.

There is nothing new about this distinction. Almost thirty years ago, after all, when many U.S. policymakers considered Charles de Gaulle a malicious wrecker of the Atlantic alliance, it was a brilliant analysis by Henry Kissinger that explained the historical and, yes, psychological origins of French policy—the better to persuade our own policymakers that they were dealing not with a foe, but with a friend who, for compelling historical reasons, happened to see the world differently. Kissinger described a French national identity crisis in terms astonishingly similar to today's debate about Russia. Here, he wrote, was a "country with frontiers that correspond to no historical experience;" its "inward security" and "faith in itself" had been shaken by wars and domestic upheavals; and out of this "spiritual malaise" came policies that "may seem disingenuous and cynical to many Americans."[13]

Nothing would have been more beside the point than to dismiss this penetrating, subtle portrait of de Gaulle as "psychiatry." It was realism of the highest order, not least because Kissinger saw through what he called de Gaulle's "illusionism." That is, the attempt to reclaim French grandeur was more a matter of bold assertion than true power. It did not threaten U.S. interests. To the contrary, it helped France make the transition from the absurd dreams of military self-sufficiency that had produced such calamitous results in the inter-war period. This, for all its national and cultural peculiarities, is the transition that Russia is struggling to make in the 1990s. □

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[12]No matter what the size of the refugee bloc, they need to feel that their government stood up for them. After World War II the millions of West Germans who had been driven from their homes in Eastern Europe did not disrupt German democratic development because they approved of the Bonn government's tough policies toward the Soviet bloc.

[13]*The Troubled Partnership* (Anchor, 1965), esp. pp. 24-5, 42-5, 62.

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A Disaster in the Making

Rational Choice and Asian Studies

Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn

IN A RECENT book published by Harvard University Press, the professor of Japanese politics at Yale and the professor of Japanese law at Chicago intend to enlighten us about Japanese politics by applying what is called "rational-choice theory" to Japan.[1] The two authors, whose chief qualification for this task seems to be that they were both raised as children in Japan, get off to a rocky start. In order to illustrate the distinction between principals and agents in their theory—bosses and underlings in plain language—they invoke the "rational choices" made by Chinese coolies pulling barges through the Yangtze River gorges. They offer the explanation that, "Acting collectively as principals, the coolies hired supervisors with whips to prevent each other from free riding."

It evidently never crossed the minds of these savants of coolie motivation that their conclusion is so preposterous that it could be established (if at all) only empirically—by some on-the-spot discovery of a hitherto unknown guild of Chinese masochists. The idea that the coolies paid supervisors to whip them is not one that can be established deductively from theory. What is needed is evidence. Did the coolies actually have a choice, or were they perhaps members of a prison gang? Where and how did they hire their tormentors? Worthless research in academic political science is not new, but in the face of stern competition this seems to establish a new low. The question is, why has it become so popular in academia just now? And why is Japan one of the premier targets of this latest fad?

From Behaviorism to Rational Choice

THE STUDY OF the American political system has often shaped the theoretical orientation of political science as a whole, and behaviorism was the first great postwar fad to sweep American political studies. Behaviorism dominated the field in the 1950s and 1960s. It was supposed to be "truly scientific"—derived from psychology (then thought to be more scientific than it is today)—and dealt in surveys of public opinion and analyses of voters' characterological propensities and attitudes. Political outcomes were said to be determined by the psychological make-up of individuals. Voters selected candidates because they identified with them, legislators found satisfaction from serving as

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[1] J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, *Japan's Political Marketplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

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delegates, strong leaders were compensating for childhoods with cold fathers, and beliefs in neutrality governed bureaucratic behavior. To the extent that institutions mattered at all, they were backdrops against which the real dramas were played.

Rational choice began to eclipse behaviorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Instead of looking to psychology, these new theorists took their cue from economists in simplifying the motivations of political actors. Now behavior became a matter of how one calculated expected gains and losses. Voters selected candidates who could deliver the best deals, but they would not vote at all if they could not calculate a return. Legislators behaved in ways reckoned to promote their reelection. Bureaucrats followed rules because they feared the consequences of punishment if they went beyond the wishes of their political masters.

Far from moving beyond behaviorism, this sort of rational choice thinking merely pared down human motivations to the most simplistic notions of gain and loss. Such assumptions about human behavior have been useful, if not always accurate, when focused around issues of money and investment. They are far less trustworthy when used to explain the complex realm of political behavior. Voters, legislators, and bureaucrats draw on a rich palette of emotions and motivations ranging from self-aggrandizement, revenge, fear, altruism, indifference, ethics, and loyalty, to name but a few.

Rational choice theory seeks explicitly to replace the concept of "culture" with "a core set of *human* interests and beliefs that constitutes the basis for much behavior [and] around which cultural variations rotate."[2] This assumption allows the rational choicer to suggest that "it *is* legitimate to apply the concept of individual rationality cross-culturally, and that it is reasonable for social scientists to postulate that many social phenomena may be understood as the aggregate consequence of individuals acting out of a prudent regard for self- or family-welfare."[3] But what rational choice theorists do not do is acknowledge that rather than going beyond culture, they are actually overgeneralizing their own culture, that of the Anglo-American "West," much as Marx before them overgeneralized the histories of France and Germany.

They are also blind to the ideological implications of their overgeneralization: differences between Japan and the United States—such as an economy that saves one-fifth of national income versus one that hardly saves at all—now disappear in a blur of universal human striving. This emphasis is quite useful to beleaguered establishments in the more permissive economy trying to gloss over the remarkable differences in economic performance between Japan and the United States. We return to this topic below, since it is central to an explanation of the great interest in rational choice theory in the United States but nowhere else. Generally speaking, people who are aware of cultural differences between a country such as Japan, with a tradition of eight centuries of feudalism, and one with a total absence of feudalism, such as the United States, find rational choice's substitute for culture a *reductio ad absurdum*. The lack of a heritage of feudalism was, after all, the key to understanding American democracy in the classics of writers on "American exceptionalism" from Tocqueville to Louis Hartz.[4]

Rational choice theory was not a break with behaviorism, just an attempt to stream-

[2]Daniel Little, "Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, February 1991, p. 41.

[3]Ibid., p. 42.

[4]Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955). Cf. Albert O. Hirschman, "America, Or The Perils of not Having a Feudal Past," in *Rival Views of Market Society* (New York: Viking, 1986), pp. 132-35.

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line its application. But streamlined behaviorism proved to be too simplistic. It needed more substance. The answer was to bounce rational choice ideas against the role of institutions. Institutions, we are now told, are not organizations developed over a long time and infused with social meaning. They are simply the "rules of the game" which affect the preferences of players in the political system. The rules guide the game, and the players seek to manipulate the rules to their own advantage. But where do these rules come from? For rational choice theory to work (that is, for rational choice to constitute the chief engine that drives the system), it is necessary to show that individuals and groups somehow choose the rules under which they operate. So it is said that the choice is governed by the goals individuals and groups wish to attain. Power can also be delegated to others who will make these decisions for them.

Sports analogies are particularly popular with rational choice theorists. Institutions—that is, rules—regulate the political game. Various teams—politicians, voters, interest groups, bureaucrats—manipulate the rules so they can win the game. Rational choice thus simplifies institutions in the same way that it simplifies behaviorism. Institutions, or the rules of the game, become just the sum total of many individual preferences. Institutions have no life of their own but simply exist to channel behavior in ways consistent with individual preferences. This view of institutions extends behaviorism beyond the individual but it also perpetuates the greatest shortcoming of economics—the inability to understand the internal life of the social organizations through which all economic and political decisions must pass.

Trivial and False

SUCH A PICTURE of political processes, though without nuance, might have some validity in societies where choice and political markets are comparatively open and well regulated. It is less convincing when applied to settings where choice is dangerous, perhaps even revolutionary, or where the rules are imposed from above or from outside the system. What is the point of falsifying history by suggesting that the Japanese people somehow "delegated" to General MacArthur the writing of their constitution?[5] When did the Japanese people "choose" to pay the highest consumer prices among all G-7 nations as a result of inordinate amounts of state regulation, and when and how did they decide that this was in their best interests? According to rational choice theory, these situations exist because the individuals and groups affected have calculated, however imperfectly, a superior set of benefits from this arrangement. All a researcher therefore needs to do is figure out the relationships that make this possible, and desirable, for everyone involved. Not only are such studies completely ahistorical but they can tell us little about why and how these systems change.

The hostility to history points to another characteristic of rational choice theory when applied to Japan: an arrogant disregard of Japanese scholarship about Japan that borders on academic malpractice. Thus, for example, McCubbins and Noble, two prominent writers on rational choice theory—the one a specialist on the U.S. Congress, the other an assistant professor of Japanese politics—tell us,

> The Ministry of Finance is clearly a crucial player in the budgetary system, but it does not act on its own and it is not free to follow its own objectives at the expense of the goals of the ruling party, whether particularistic or collective. It is the LDP [the Liberal Democratic Party, which reigned in Japan from 1955 to 1993] that has the constitutional

[5]This point is well made by David Arase in *Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan's Foreign Aid* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

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authority and the electoral incentive to govern budget making."[6]

This assertion is both trivial and false. It is trivial in that, of course, the ministry does not act in a vacuum. It is false in that the ministry was creating budgets for seventy-five years before the LDP came into existence and continued to do so throughout the long years of the LDP majorities in the Diet. It did so in such a way that the nation always gave priority to producers' interests over those of consumers. Even so convinced a practitioner of rational choice theory as Frances Rosenbluth acknowledges that "There are many consumer needs, such as yields on savings, which neither the LDP nor the opposition parties have addressed."[7] After the collapse in 1989 of the LDP majority in the upper house and in 1993 in the lower house, the Ministry of Finance was still vetoing governmental expenditures to lift the economy out of recession that it considered fiscally unsound. This tension between a powerful bureaucracy and a weak party system is one of the main features of Japanese politics at the present time. It is what political science needs to explain, rather than asserting that all power flows from the voters to their elected representatives, and that these representatives in turn control the bureaucrats.

The more sophisticated rational choice theorists, such as Douglass North, recognize that despite their assumptions of rational behavior, outcomes are often far from optimal and can frequently be harmful to those who chose them.[8] Attempts to make rational decisions can produce irrational outcomes. Here rational choice theorists again fall back on economics and introduce the notions of imperfect information, transaction costs, and multiple equilibriums. In other words, no matter how sincerely people try to calculate their potential gains and losses when making decisions, information shortages or costs hamstring their best efforts.

For the theory to work, however, it must explain not only how players end up with inaccurate, subjective models of the world, but also how these models in turn affect other players. And in explaining political behavior, it must take into account such additional factors as coalition complexity, disputed preferences, incomplete information, transaction costs, contradictory motivations, economic limitations, the weight and drag of previous institutional arrangements, opposition parties, international factors, and social and cultural limitations. Perhaps this is not impossible, but it is difficult to find a rational choice argument that meets these requirements. Instead, dubious or clearly false assumptions are usually made to keep the model afloat, or worse, facts are massaged or tendentiously restated.

Despite these shortcomings, rational choice theory is increasingly popular in area studies because it exempts scholars from the cost and difficulty of language study and the carrying out of in-depth empirical field research. Researchers arrive in Japan or China with their analytical engine as part of their baggage, their chief mission being to feed the engine the evidence it needs. Accuracy is usually the first casualty, as facts are bent and history ignored to retain the integrity of the model. For example, a common rational-choice understanding of American bureaucracy is that it gains power from playing one political party off against the other. When transposed to Japan, where

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[6]Matthew D. McCubbins and Gregory W. Noble, "Equilibrium Behavior and the Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget Process in the U.S. and Japan," in Peter Cowhey and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., *Structure and Policy in the U.S. and Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[7]Frances McCall Rosenbluth, *Financial Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 12.

[8]Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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the Liberal Democratic Party held power for 38 years, the same concept would lead us to conclude that the bureaucracy must be weaker than in the United States. After all, the Japanese bureaucracy has not had the advantage of playing off alternating parties in power against each other. This is, in fact, the conclusion reached by Ramseyer and Rosenbluth in their book *Japan's Political Marketplace*.[9] It is an absurd notion, based on an ahistorical understanding of Japan that flies in the face of even the most rudimentary understanding of Japanese politics. It is easier to believe that Chinese coolies paid supervisors to whip them than that Japanese bureaucrats have less power than American ones.

When applied to other cultures rational choice is not merely often wrong but it also tells us surprisingly little about the subjects it purports to study. Its simplification of human behavior, inability to conceive of institutions as anything more than rules that are extensions of behaviorism, and its total lack of interest in culture and social meaning suggest that political scientists have adopted some of the worst tendencies of economists. Even economists have been surprised by this situation. Albert O. Hirschman, over thirty years ago, observed that economists were taking over large portions of the political science discipline, and that the needless inferiority complex of political scientists was making this possible. Moreover, he noted that political scientists had shown themselves "quite eager to be colonized and have often joined the invaders."[10] Rational choice is perhaps the clearest example of this. The only people who are sanguine are those promoting rational choice—for example, Mancur Olsen, who argues that "no natural divisions separate economics and the other social sciences; all of them deal with one seamless reality"—and those who profit from it by pretending to a spurious scientificity.[11]

All of this may strike the reader as "purely academic," but as Gertrude Himmelfarb has pointed out,

> We all pay lip service to the adage 'Ideas have consequences,' but it is only in extremis that we take it seriously, when the ideas of Stalin or Hitler issue in the realities of gulags and death camps....Well short of such dire situations there is an intimate, pervasive relationship between what happens in our schools and universities, in the intellectual and artistic communities, and what happens in society and the polity.[12]

In the case of rational choice theory, it cuts to the core of expertise a government can draw on to design effective international policies in the post-Cold War world. Rational choice is increasingly used in area studies to churn out quick dissertations or journal articles by nervous academics in search of jobs or tenure. This careerism helps to control the research agenda and also helps to keep rational choice popular. Truly important and difficult questions fall by the wayside. As a result, our knowledge about Asia, home to the most dynamic economies and societies in the world, is eroding as it falls into the hands of individuals with weak groundings or interest in empiricism.

We are in danger of producing a generation of specialists who will systematically misunderstand and misinterpret the most important event of the late twentieth century—the enrichment and empowerment of Asia. Even

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[9]"The LDP's control over the Japanese bureaucracy should be stronger than that which Congress exercises over American agencies." Op. cit., p. 110.

[10]Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 19.

[11]Mancur Olsen, "Toward A Unified View of Economics and the Other Social Sciences," in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 213.

[12]Gertrude Himmelfarb, *On Looking into the Abyss* (New York: Knopf, 1994), p. xii.

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a well-informed use of rational choice theory has a strong bias toward equilibrium. Yet the one overriding characteristic of the post-Cold War world is the breakdown of equilibrium in international, regional, and even domestic affairs. It is tragic that rational choice theory should become so popular at precisely the time it is least appropriate.

Calling rational choice a theory at all is probably a misnomer since it does not pretend to predictive power. It is primarily a classification system which orders past events into patterns. Once a pattern changes, rational choice has nothing to tell us until a new equilibrium is established. Yet it is precisely the experience of disequilibrium with which political science should be concerned, especially in the post-Cold War world.

Political science would do us all a favor if it would come clean. Economists did this decades ago by accepting the difference between the "real economy" and the theories they use to model the real economy. There are economists who do empirical work, but they generally occupy a separate subfield within the discipline. Political science now needs to adopt the same approach. There is nothing wrong with theoretical flights of fancy. They may be entertaining and stimulating. But they are also dangerous when they attempt to pass themselves off as factual. Students, policymakers, and the general public should be forewarned about the differences.

American Triumphalism

DURING AND following World War II, the United States developed a need for accurate information about parts of the world that were thought to be exotic from an Anglo-American perspective. This was the beginning of area studies. The very exoticism of some of these early forays into regions previously explored only by anthropologists produced some tensions with political theorists, even though what the political theorists purveyed was often ideology masquerading as theory. People who did area studies were seldom given the status and respect accorded theorists within the American academy, a situation somewhat comparable to that of the engineers *vis-à-vis* 'pure' scientists. Nonetheless, area studies always held their own for the simple reason that practitioners could say 'I told you so' about some of the greatest disasters of postwar American foreign policy: the failure to understand the nationalistic origins and therefore success of the Chinese communist revolution, the failure of bombing and high-tech interdiction to halt a guerrilla war in Vietnam, and the misunderstanding of the Shah's "white revolution" in Iran or of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

The latest example of the common American failing of trusting theory divorced from context may well be Jeffrey Sachs' band of free-market shock-therapists in Russia. They have foisted off on the former Soviet Union a model of capitalism so inappropriate that the movement toward democracy has been undercut. Boris Yeltsin is being discredited, Vladimir Zhirinovsky is advancing on an ultranationalist platform, and many Russians are nostalgic for Lenin. That is truly and spectacularly snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

What is new today is that the competition between theory and area studies has come to an end—with the virtual defeat of the latter. In almost all graduate programs in economics and political science, doctoral students must force the data they have collected from non-Western civilizations into theoretical frameworks, such as rational choice, generated to explain American conditions. Most of their professors of international political economy know less about the world beyond North America than do the students themselves. University committees designed to maintain quality control are staffed by professors with similar area qualifications ("They flew over the country during daylight," as their graduate students put it), and promotion is based on the quantity and heft of "papers" produced and the amount of external funds attracted. Virtually all doctor-

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al programs in economics and political science are abandoning the requirement of one or more foreign languages in favor of mathematics and computerology.

Commenting on a student protest against this trend at a graduate school of the University of California, Michael Lehmann writes that he is "disappointed to see that another discipline has succumbed to the kind of theoretical orthodoxy that now prevails in Economics. I have never understood how a timeless, non-historical analysis that removes itself from technological, institutional, and other social developments can be employed to discern the course of human events. Nor can I fathom the ideological orthodoxy that insists on such a path to the exclusion of others."[13]

This ideological orthodoxy is almost surely one of the less pleasant, unintended consequences of the end of the Cold War and Americans' perception that they "won" it. From Francis Fukuyama's attempt to enlist Hegel in support of the victory of capitalist consumerism to presidential prattling about America as a "unipolar superpower," Americans are full of their own hegemonic triumph.

The root assumption of rational choice theory has always been American economic individualism, which in practical terms translates into the belief that all human beings would behave like little Americans if only someone or something were not preventing them from doing so. The end of the Cold War and the patent desire of many people in the Eurasian communist countries to join the "West" lent powerful support to this point of view. In this contest, rational choice theory became not just the tool of "poli-sci" pedants but part of the explanation for the U.S.'s victory in its forty-year struggle with Leninism—and, therefore, of the way events are destined to move from here on. But, if the rest of the world is evolving to look like the democratic capitalism of the United States, then there is no longer any transcendent strategic reason for Americans to know anything about "the rest." American scholars need only continue to perfect mathematical proofs of the correctness and inevitability of the American "rules of the game."

The Japanese Problem

IN AN IMPORTANT new book, David Williams notes that,

> The economist committed to positivism believes that he already knows how Japanese society behaves in the economic sphere because it is exactly the same way that profit-maximizing individuals behave everywhere. This situation could not be otherwise, because if Japan were different then universal positive laws would not be universal. It follows also that the need to learn the Japanese language will not be strongly felt by the modern economist because, aside from the raw data, knowing Japanese has, by definition, no substantive implications for the working of positive laws.[14]

The problem is that these "universal positive laws" do not work in Japan—and this is more than just a puzzle or a glitch. Japan appears increasingly to be what science calls a true anomaly, which means that what is taught as economic science and rational choice theory in American universities is itself culture-bound. And that thought is extremely threatening to non-Japanese-reading tenured professors of international political economy faced with the alternatives of retooling or early retirement.

Until very recently the American political establishment handled the Japanese anomaly by ignoring it. During the Bush administration's Congressional hearings to name a new director of Central Intelligence, for example, the senators spent a great deal of time discussing who shot the Pope, who

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[13]Letter of Professor Michael B. Lehmann, Department of Economics, University of San Francisco, dated March 11, 1994, [used with permission].

[14]David Williams, *Japan: Beyond the End of History* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 87.

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invented the concept of the "evil empire" (referring to the former USSR and its satellites, not *The Empire Strikes Back*) and what life was like in post-Sandinista Nicaragua. However, they scrupulously avoided mentioning the world's second economy, one the size of two Germanys, the first in history to produce a $100 billion trade surplus, and one that already wields considerable techno-nationalist and financial leverage over the United States. One reason why Congress shies away from this subject is that Japan is adept at manipulating such discussions—through inducements (such as investments in a particular state) or penalties (by calling "racist" any American criticism of Japanese behavior). But the main reason why American officialdom is loathe to discuss Japan's achievements is that if these were taken seriously, they would be a mortal threat to American explanations of their own Cold War victory.

As time goes on it is becoming much harder to ignore Japan. There are still almost no well-rounded university programs devoted to Japan comparable to those once designed to monitor and analyze the former USSR and the People's Republic of China. It remains a source of mystery why a president elected on a platform of economic reform has failed to appoint even one high-ranking official in his administration with the basic requirements for dealing with the nation's main economic competitor and the source, once imports from Japan's overseas factories are added in, of virtually one hundred percent of our trade deficit. President Clinton's ambassador to Japan, trade representative, NSC staff, assistant secretaries of state and treasury for East Asia, and economic advisors are all on-the-job trainees as far as Japan is concerned.

The minimum requirements for trying to understand a country 1,500 years older than the United States are that a person study it, that he or she have experience working there, and that he or she be able to accurately read articles written in contemporary Japanese periodicals. Japan is now too big and its ascendancy in the Pacific and the world too irreversible to continue the tradition of neglect. Therefore, American social science can no longer marginalize the study of Japan. But it can try to decontaminate it. As James Fallows points out in his perceptive book *Looking at the Sun*, "It is difficult to look directly at the sun, so we turn away, view it obliquely, look at the shadows it casts. It has been difficult for Westerners, especially Americans, to think directly about the economic power that has spread to the rest of Asia from Japan."[15]

This is why rational choice theory has become such a fad. In Japan, the state is an active participant in the economy. The Japanese people are both trained in and comfortable with the thought that the group takes precedence over the individual. Japan has demonstrated that economic nationalism and neo-mercantilism both work as national policies and can produce results undreamed of in the theories of Anglo-American economists. And on the key political question, 'Where does power lie in the Japanese polity?' Japan provides an answer that seriously undercuts Western notions that the society must legitimate the state instead of vice-versa. These are serious anomalies for a theory that purports to be universally valid, and they occur in non-trivial forms in an important country. Rational choice theory in this context becomes something considerably more than a mere "tool" of analysis: it becomes a talisman to ward off heresy.

As Ramseyer and Rosenbluth put it, "It is our purpose to demonstrate that standard choice-theoretic principles explain the dominant patterns of Japanese political life. The principles are not those intended to explain Japan. Indeed, they were not invented to explain any particular society. But that is our point."[16] However, if one did encounter a society that contradicted "standard choice-theoretic principles"—which is a common

[15]James Fallows, *Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and Political System* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), p. 19.

[16]Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, p. 15.

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experience of area specialists—then the choice-theoretic principles would no longer be universally valid. They would also no longer even be rational except in a particular cultural context.

Rational choice theory is unable to provide the demonstration that Ramseyer and Rosenbluth promise. In order to hold the theory together at all, the authors are forced to invent hitherto unknown practices as alleged features of Japanese life, much as they invented the coolies who hired people to whip them. For example, they invent a practice which they say elected politicians use to control officials of the state bureaucracy. "Party leaders," they write, "require all elite bureaucrats to post large portions of their lifetime earnings as bonds. The bureaucrats then receive these amounts only if they perform satisfactorily during their tenure at the ministry."[17] What they apparently mean by this is that bureaucrats will not advance to senior positions in their ministries or obtain lucrative post-retirement jobs unless they do the bidding of LDP politicians. (With the fall of the LDP it is of course no longer clear who might be controlling the bureaucrats; and it is our personal—non-rational choice—opinion that the bureaucrats are, as always, doing their own thing.)

Bureaucrats in Japan have *never* been very responsive or beholden to the nation's elected representatives. And their post-bureaucratic careers depend more on the connections they have been able to forge with large corporations and 'old-boy' networks of their former colleagues than with politicians. Whereas American senior bureaucrats enter government service from the private sector, in Japan the pattern is reversed. This is one reason why the bond between big business and the bureaucracy is so tight—and why the Japanese government does not need to issue rules and regulations to get big business to do its bidding.

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth actually know these things. They are trying to eliminate disturbing Japanese facts before they can undermine American pretensions. They know that whereas an American president can name somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 high government officials, a Japanese prime minister can name only about twenty. The Japanese nominees are the ministers and directors of various agencies, and a majority of them must be elected members of the Diet. It is no easier for a Japanese prime minister to fire a career official than it was for Harry Truman to fire General MacArthur—and such things happen much less frequently in Japan than in the United States.

One wonders whether Samuel Kernell also knows these things. He is an academic writer on the American presidency. He can neither read Japanese nor do research on Japanese politics. Nonetheless, in a collection of articles that he put together for the Brookings Institution, Kernell rejects the conclusions of virtually all previous writers on modern Japanese politics, including some of the Japanese scholars who contributed to his own volume. "The Japanese miracle," he writes, "has occurred in the sectors of the economy where the government has remained relatively uninvolved." More importantly, "This is not surprising news for anyone who has even a cursory familiarity with American politics."[18] It is, however, totally without foundation for those with even a cursory familiarity with Japanese politics, and it is a dangerous assumption that deludes Americans about their place in a post-Cold War world.

Time is running out for the United States to craft an empirically sound policy for living with and balancing the power of Japan. One of the first steps in doing so is to come to grips with Japan intellectually and begin to staff the American government with competent people. Unfortunately, at the present time American universities are part of the problem rather than the solution. □

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[17]Ibid., p. 13

[18]Samuel Kernell, ed., *Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991), pp. 326, 328.

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An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations

Four reactions to Richard H. Kohn's article in our Spring 1994 issue, together with a response from the author.

Colin Powell:

OF ALL THE problems facing the nation, a crisis in civil-military relations is not one of them and things are not out of control.

Mr. Kohn lays major responsibility for this non-crisis at my door step. I trust Mr. Kohn and the Republic are sleeping more soundly now that I have retired. I note that, to keep the pot boiling, in his last paragraph he takes a minor swipe at General Shalikashvili by an anonymous source.

I can assure your readers that Presidents Bush and Clinton, and Secretaries Cheney and Aspin, exercised solid, unmistakable civilian control over the Armed Forces and especially me. That's the way it should be and was. My activities as Chairman were always taken with the prior knowledge of my civilian leaders. It was not lost on me that Mr. Cheney had shown he knew how to fire generals. Mr. Aspin showed he could reject my recommendations because of broader issues he had to consider.

A more balanced article might have noted that both Presidents Bush and Clinton expressed satisfaction with the manner in which I provided my advice. By the way, it should be noted that President Clinton has been receiving rave receptions in his recent visits with the troops. Mr. Kohn had better look for another "crisis" with more staying power.

On a factual note, Mr. Kohn was correct in noting that the biography about me by David Roth, *Sacred Honor*, showed me as the copyright holder. It should have occurred to Mr. Kohn that it was an error, since authors usually copyright in their own name. The publisher's error was corrected in the second printing. Mr. Roth holds the copyright on his work. □

General Colin Powell (ret.) was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-1993.

John Lehman:

AFTER DECADES of academic conformity in praise of more centralization in the Pentagon and "reform" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is refreshing to hear common sense from a professor at last. Professor Richard Kohn is full of excellent insight. Civilian control, as the term is generally understood and certainly as it was intended by the Founding Fathers, has been eliminated by years of well-meaning reform legislation, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, drafted almost entirely by military staff officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the committee staffs.

Our early leaders, well-read in historic lessons, feared standing armies. They divided

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military control between the branches and among the states. They purposefully avoided centralizing naval and military forces under one agency, and put the militias under state control. As Justice Brandeis said, "Separation of powers was adopted...not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power...to save the people from autocracy." In their understandable quest for efficiency, the military reformers have consolidated the power previously separated between the military departments, disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service, and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary power in the person of the Chairman.

Reading Rick Atkinson's account of Oval Office decision-making in Desert Storm (*Crusade*, Houghton-Mifflin, 1993), one finds General Powell providing the president not choices but one recommendation, to end the fighting early, leaving Saddam in office. The president could overrule such a unitary military position only at the greatest political peril. It is hard to believe it is the same government, when one recalls the accounts of FDR's famous war councils where he encouraged MacArthur to argue with Marshall, Marshall with King, King with Nimitz. He heard all military perspectives and then made the decision himself. He would never allow himself to be faced with only one military option, and adamantly opposed Marshall's constant efforts to create a Chairman with the powers now enjoyed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of the careful balancing established by the founders to ensure civilian control, all that remains is the important separation of budgetary appropriation from Executive command.

Perhaps the most important dimension of civilian control is our tradition of citizen soldier. The Continental naval captains and privateers were not professional naval officers, nor were Washington and his generals professional soldiers. Our Constitution is imbued with the concept of the minuteman, the citizen soldier, and citizen sailor. Washington held Cincinnatus, the farmer who took up arms to save Rome and then returned to the plow, as his ideal, not Caesar. While the need for small cadres of career professionals was recognized early in the nineteenth century, the bias against large career military forces in peacetime was strengthened by 150 years of practice. The land grant acts, for example, created a *reserve* officer training corps, not a *career* officer training corps. The officers and men of our navy and military were expected to be drawn largely from civilian pursuits for limited terms, assuring a constant leavening of civilian cultural values within the military and in turn carrying back to the civil world a respect for and understanding of military culture.

Twenty years without the draft (good riddance), and with an all-volunteer force whose personnel policy has fallen under the control of the career military staffs, has all but eliminated this dimension of civilian control. With the laudable exception of the "Army College Plan," the recruiters discourage all but long term enlistment options. The *Reserve* Officers Training Corps has been transformed into the *Regular* Officers Training Corps by the introduction of scholarships and regular commission. In recent years Academy classes have been about their wartime highs, leaving virtually no slots for Officer Candidate Schools. The Marines are a notable exception. Those same career staffs have lengthened the minimum active duty required of pilots to nine years from commissioning. There will be no more Bob Lovetts, Jack Kennedys, or George Bushes in the future all-volunteer military. Ask any group of male community leaders over age fifty how many served in the military and eight of ten hands will rise; ask how many have children who served and it will rarely be one or more. Cadets and midshipmen who are children of career military parents are at record highs in Academies. The symptoms are legion. We have created a separate military caste.

While agreeing completely with Professor Kohn's insightful narration of the

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problem, I differ with him in remedies. First, careerism should be greatly reduced and "reservism" greatly expanded in the uniformed services. Second, the service secretaries should be the operating executives through which the secretary of defense exercises civilian control. They alone have line authority over uniformed promotions and assignments, i.e. the carrots and the sticks to which generals and admirals respond. The huge staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is just that, staff, not line, and cannot as such have carrots and sticks. Third, presidents and secretaries of defense should always have differing service perspectives represented in important policy and crisis meetings so that they, the civilians, hear real differences and have real options to choose from. Nothing now prohibits them from including whomever they wish in important councils. No new legislation is needed. What is needed are civilian leaders with the experience, judgment, and leadership to reassert civilian control wisely. □

John Lehman was Secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration. He is currently CEO and chairman of J.F. Lehman and Co.

William Odom:

RICHARD KOHN has discovered what Machiavelli told us long ago, that military affairs are political, both at home and abroad. Does the United States have a problem? Yes, but it is neither as new as Kohn asserts nor as much the military's making as he believes.

The real problem is not "civilian" control. Civilians have created dictatorships as readily as soldiers. The challenge is making the military politically responsible to democratically elected officials, who are responsible to the electorate for failures as well as successes. Do the hundreds of senior civilians in the Department of Defense insure such leadership? Or do they merely increase the number of people playing in the triangular struggle for resources described by Kohn, most of whom escape responsibility?

None of them was elected, and only a handful of the top civilian officials are really known to the president who appoints them. Yet political control depends on presidential appointees who understand the president's agenda, who are "his people," not people of the Defense Department, and who have more competence in military affairs than in turning the defense budget into pork for their friends.

Presidents today have a more difficult time finding such people to put in charge of the military. Eliminating the draft and throwing ROTC out of the leading universities created a new generation of political elites who not only know little about the military but have been encouraged to see it as evil. Do the several incidents Kohn cites of jeering and anti-civilian outbursts in the military ranks reflect only a problem within the uniformed ranks? Or are they symptomatic of political polarization within the larger society?

Kohn's argument supports the latter answer when he speaks of the way both Democrats and Republicans have lined up for and against the military. But he gets his facts and his argument wrong. No Republican president in this century except Reagan increased the defense budget. Every Democrat did, including Jimmy Carter, until Bill Clinton. The huge cut in military spending during and after the Vietnam War (38 percent between 1969 and 1978), which Kohn attributes to the Democrats, was made by Nixon and Ford. And to say that Kennedy and Johnson increased control over the military implies that Eisenhower and Truman had relaxed it. No postwar President had the military under a tighter rein than Eisenhower.

Moreover, he followed General Ridgeway's sound advice on the military aspects of engaging in the Vietnam conflict

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and stayed out. By contrast, McNamara rejected advice from the JCS on Vietnam. The flaw lay in the larger strategic conception that it was more in Washington's interest to contain China in Southeast Asia than in Moscow's. Neither the Democrat, McNamara, nor the Republican, Henry Kissinger, understood that. Here Kohn's larger point is valid: the Democrats have treated the military as the source of bad national strategy in Vietnam and the Republicans have defended the military against the charge. Both might better shift it to McNamara, Rusk, Kissinger, and the presidents they served. President Clinton and many of his aides, as long as they insist that they were "right" about Vietnam while failing to see the error in strategy and refusing to admit that they were misguided in their youthful indignation toward the military, remain incapable of setting things right. And President Bush, by politicizing the Persian Gulf War victory and by the ill-advised use of the military in Somalia, bequeathed the Clinton administration an even greater burden.

As for assertiveness in matters of strategy by General Powell and Admiral Crowe, they do not look exceptional when compared with some of President Lincoln's generals. Moreover, as Kohn admits, senior military leaders have always been subjected to multiple sources of political direction: the Congress and the president—and, he might add, state governors when it comes to funding the National Guard. And it is not obviously a more serious problem today than in the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, it explains why interservice rivalries over roles and missions are unresolvable either by the military or civilians in the Pentagon. Congress will not give up its option to play the services against each other in the budget disputes that cause the rivalries.

Clausewitz insisted that an effective political-military nexus in a nation's "cabinet" government requires not only the military members to understand the political imperatives but also civilian members to understand the military imperatives. More than civilian clothes are needed for the latter duty.

There *is* a problem today. The leaders of the two major parties must de-politicize their approaches to the military. They might also ask whether it is politically healthy for most of the youth who seek political careers to be able to avoid any military experience. The declining number of people with such experience in the Congress and the Executive is indeed worrying.

Kohn could have usefully reviewed the record of one other recent Chairman of the JCS, General John Vessey. Vessey quietly played a strong role but accepted being overruled by his political seniors, e.g., in sending the Marines into Lebanon. Speaking once to a group of newly promoted Army brigadier generals, he said that the American public expects three things of them. First and most important, they must not lose wars. Americans do not like defeat, he warned. Second, they must tell the truth. Americans never forgive generals who are dishonest. Third, Americans tend to prefer "low-key" military leaders.

General Vessey touched the heart of today's problem: who takes the blame for losing wars? Both Democrats and Republicans have tried to escape the blame for flawed strategy. An ethically professional military, responsible for the nation's security, can hardly be blamed for trying to get the strategy right if it is taking all the blame when it goes wrong. With civilian control goes civilian responsibility. Kohn knows that something is wrong, but his solutions are directed at the symptoms, not the ills. □

Lieutenant General William Odom (ret.) is director of national security studies at the Hudson Institute and was director of the National Security Agency from 1985-1988.

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Samuel Huntington:

DOES A CRISIS exist in American civil-military relations? If a crisis is a brief period of great danger and great opportunity, the answer is no. The short-term, immediate problems are not serious enough to be a crisis, and the highly serious underlying problems are too long-term to constitute one. The problems of American civil-military relations are either temporary or profound, but not both. These problems can be ranked in three categories in terms of their increasing degrees of permanence and severity.

First, there is the immediate set of issues stemming from, on the one hand, the coming into office of a president and administration with little experience with and little interest in military affairs and, on the other hand, a military leadership reaping political benefit from winning a war (as the military always does) and headed by an extraordinarily politically skillful Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This juxtaposition led to a series of unfortunate gaffes, slights, misunderstandings, and sheer awkwardnesses, some but not all of which Richard Kohn lays out in his essay. Given the situation, some of these were inevitable, but some could have been avoided. The president would have benefitted if he had brought a highly respected general or flag officer without political ambitions into the White House to serve as an adviser and liaison with the military establishment.

In Colin Powell, on the other hand, the President confronted a military leader who was not only immensely capable but who did not hesitate to speak out both on foreign policy issues and on defense issues such as the place of gays in the military. Powell, of course, also had more experience working in the White House than any other major Clinton White House staffer until David Gergen came aboard. One lesson here is that while it is perfectly appropriate and may be desirable to appoint a military officer as national security adviser (and both Powell and Brent Scowcroft did well in that position), that officer should not then be expected to go back to the forces, separate himself from politics, and perform in a purely military role. Powell could not adjust to the depoliticization in role, and if he could not do so no one else is likely to be able to. The administration should have an easier time with General Shalikashvili.

Second, the advent of the Clinton administration coincided with drastic changes in the international environment, and hence the missions of the American military. Comparable changes in the environment, the American role, and the American military occurred after 1815, 1898, and 1945. Each of these periods also saw increased tensions and uncertainty over the place of the military in American society and its organizations and missions. In each period the military has had to refashion itself to meet new needs. As a result, tensions and conflicts heighten between military and civilians and within the military. Debates occur over national purpose and strategy, military roles and missions, the size of the military establishment, and the functions of civilians and the military. In due course, a more or less satisfactory resolution of these issues is worked out.

The initial years of the Cold War, for instance, were characterized by the creation of new defense agencies and the restructuring of old ones, brutal interservice battles over roles and missions, extensive assumption by victorious commanders of political roles and exercise of political power, intense conflicts between political leaders and some military chiefs, and debates over fundamental national security issues. By 1955 most of these problems had been overcome and military policy and civil-military relations settled into the basic patterns they were to retain through most of the Cold War. The problems of adaptation resulting from the end of the Cold War are at least as great and it will probably take most of the 1990s to work out a new equilibrium.

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The first set of civil-military problems will thus be resolved reasonably quickly by leaders learning and leaders changing. The second will be resolved over time through the workings of the policy-making processes. The third set of problems is much more fundamental and much less susceptible to resolution through changes in people or policy. These problems inhere in the ambiguous and difficult relationship between the American military and American society which has existed since the founding of the Republic. They are becoming more intense as a result of changes in American society.

The classic American approaches to the military, I argued years ago in *The Soldier and the State*, are extirpation or transmutation, that is, to reduce the military to the lowest level possible or to civilianize it. These policies stem from the pervasive liberalism of American society, on the one hand, and the inherent conservatism of the military profession on the other. In recent decades the basic outlook of the military has not changed. The now dominant group in American society, that is, the baby boom generation, however, is more antagonistic to and questioning of the fundamental assumptions of the military approach than any previous generation. At the most basic level, these attitudes, as Charles Moskos has pointed out, question the legitimacy of the nation-state and the use of force to promote the interests of the nation state. The military, however, defines its identity and mission in precisely these terms. Military officers are overall far more conservative in their attitudes than other major groups in American society. These fundamental differences in philosophy underlie such conflicts as those over the place of gays and women in the military and most other issues.

Satisfactory resolution of the immediate and long-term problems of civil-military relations must rest on sound premises.

(1) Despite Professor Kohn's suggestion to the contrary, the political influence of a military establishment is not a function of its size or resources. Military forces that consume a large proportion of a country's GNP may be kept under quite effective civilian control, as with the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, while armies that consume only a small portion of a country's GNP may regularly defy and overthrow civilian governments, as in many Latin American and African countries.

(2) Intense hostility between political leaders and military chiefs is dysfunctional: so also, however, is total harmony. Government and military heads have different functions and hence different perspectives and interests. Some measure of competition and tension between them is natural and even desirable, as it is in legislative-executive relations and labor-management relations.

(3) Military establishments want political leaders to set forth reasonably clear goals and policies. If political leaders fail to do this, chiefs of staff have to make their own assumptions and develop their plans and programs accordingly. Despite Professor Kohn's implied criticism, General Powell did just what he should have done when he formulated a new military strategy for the post-Cold War era. So did the individual services. It is to the great credit of the American military that it did not attempt to perpetuate Cold War strategies and instead took the initiative in attempting to redefine its missions and restructure its forces. It was the top political leadership which failed to adapt rapidly to the changed conditions.

(4) Civil-military relations are less acrimonious to the extent that political and military leaders recognize and accept their different functions and do not attempt to invade each other's turf. The military are always happy to have more resources, but if they have to choose between more resources and more autonomy, they will choose more autonomy. Secretary McNamara had bad relations with the mili-

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tary because he invaded their autonomy, despite the fact that he also substantially increased military budgets.

(5) Professor Kohn criticized Colin Powell for being a "reluctant interventionist who made extraordinary efforts to control his civilian superiors' inclinations to make strategy and move rapidly into combat." Professional military officers, however, are properly hesitant about committing their forces to war. Would Professor Kohn prefer to have fire-breathing, trigger-happy military chiefs goading political leaders into reckless military adventures? In the Gulf conflict Powell and Schwarzkopf behaved just as they should have in warning Bush administration leaders, who were eager for war, of the danger of premature and illprepared action.

Kohn cites my reference in *The Soldier and the State* to a crisis in civil-military relations in the early 1950s. I spoke of a crisis because I doubted whether American liberal society would sustain for long the large professional military establishment needed to counter the Soviet challenge. For forty years, however, American society did do this, and the crisis I feared was avoided. This outcome was the result, on the one hand, of the immense threat which totalitarian communism posed to American liberalism, and, on the other, of President Eisenhower's skill in devising an endurable compromise between the needs of military security and the demands of American society. The needs of military security will be less and different in the coming years, but the demands of American society are likely to be more intolerant and corrosive of military professionalism. Avoiding a future crisis by creating a new civil-military equilibrium is a daunting challenge to political and military leaders. □

Professor Samuel Huntington is director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

Richard H. Kohn responds:

I AGREE WITH MUCH of what Generals Powell and Odom, Secretary Lehman, and Professor Huntington write. None of them offers facts or interpretations that undermine my observations or my argument.

It would be easy to misconstrue my thinking by focusing on the title. "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations" was not my idea, and was reconciled to it only after deciding that "out of control" referred to the relationship between the military and its civilian masters, not the American military as such. The phrase "The Erosion of Civilian Control" would have described my thesis more accurately.

Last year there *was* a crisis (and unlike Professor Huntington I think crises can be multiple and exist at varying levels simultaneously—short and long term, superficial and underlying, temporary and profound), and it may be continuing. One source of it lay in the professional understanding of a large number of our officers: attitudes toward, or ignorance about, civilian control and what it means, on what it rests, how it plays out, and what is proper behavior on the part of the American military. In speaking to officers recently about the article and about several other issues (particularly homosexual service), I have been struck by the depth of the alienation and distrust; the partisanship; the view that the military's role is to preserve American values (in addition to providing for our national defense); the belief that the military is *owed* respect and understanding (and the historical amnesia about traditional American disparagement of the professional military); and the propensity to categorize people and ideas as either "friends," or "enemies."

That said, I agree with many of these officers, and Secretary Lehman, General Odom, and Professor Huntington, that much of the problem resides on the civilian side of the relationship. We must have knowledge-

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able and experienced leadership willing to make or decide upon policy, strategy, and operations (after deciding in each situation the proper division of responsibility between civilian and military). But where are we to get such leadership when our best colleges and universities so neglect the study of war and the military, and abhor ROTC, and when our political leadership will increasingly lack personal or professional experience in military affairs? I agree with Secretary Lehman that we must have strong service secretaries to oversee promotions and assignments in order to prevent our professional military from becoming a self-perpetuating elite; I would disagree with him about the power of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which I believe needs to be strong in order to balance the service staffs and the Joint Staff, now so much more important after the Goldwater-Nichols law. However the reason I did not emphasize the civilian side (and that was purposeful) is that I have little confidence, given past practice, that a remedy will be forthcoming. Civilians come and go in Congress and the Executive Branch; some will be wise, understanding, brave, decisive, and perhaps even disinterested. Many, if history is any guide, will not.

Instead I focused on the military because it is the officer corps that is permanent and provides continuity in the relationship. Like other professions—law, medicine, the clergy, academe—the military must shape its relationship with its clients (or bosses). Our military leadership must be prepared to mentor young officers as well as educate civilian leaders on proper roles and behavior in the civil-military relationship. The military must be prepared to forswear certain actions as it has historically, to act as other professions do—with responsibility and on occasion against its own interest (as lawyers do who try to avoid going to court, or physicians who avoid unnecessary surgery). The military must abandon participation in public debate about foreign and military policy, stop building alliances amongst the public and in Congress for defense spending—and resist the temptation to maneuver in the bureaucracy to achieve its own ends, however commendable. At present, our society, civilian and military, assumes civilian control-without discussing the conditions necessary to sustain it or the forces that might be eroding it.

Now of course I would not have had General Powell do nothing during the policy vacuum of 1989-1990, or have had him, during the Gulf War, goad "political leaders into reckless military adventures" (Professor Huntington's words). What disturbs me in both instances was not his goals, which were commendable, but his methods: that he believed he had to maneuver so circuitously in the bureaucracy in order to perform his duty. My criticism was presented purely to call attention to what seem to me to be troubling trends in the civil-military relationship. To read my article as an attack upon the General, or to conclude that I blame him for these problems, is understandable but erroneous.

Generals Powell and Odom in their letters mistake "prior knowledge" on the part of the civilian leadership, and defense budget levels (rising or falling), with civilian control. Admittedly, as I argued originally, civilian control is indistinct and situational,with no cookbook answers or "school solutions." The proper balance can almost be measured intuitively against historical practice, implications for present or future policy, and judgments about the health of government in this Republic. My point was simply to ask if it is civilian control when the military in effect makes national security policy, however blessed by civilians above; circumscribes the choices for civilians in time of war; speaks publicly as the military on foreign or military policy, sometimes before decisions are reached; or negotiates on an equal basis a major issue about the social composition of the armed forces that has important implications for civilian society. How to achieve a proper balance needs to be discussed pub-

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licly, researched by scholars, and taught in our educational system, civilian and military.

To me one of the most disquieting underlying problems for civilian control is the development of a distinct military community in the United States consisting of the active and reserve military forces, the retired military, communities dependent upon and sympathetic to military viewpoints and values, and portions of industry, labor, government, religious groups, and other major institutions similarly dependent or sympathetic. Such a community is new to our country, the product of the Cold War and, partly, size. (Professor Huntington may be correct that "the political influence of *a* [my emphasis] military establishment is not a function of its size or resources," but I think the political influence of the American military establishment—the one we have had these last forty years—has very much been the product of its size and role in American life.) Insofar as this community possesses a sense of identity, interests, and perspectives separate from the rest of society, and feels abused or alienated, and is willing to speak out or even lash out (as it did last year) as a separate military interest, there is a threat to civilian control. If the active-duty military leadership undertook to lead this community, and it became allied with a political party or faction, then the military could pose a danger to the American government.

Fortunately, this has rarely, if ever, happened. Our military community retains enough diversity of perspective and is so committed in its loyalties to our form of government, and the belief in civilian control as a foundation of American liberty so pervades our society, that a direct challenge is all but inconceivable. At the end of my article I suggested that our system is self-correcting. With time this community will probably shrink in influence as it does in size, as we go through the transformation in our national security policies and institutions that Professor Huntington notes is occurring, and the country shifts its attention more to domestic concerns. But if civilian control is a process, as I argued, that depends for its measure on the relative weight of military influence at any given time or situation, then we ought ever to err on the conservative side (and my views on civilian control are conservative in every sense of that word). We ought to remember President Eisenhower's warning. "We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together." □

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Taylor-Made History

Gertrude Himmelfarb

PARADOXICAL, perverse, contrary, unconventional, A. J. P. Taylor is a biographer's dream. The oddities of his personal life are fascinating, if not always edifying: his three unconventional marriages (he continued to live part-time with his first wife while married to his second and third wives); his first wife's affairs, which bore an uncanny resemblance to those of his mother, and which he, like his father before him, tolerated; his attitude toward money (charging his friends interest on loans, and indignantly protesting, when his wife continued to give money to Dylan Thomas with whom she was enamored, that he "might have stood for anything else, but breaking one's word over money went against my deepest principles—the sanctity of contract"); his relish for the good things of life while representing himself as a "man of the people" (the familiar "thinking left and living right" phenomenon); his yearning for the social and academic distinctions that he ostensibly scorned; his professing an enduring love for the North of England where he was born and brought up, while fleeing at the first opportunity to Oxford and London; his sycophantish relationship to Lord Beaverbrook, to the dismay of his friends (and to his own considerable advantage); his comments about himself and his associates, which were clever, engaging, sometimes self-deprecating, more often acerbic, mean-spirited, and self-aggrandizing. All of this makes for a very good read.[1]

Or there is the matter of Taylor's war service. During the period of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, he was less than enthusiastic about the war. At one point, when the Soviet Union attacked Finland and it seemed that Britain and France might go to Finland's aid, he contemplated "the duty of war resistance." Only after Hitler invaded Russia, and England, much to his surprise, became an ally of Russia, did he become a supporter of the war. But even then he cheerfully acquiesced when the university certified his work as being of national importance, thus exempting him from military service. He later claimed that this had been done without his knowledge, but he certainly offered no objection to it; nor did he volunteer for service, as many of the other Fellows of his college did. In his autobiography, he was blithely unapologetic. "As I should have made a poor soldier, I do not think there was anything to be ashamed of about this."

Gertrude Himmelfarb's most recent book is *On Looking Into the Abyss* (Knopf, 1994).

[1]Adam Sisman, *A. J. P. Taylor: A Biography* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994, 468pp.). An even better read is Taylor's autobiography, *A Personal History*, published in 1983, which is remarkably candid (except for the story of his second marriage which his second wife insisted upon suppressing).

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He had, in fact, "a good war," although not in the sense in which that expression is generally used in England—a war in which one performed honorably or courageously; rather in the mundane sense of a war that involved minimal danger or even discomfort. He did a brief stint in the Home Guard, lectured to the troops and civilians (which gave him unlimited supplies of petrol), tended his garden (literally, thus providing him and his family with abundant food), rented a room in London which made it easier to frequent the theater, concerts, parties, and, as he said in his autobiography, have an "active social life." He chose not to send his wife and children abroad, on the theory that if the Germans invaded England, "someone should remain to lead the ultimate liberation and I wanted my sons, if not myself, to be among them."

The anomalies and aberrations of his private life carried over into his public life. A leading light of Oxford University for a quarter of a century, one of the best-known and most prolific historians in England, the author of a substantial volume in the Oxford History of Modern Europe and another in the Oxford History of England as well as numerous other books, a member of the British Academy and the deliverer of the prestigious Ford Lectures and Romanes Lecture, Taylor was repeatedly passed over for a chair of Modern History at Oxford and for the Regius Professorship. It was not until he left Oxford in 1962 and took a visiting professorship at Bristol University that he could claim the title "Professor." Nor was he a "Dr."; perhaps because he shared the then fashionable contempt for that degree (or, some thought, because he begrudged the eighteen-guinea fee), he never bothered to apply for it. That title too came to him later when he received an honorary degree from a Canadian university.

If his professional life was alternately frustrating and gratifying, it was because he had not one but two professional lives. He was denied the Regius Professorship because of the zeal with which he pursued his other career—as a journalist (in the popular press, to boot), a radio commentator, and a television "personality."[2] At one point the Regius Professorship seemed to be his, on condition that he give up those other unseemly activities. He refused; later he said that he would not have accepted an appointment from a prime minister (Macmillan) whose hands were "stained with blood." (This was shortly after Suez.) But he was bitterly disappointed, all the more because his arch enemy Hugh Trevor-Roper received it instead. He never again spoke to his life-long friend and mentor, Lewis Namier, who had supported his candidacy and had shifted to Trevor-Roper only after Taylor had refused to curtail his journalistic and television pursuits.

A historian can only marvel at the way he combined those two careers, turning out on demand, effortlessly, an enormous quantity of articles and reviews, delivering his radio talks and appearing on television, while at the same time producing such lengthy and serious works of scholarship as the volumes in the two Oxford series (*The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914* published in 1954, and *English History, 1914-1945* in 1964), several other books involving a good deal of research, and still others of a more popular cast. Whatever else one might say of Taylor, one must pay tribute to his extraordinary accomplishments and to a most fertile and versatile mind. Moreover, all his work, from the most ephemeral to the most academic, displays the same effervescent style—pithy, witty, irreverent, opinionated. One can never forget the person of the author in even the most solemn of his tomes. It was, perhaps, this "authorial voice," as we would

[2]It was typical of Taylor that at the height of his TV career, and while he was ardently supporting the introduction of commercial television, he himself did not own a TV set.

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now say (an Americanism that Taylor would have scorned), as much as the substance of the books, that irritated his academic critics.

But there is much in the works themselves that are calculated to provoke and exasperate. Indeed some critics believe Taylor deliberately intended to shock his conventional colleagues and to appeal to a gullible, sensation-seeking public. On this charge, he may be acquitted. He was certainly uninhibited in expressing his views, which were sharp, often unorthodox, sometimes eccentric. But however flippant his tone, there is no doubt that he firmly believed at least most of them, most of the time.

CERTAINLY THIS was true of his most influential and controversial book, *The Origins of the Second World War*. The *Origins* has been a "set text" for students throughout the world, the occasion for countless articles and reviews, the subject of several volumes of critical essays (the most recent in 1986), the theme of entire issues of historical journals and of sessions of historical associations. (The American Historical Association in 1985 featured it under the title "the A. J. P. Taylor debate.") The publication last year of a book by an American historian, Robert Cole, analyzing his most important works,[3] and more recently the biography by Adam Sisman may well inspire yet another round of the A. J. P. Taylor debate. Even if nothing new emerges from it, a recapitulation of the old arguments is useful, for the Taylor thesis is still very much alive. One can hear echoes of it in the debate over the Cold War (a debate revived since the end of that conflict); in the now fashionable "structuralist" analyses of Nazism and Stalinism; in the biography of Winston Churchill by John Charmley, an author of a very different political disposition from Taylor's; and in the perennial disputes among historians about moral judgments and objectivity, determinism and contingency, ideology and policy.

Published in 1961, the *Origins* was greeted with overwhelmingly negative reviews. One of the few exceptions was the favorable notice in the *Times Literary Supplement* (anonymous, as was then the custom, but generally attributed to E. H. Carr), which praised Taylor for the "cogency of his analysis" and "methodical and impeccable logic." This provoked a series of indignant letters from outraged historians. A devastating critique in *Encounter* by Hugh Trevor-Roper led to a televised debate between Taylor and Trevor-Roper. An American edition the following year drew even more hostile notices, which further enflamed the controversy and, as Taylor mischievously pointed out, made the book a best-seller. It was translated into a dozen languages, including Sinhalese, was reissued in America as recently as 1983, and is still in print.

Taylor was not the first to expound the "revisionist" thesis of the origins of the Second World War, but he was the first to do so systematically, documenting it from the available published sources and presenting it in an eminently readable form. With his gift for the dramatic, he oversimplified the traditional view so as to heighten the contrast with his own and to put him in the congenial position of the rebel (a descendant of the "troublemakers" he had eulogized in an earlier volume) defying the "establishment" (a word that he had, if not coined, at least popularized).

The conventional explanation of the cause of the war, according to Taylor, was simple: it was Hitler. "He planned the second World war. His will alone caused it." That explanation pleased everyone, Taylor said: those who favored resistance to Hitler because he was bent on war; those who

[3]Robert Cole, *A. J. P. Taylor: The Traitor within the Gates* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 285pp).

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favored appeasement but were finally thwarted by the actions of a madman; and the German people who were thus absolved of responsibility for the war. Taylor's own view, he prided himself, was designed to please no one except the seeker for the truth.

In gripping detail, Taylor describes the course of events from the end of the First World War to the beginning of the Second—and in doing so describes a Hitler very different from the conventional one. So far from being the driving force behind the war, an aggressor intent on the domination of the world, Hitler was pursuing the traditional policies of all German statesmen, and, indeed, of the statesmen of all countries. He had come to power "in a strictly constitutional way and for solidly democratic reasons." Although in domestic affairs he "gradually became an all-powerful dictator," in foreign policy his aims were those of his predecessors: to free Germany from the restrictions of Versailles (a goal that enlightened opinion in the West sympathized with), to restore the German army, and "to make Germany the greatest power in Europe from her natural weight."

In contrast to the received wisdom, Hitler was not a "system-maker," had no "preconceived plan," and certainly no "precise time-table." Such systems as he seemed to propound, in *Mein Kampf* or *Table Talk*, were nothing but "day-dreams," reminiscent of Charlie Chaplin's Great Dictator who transformed the world into a toy balloon and kicked it to the ceiling with his toe. Academics hear in Hitler's pronouncements the disciple of Nietzsche or Attila; Taylor hears in them "only the generalisations of a powerful, but uninstructed, intellect; dogmas which echo the conversation of any Austrian café or German beer-house." The war-like rhetoric of Hitler, like that of Mussolini, was "no worse than the 'sabre-rattling' of the old monarchs; nor, for that matter than what English public-schoolboys were taught in Victorian days." The historian must try to "push through the clouds of phrases to the reality beneath." And that reality is not to be found in the day-dreams of *Mein Kampf*, nor in the Marxist theory of the economic contradictions of capitalism, nor in the Leninist doctrine of imperialism, nor in the ideology of *Lebensraum*, but only in the *Realpolitik* of international affairs.

Hitler was only a German, a larger-than-life German, but still only a German. He was also a "statesman" like all others, only a little more so. The policies of all statesmen rested on force, but they hoped not to have to use it. Hitler intended to use it if necessary, and if his threats were more effective than theirs, it was because he had stronger nerves than they. There was no moral distinction between them. "If Western morality seemed superior, this was largely because it was the morality of the status quo; Hitler's was the immorality of revision." The only moral argument on the British side was the legitimacy of frontiers; on that reasoning, the Hapsburg Empire should not have been dissolved and the American colonies should not have become independent.

Hitler's aim was to change the status quo, but his method was "patience," to wait for the opportune moment and take advantage of his opponents' mistakes. He was a supreme opportunist, not an ideologue. He did not contemplate a war for world conquest, and probably did not intend any war at all; the state of German armament was proof of that. The seizure of Austria was not planned; Schuschnigg provoked the crisis and Hitler then "improvised." Nor did Hitler precipitate the Czechoslovakian crisis; "he merely took advantage of it." Nor was the destruction of Poland "part of his original project." Nor was the Nazi-Soviet pact; this too was an "improvisation" on both sides. While everyone was talking of Hitler's next move, "the man who talked, and apparently thought, of it least was

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Hitler himself." The war that did come in August 1939, "far from being premeditated, was a mistake, the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders." The final blunder was fatal: Hitler's "launching on 29 August a diplomatic manoeuvre which he ought to have launched on 28 August."

IF THE WAR itself was a mistake, the policy of appeasement, Taylor suggests, was not. It was a perfectly rational response to the character of Hitler and to the situation. Indeed, it was not only diplomatically and politically justified; it was eminently moral.

> [Munich] was a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and shortsightedness of Versailles.

Most critics at the time (and many today) read the book as a double "apologia" —for Hitler and for appeasement. In prefaces to the American edition in 1962 and a new English edition the following year, Taylor indignantly denied this. He was not excusing or vindicating Hitler; he was only explaining his actions and exposing the "legends" about him: that he was "a maniac, a nihilist, a second Attila"; that he had a "coherent, longterm plan of an original nature"; and that he bore the burden of "war guilt."

Nor, Taylor insisted, was he himself an apologist for appeasement. He had a "clean record" on this score; he was addressing public meetings against appeasement when his critics were confining their protests to Oxford common rooms.[4] As for the much quoted and derided passage about the "triumph" of Munich, that was meant as a joke—although he quickly added, not altogether a joke. For "the best-informed and most conscientious students of international affairs had argued that there would be no peace in Europe until the Germans received the self-determination which had been granted to others," and Munich only reflected that view. Toward the end of the preface, that "joke" becomes even less of a joke as the appeasers (again, after Taylor disowned any intention of vindicating them) are portrayed as "men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time." In retrospect, that "best" seems to Taylor very good indeed.

> In 1938 Czechoslovakia was betrayed. In 1939 Poland was saved. Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better—to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole? I am glad Germany was defeated and Hitler destroyed. I also appreciate that others paid the price for this, and I recognise the honesty of those who thought the price too high.

In this passage, it is Taylor's interjection of his personal opinion—"I am glad Germany was defeated and Hitler destroyed" —that seems irrational and arbitrary, while those who favored appeasement appear to be not only honest but also sensible and humane. (A very different conclusion, of course, would result from taking into account figures of the potential loss of life if Hitler had triumphed, to say nothing of the potential tyranny that would have

[4]In the book itself he made the point more emphatically: "I was an anti-appeaser from the day that Hitler came to power." He repeated this in his autobiography, perhaps forgetting his account in the same book of the early 1930s when he was one of the leaders of the Manchester Peace Council and an assiduous promoter of disarmament. It was not until February 1936, with the Popular Front policy firmly in place, that he announced his "conversion," as he put it, to the cause of rearmament.

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been the fate of a Europe under German domination.)

The opponents of appeasement, Taylor argues, were operating with a "double standard." If Hitler's preparations for war were taken as evidence of his aggressive intentions, why were not similar motives deduced from Britain's rearmament? If other countries were convinced that Hitler was bent on German domination, was Hitler not equally justified in assuming (what was the fact) that the others were trying to prevent Germany from being the Great Power it had the right to be? If the British claimed that they wanted only "to keep things quiet" while Hitler wanted to "stir them up," could not the Germans properly make the counter-claim that "the status quo was not peace, but a slave treaty"? The British, in short, were applying to their own government a "generosity of interpretation" that they did not extend to Hitler, a "double standard" derived solely from the assumption of Hitler's "wickedness."

To Taylor's charge of a double standard, his critics might reply that he himself is guilty of the fallacy of "equivalence" —a political (and also moral) equivalence that made Hitler and Chamberlain alike "statesmen," each pursuing the legitimate interests of his country. "This is a story," Taylor tells us, "without heroes; and perhaps even without villains." Hitler was not uniquely wicked, not another Attila. "In principle and doctrine, Hitler was no more wicked and unscrupulous than many other contemporary statesmen." And then, as if belying his own words: "In wicked acts he outdid them all." Those wicked acts, however, were entirely in the realm of domestic affairs. In foreign affairs Hitler was a statesman like all others, following a conventional policy of *realpolitik*.

> As supreme ruler of Germany, Hitler bears the greatest responsibility for acts of immeasurable evil: for the destruction of German democracy; for the concentration camps; and, worst of all, for the extermination of peoples during the second World war. He gave orders, which Germans executed, of a wickedness without parallel in civilised history. His foreign policy was a different matter. He aimed to make Germany the dominant Power in Europe and maybe, more remotely, in the world. Other Powers have pursued similar aims, and still do. Other Powers seek to defend their vital interests by force of arms. In international affairs there was nothing wrong with Hitler except that he was a German.

ON THIS NOTE Taylor concludes his own apologia. The dichotomy between domestic and foreign affairs is at the heart of his thesis. It is this that accounts for the paucity of references in his book to Nazism, anti-Semitism, racism, dictatorship, tyranny, and the like, and that permits him to speak of Hitler not as a "villain" but as a "statesman." In the preface Taylor explains that it was obvious that Germany would seek to become a Great Power, and then, almost as an afterthought: "obvious after 1933 that her domination would be of a peculiarly barbaric sort." But that observation is made in passing and has no bearing upon the rest of his analysis.

In the book itself the idea of tyranny intrudes on only one occasion, in connection with the occupation of Prague. "Of course Hitler's protectorate brought tyranny to Bohemia—secret police, the S.S., the concentration camps; but no more than in Germany itself." That equivocal note—"no more than" —is followed by the comment that it was this tyranny that roused public opinion in Britain. "Hitler's domestic behaviour, not his foreign policy, was the real crime which ultimately brought him—and Germany—to the ground." Taylor then goes on to say that the occupation of Prague was undertaken "without design" and was unnecessary for his purposes. Thus what "ultimately" brought Hitler down need not

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have done so at all. Presumably if the occupation of Prague had not occurred—and, by Taylor's account, it need not have—Hitler's tyranny might have remained safely at home, where it would not have aroused the indignation of the British public and therefore would not have caused his downfall.

Taylor's insistence upon the complicitousness of the German people also serves to detract from the subject of Hitler's "wickedness." Taylor himself is contemptuous of all the talk about "war guilt" : "I have never seen any sense in the question of war guilt or war innocence. In a world of sovereign states, each does the best it can for its own interests; and can be criticised at most for mistakes, not for crimes." But on those rare occasions when he does lapse into the question—not of "guilt," a word he assiduously avoids, but of "responsibility"—he shifts the focus of the discussion to the German people. Having written an entire book in which Hitler appears on almost every page as the architect and agent of foreign policy, he prefaces it with a warning to his readers not to attribute everything to Hitler alone. Hitler was the "creation" of Versailles, of ideas common throughout Europe and especially among the German people. "He would have counted for nothing without the support and cooperation of the German people." He gave the orders for "acts of immeasurable evil," but it was the Germans who "executed" them. "The Germans put Hitler into power; they were the only ones who could turn him out." (In fact the Allies turned him out.) One of the few references in the book to anti-Semitism, tucked in the middle of a paragraph on other subjects, has Hitler carrying out, with "a terrifying literalism," racial doctrines endemic among the German people throughout their history. Responding to the criticism that he had made too little of Hitler's anti-Semitism, he warned against projecting Hitler's "later madness" into the pre-war period. In the thirties, he said there were no extermination camps in Germany, and the fate of Polish Jews was far worse than that of the German Jews. "Without the carnage of the war, I wonder whether he [Hitler] would have stumbled onto the idea of the gas chambers." [5]

It is curious that in a book where the leading characters, the actors of history, are almost entirely diplomats and statesmen, Taylor should have felt it necessary to invoke, at this point of his argument, generalizations involving "the Germans," "the German people," "the German nation." These concepts appear more frequently in his book written toward the end of the war, *The Course of German History*. Here collective guilt serves to mitigate individual guilt, and not only the guilt of Hitler but also—because it is a collective guilt of long-standing—of Nazism as well.

IN AN INTERVIEW with Ved Mehta shortly after the *Origins* appeared, Taylor said that the American reviewers were "cleverer" than the English (this is one of his few tributes to Americans) because they responded more directly to the political implications of the book. "Liking the book becomes a matter of politics. If you're a Left Winger and are against the bomb and the arming of Germany, you may be in sympathy with the thesis; if you're a conservative, a militarist, and for Germany in NATO, you may not be." [6]

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[5] In a review in 1977 he wrote:

> Historians have often discussed the background of Hitler's so-called ideas. They have pointed to geopoliticians and racialist writers. I see now the true source of Hitler's inspiration. It was Karl May, a German who wrote a thriller about Red Indians. Hitler always saw himself in the dramatic role of a Red Indian brave.

Taylor might have dismissed this as a "joke," like his passage on the appeasers. But even a joke can be obscene.

[6] Ved Mehta, *The Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounters with British Intellectuals* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1962).

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An opponent of the bomb could take comfort in Taylor's thesis that the war was unpremeditated and unplanned, because there was then no justification for any preventive or preemptive measures against "accidental" wars; indeed, nuclear weapons might themselves accidentally unleash a Third World War. This was, in fact, a major argument used by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in which Taylor himself was deeply involved at just the time he wrote the *Origins*. His justification of appeasement also served the cause of the CND because this was a common charge brought against the movement. Similarly, the shift of responsibility for the war from Hitler to the Germans could be taken as reason to oppose the rearming of Germany and its admission to NATO. "If all Germans are culpable for the war," Taylor told Mehta, "then the present Western policy towards Germany is wrong." Those who wanted to make Germany an ally in the Cold War could do so only by assuming Hitler's unique wickedness. But if Hitler's policies were those of all Germans, indeed of Germany through two world wars and as far back as Bismarck, Germany could never be trusted. Hitler might be dead and Nazism finished, but Germany would remain the main threat to peace. (Some of Taylor's critics—Isaac Deutscher, for example—drew exactly the opposite conclusions from his thesis, criticizing it for mitigating Hitler's responsibility for the war and thus lending support to those who favored rearming Germany and admitting it to NATO.)

What Taylor did not say to Mehta, but what many critics did (and what Taylor himself on other occasions admitted), is that there was another political reason for liking or disliking his book, and that is the Soviet Union. One might paraphrase Taylor: If you're a Left Winger and are against the United States and for the Soviet Union, you may be in sympathy with the thesis; if you're a conservative, for capitalism and for the Cold War, you may not be.

The Soviet Union—which Taylor generally refers to as "Soviet Russia" —takes center stage only once in the book, at the time of the Nazi-Soviet pact. For Taylor the pact was no more than another aspect of the diplomatic maneuvering and improvising that culminated in the war. "It was no doubt disgraceful that Soviet Russia should make an agreement with the leading Fascist state; but this reproach comes ill from the statesmen who went to Munich and who were then sustained in their own countries by huge majorities." In any case, the pact was intended not to bring on a war but to prevent it; it was neither an alliance nor an agreement to partition Poland. (Munich had been "the true alliance for partition.") Moreover, it is difficult to see what other course Russia could have taken. "The policy was right according to the textbooks of diplomacy"; its only fault was to suppose (as Western statesmen did) that Hitler would keep his word. But the pact had a greater significance than all the other diplomatic maneuvers. "[It] was a milestone in world history; it marked the moment when Soviet Russia returned to Europe as a Great Power." And the breaking of the pact was more significant still. In the final paragraph of the book, looking ahead to the war itself, Taylor dates the beginning of the "real World War" as 1941, when Hitler attacked Russia and declared war on the United States. "We still live in its shadow," he observes of that war.

TAYLOR HIMSELF lived in the shadow of another war, the Cold War. He spoke of this in the most apocalyptic terms. It was "the most disastrous and mistaken event in my lifetime," a war that "devastated my life" and had "a more shattering effect on me than the troubles of my private life" —this in a lifetime that witnessed the rise of Nazism and Communism, the havoc of the real war and the horrors of the Holocaust.

In the *Origins*, as much as in the CND,

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Taylor was fighting his own Cold War. If Hitler was not the aggressor in the Second World War, neither was Stalin in the Cold War. If Hitler was a statesman like all others, so were Stalin, Khrushchev, and his successors. If the rhetoric and ideology of Nazism were irrelevant to Hitler's foreign policy, the rhetoric and ideology of Communism were irrelevant to Stalin's. If the Nazi dictatorship was entirely a matter of domestic policy and of no proper concern to other powers, so was the Soviet dictatorship.[8] And, if appeasement was a rational response to a Germany pursuing its national interests, the same policy would be justified toward Soviet Russia. (Or to Russian satellites. In 1950, condemning the Korean War, he wrote: "Appeasement is still one of the noblest words in the language, in spite of its abuse twelve years ago; and appeasement should at all times be the object of an enlightened diplomacy.")

As between America and Russia, Taylor made no secret of his own preference. An Anglo-Russian alliance, he insisted, would be infinitely better for England than an Anglo-American alliance. Unlike America, which wanted to "dominate the world," Soviet Russia sought "security, not world conquest" ; she wanted only to be "left alone" and to be "treated with normal respect." Nor was Taylor deterred by evidence that communist ideology and tyranny were being exported to neighboring countries. In 1948, he was momentarily disturbed by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, "largely because it affected my friends," but he soon decided that his friends had brought it on themselves by trying to form a government without the communists. While some prominent English communists were sufficiently distressed by the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 to leave the party, Taylor was unmoved. "Better a Communist regime supported by Soviet Russia, I thought, than an anti-Communist regime led by Cardinal Mindszenty." A quarter of a century later he felt vindicated: "I think in every way what happened in Hungary in 1956 was fortunate"; "everything I have seen in Hungary since then confirms my belief that I was right." When Margaret Thatcher went to Hungary in 1984 (her first visit, Taylor commented, "behind what is laughably called the Iron Curtain"), he hoped that the English would finally recognize that Hungary is "a normal civilised country, very like the more industrial parts of England," with similar buildings, social life, and cars, and more respect for academics.

"Anti-Communism," Taylor pronounced, "causes more trouble in the world than ever Communism does or did." Yet, in spite of occasional tributes to Lenin ("a very great man and even, despite his faults, a very good man"), Taylor was neither a Marxist nor, except for a brief period, a communist. He was what in America is called a "red-diaper baby," a communist by birth. His mother served as a conduit for money from the Soviet Union to the Communist Party of Great Britain, and his father was buried with a Red Flag emblazoned with hammer and sickle wrapped around the coffin. He himself joined the Communist Party in 1925 as an undergraduate at Oxford. (Earlier, when he sat for a scholarship examination, he told the tutors that he was a communist and advised them what to do with the university: "Blow it up after I have gone down." He was bitterly disappointed not to get the scholarship.) He made the obligatory visit to the Soviet

[8]Revisionist historians of the Soviet Union and the Cold War make just this point. "It is now incontrovertible," one historian recently observed, "that the Soviet regime was as horrendous as any U. S. policy maker believed. But I don't see the new literature on the Soviet documents suggesting that Stalin's foreign policy was equally horrendous." (Melvyn P. Leffler, as quoted in "Scholars Refight the Cold War," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, March 2, 1994).

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Union with his mother and her lover, where they were received as honored guests and shown the sights of the socialist paradise. But he began to lose faith in the English communists when they did little in the miner's strike, and he permitted his membership to lapse after he left Oxford. He later defined his credo: "I have remained left-wing, pro-Russian and anti-Communist ever since."

"Pro-Russian and anti-Communist" — it was this combination that permitted Taylor to dissociate himself from communist ideology and Soviet tyranny and at same time to be a staunch champion of Russia in world affairs. He accused E. H. Carr of being blind to the moral faults of communism, and once defended capitalism to Kingsley Martin as an instrument "for peace, not war." (Not American capitalism, to be sure; that was an unmitigated evil.) He generally spoke of himself as a socialist, praised Yugoslavia as an ideal form of communism for Eastern Europe, and commended the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union. In fact, he was not so much a socialist as a nineteenth-century style radical—an anti-establishment, iconoclastic, populist little-Englander.

A FEW YEARS after the publication of the *Origins*, Taylor wrote: "If my book had a moral for later it was to preach co-operation between Russia and the West." Yet an essential part of its thesis is that history has no moral dimension and teaches no moral lessons—indeed no lessons of any kind. Like most important events in history, the war was the product of a series of accidents, contingencies, maneuvers, blunders, and opportunities seized and missed.

> Wars are much like road accidents. They have a general cause and particular causes at the same time. Every road accident is caused, in the last resort, by the invention of the internal combustion engine and by men's desire to get from one place to another. In this sense, the "cure" for road accidents is to forbid motor-cars. But a motorist, charged with dangerous driving, would be ill-advised if he pleaded the existence of motor-cars as his sole defence. The police and the courts do not weigh profound causes. They seek a specific cause for each accident—error on the part of the driver; excessive speed; drunkenness; faulty brakes; bad road surface. So it is with wars.

Like road accidents, wars have "profound" and "specific" causes, which are complementary and not mutually exclusive. But the important question is "why that particular war happened at that particular time," and this question can be answered only by an examination of specific events.

This passage has been much quoted and criticized. How "particular" is that "particular time"? For Taylor it is very particular indeed. The relevant question for him is why the war broke out on September 3, 1939, and it is in answering this question that Hitler's launching his diplomatic maneuver on the 29th rather than the 28th of August becomes the crucial "mistake" culminating in the war. From this particular perspective, "profound causes" are irrelevant. Taylor himself mentions only two such causes: "international anarchy," which he dismisses as too amorphous to explain anything; and, more elliptically, the First World War, which "explains the Second and, in fact, caused it, in so far as one event causes another." Nazism does not figure as a cause, "profound" or otherwise.

Only in the concluding paragraph of his book does he take a somewhat longer perspective when he says that the "real World War" began in 1941 with Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia and declaration of war against the United States. The final sentence is almost an admission of the triviality of the "particular" war as he defined it and thus of the sterility of his own work: "The war which broke out in 1939 has become a matter of historical curiosity." It

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is odd that he should have chosen to write a book about a mere "historical curiosity" rather than about the "real" war. Yet not so odd if one keeps in mind the Cold War that Taylor regarded as a worse disaster than the "real" war, for it was only the "particular" war that broke out on September 3, 1939, that could be portrayed so coolly, as lacking in moral purpose and therefore as justifying a policy of appeasement. And this was the lesson that he wanted to apply to the Cold War. The "real World War," which, as he admitted shortly after the publication of the *Origins*, was "probable, if not inevitable, at some time," did not lend itself to that severely *Realpolitik* approach, and may even have suggested that the Cold War itself was "probable, if not inevitable."

Moreover it is only about this "particular" war that Taylor himself could profess to be dispassionate. Once Russia entered the war he abandoned any pretense of moral neutrality. Winston Churchill's stand in allying England with Russia endeared him to Taylor, in spite of such earlier iniquities as his suppression of the General Strike. And Taylor's stirring peroration to his *English History* (published only four years after the *Origins*) is an unabashed encomium to the war:

> Future historians may see the war as a last struggle for the European balance of power or for the maintenance of the Empire. This was not how it appeared to those who lived through it. The British people had set out to destroy Hitler and National Socialism—"Victory at all costs." They succeeded. No English soldier who rode with the tanks into liberated Belgium or saw the German murder camps at Dachau or Buchenwald could doubt that the war had been a noble crusade....

THERE WAS unquestionably an important ideological motive in Taylor's insistence, not only in the *Origins* but in other of his writings, that there are no moral judgments to be passed on history and no moral lessons to be derived from it. But there was also an important methodological motive, as it were. However strained Taylor's later relations with Namier, he remained a Namierite in his "positivist" approach to history: history as the "hard" facts about public events, documented in parliamentary records, diplomatic dispatches, memoranda, correspondence, and the like. Unlike Namier, Taylor managed to produce out of this "microscopic history" a sustained, dramatic narrative. But like Namier he eschewed such "soft" sources as ideas, beliefs, or moral principles. He once accused Namier of taking "the mind out of politics." But this is just what he himself did. (Like Namier too, he largely ignored economic, social, and cultural issues, and when he did address them, as in describing the Nazi economy,what resulted was subject to much criticism.)

Even for eighteenth-century England, the period that Namier took as his own, the Namierite method has been shown to be inadequate. For the twentieth century, and especially for the interwar period when ideological and moral passions ran so high and had such momentous effects, that method is even more unsatisfactory. Those passions are the "hard" facts of history, and for the historian to ignore or belittle them is to emasculate history. It is salutary to be reminded of the "accidents" of history, as a corrective to the familiar economic determinism. But accidents are not the whole of history. Nor is diplomacy the whole of foreign policy. Diplomacy-as-usual works only with statesmen-as-usual, not with "world-historical individuals" like Napoleon and Hitler, who do not abide by the rules of the game—who change not only the rules but the game itself.

The objection to the *Origins* is not that it fails to make moral judgments about history, but that it fails to take into account the moral facts that are an essential part of that history—facts about the ideas, beliefs, intentions, and aspirations, not only of

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Hitler and the Nazis, but also of those who had to confront them and who chose to appease or resist them. Nor is it only in hindsight, as is sometimes said, that these moral facts emerge so clearly. Hitler could not have made them clearer than he did in *Mein Kampf* and in the innumerable speeches he delivered to the German people. The precise mechanism of the Holocaust, like the precise timetable for war, were not known in advance; Hitler himself did not know them. But that there would be a war if he was opposed abroad, and a Holocaust if he prevailed at home, was hardly in doubt.

Even in the 1960s Taylor was criticized for being an old-fashioned historian: writing narrative rather than analytical history and being excessively concerned with political and diplomatic rather than economic and social affairs. Today he is still more at odds with the prevailing fashions; race, class, and gender are conspicuously absent from his work. Yet the revisionist thesis about the Second World War is still very much alive, paradoxically because it is congenial to the analytical mode that was so alien to him.

The "structuralist" (or "functionalist," as it is sometimes called) school of historians looks for the sources of historical phenomena in precisely those "profound" causes that Taylor spurns: the structure of states, the nature of bureaucracies, the pressure of classes and interest groups, the exigencies of economics, geography, demography, ethnicity. From this point of view, the whole of Taylor's book—which dwells in such detail on the day-to-day politics of diplomacy, the accidents and blunders of statesmen, the complications and unanticipated consequences of events—is irrelevant, a study of ephemera, the flickering of "fireflies," as the master-structuralist, Fernand Braudel, memorably put it. Yet Taylor's short-term contingent history and the structuralist's long-term deterministic history converge in one crucial respect: They both ignore the ideas that govern the actions of individuals and thus evade the question of personal, moral responsibility. They both "de-moralize" history, not in the sense of failing to pass moral judgments upon history but of failing to respect the moral facts of history.

In his autobiography written almost a quarter of a century later, Taylor said that the *Origins* had become "the new orthodoxy" —characteristically adding, "much to my alarm." The new orthodoxy, to be sure, the new revisionism, presents itself in a very different form from the old, professing to be more sophisticated theoretically and more advanced methodologically.[10] Yet behind that modish veneer one can see the same impulse—not only the "de-moralizing" of history but also its "demystifying" and "demythicising."

Like Taylor, the new revisionists are engaged in revising the past in accord with the ideological predispositions of the historian. Edward Freeman, the late-nineteenth century Regius Professor of History at Oxford, coined the much quoted dictum, "History is past politics, and politics is present history." Today one is tempted to amend that to read: "History is present politics, and politics is past history." That might well serve as an epitaph for Taylor himself. □

[10]"Revisionism" is also used in a more limited sense, applying not to the larger question of the causes of the war, but only to the question of appeasement. Appeasement in this view is seen not as a matter of political obtuseness or moral cowardice but rather as a realistic, rational (if often futile) policy.

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Tomorrow's Germany

Jacob Heilbrunn

FOUR YEARS AFTER the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification continues to send political shock waves through Europe. The exposed location of Germany in the center of Central Europe has always ensured that what it does, or what it chooses not to do, has had enormously important implications for its neighbors. Now that the formal restrictions imposed after World War II by the four powers have been removed, it is no longer possible to ignore Germany's restoration to great power status.

At first, German leaders such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher contended that reunification would realize rather than destroy the dream of a united Europe. German industrial power would be submerged in the European Union and German military might in NATO. The difficulty would not be an aggressive Germany, but one that was likely to persist in seeing itself as a follower rather than a leader. As recently as 1992 Christoph Bertram, the diplomatic correspondent for *Die Zeit* and a former director of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, could take it for granted that the "view in Germany that vision and leadership are still for others to exercise will not disappear rapidly."[1]

Yet already a powerfully self-confident tone and an insistence on explicitly defining and defending German interests has begun to resonate among political elites. From the conservative daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* to the leftist weekly *Der Spiegel*, a peculiar political axis opposed to Maastricht has emerged. The new assertiveness is particularly pronounced among the so-called *Nachwuchs*, or post-1945 generation of Germans. Books like *Western Ties: Chances and Risks for Germany*, whose young editors lament that attachment to the West has become an "article of faith," or *Fear of Power*, which calls for a "new German sovereignty" and a return to power politics, offer vivid examples of the resurgence of German nationalism.[2] Although Germany is not about to bolt the Western alliance, it is acutely aware that it finds itself in the same position as the Bismarckian state of 1871 or the Weimar Republic after the signing of the Rapallo Pact in 1922. Germany has a choice

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[1]Christoph Bertram, "Visions of Leadership: Germany," in Steven Muller and Gebhard Schweigler (eds.), *From Occupation to Cooperation: The United States and United Germany in a Changing World Order* (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 49.

[2]Rainer Zitelmann, Karlheinz Weissman, and Michael Grossheim (eds.),*Westbindung: Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Propyläen, 1993); Gregor Schöllgen, *Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen Und Ihre Aussenpolitik* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1993).

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again—as what Bismarck called "the tongue on the balance," it can go East or West. The consequence has been a reassessment of German national interests, and the reopening of the old question of a German identity.

The advent of a new German foreign policy has its sources not only in the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also in Chancellor Helmut Kohl's attempt to create a "normalized" Germany. In the 1980s Kohl sought to establish a normal Germany that would be accepted as an equal, not a junior, partner by its Western allies. Like the founding father of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, Kohl is a Roman Catholic from the Rhineland for whom the unity of Western Europe has come first. The reconstruction of the German nation-state, however, has forced Kohl to revise drastically the domestic and foreign policies of the Federal Republic, for the rise of German nationalism has sent Kohl's attempt to normalize Germany spinning out of control. Ironically, Kohl's greatest achievement—German unification—has transformed Adenauer's legatee into the gravedigger of European unity. The result will be a German Europe, not a European Germany.

German Interests

DESPITE THE pious avowals of everyone from Adenauer to Kohl that European interests were completely compatible with German interests, Germany has always sought to assert its national interests. From Bismarck to Hitler, the Germans conducted *Schaukelpolitik*, the jockeying for advantage between East and West. Adenauer believed that by grounding Germany in the West, the Federal Republic would serve as a magnet for the East. Self-abnegation became the condition for regaining German sovereignty. In the 1970s, Willy Brandt added an Eastern dimension to the FRG's foreign policy through the pursuit of *Ostpolitik*, or detente with the East bloc. But Germany was still able to disguise its own designs behind the comforting platitude of European interests. Brandt and then Genscher could always point to *Ostpolitik* as being a way to bridge the differences between East and West. Genscher in particular employed foreign policy as a means of domestic policy, shoring up the Free Democratic Party's standing in the polls by courting Gorbachev and the East bloc. Genscher's pursuit of detente with the East may come to be seen as the precursor of a new *Ostpolitik*, pursued by a united Germany. Above all, Genscher and Kohl preached that they were creating a new European identity by reaching out to the East.

With unification the German public began to resist the calls to sacrifice more sovereignty to the European community. Perhaps the most stout resistance has come from Bavaria. Kohl's coalition partner, the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), has adopted an anti-Maastricht (and, implicitly, an anti-Adenauerian) stance. The credo of Bavarian Minister-president Edmund Stoiber is that "Europe is a delusion." In addition, the Munich lawyer and former head of the Bavarian Free Democrats, Manfred Brunner, has established a "Citizens' movement for a Europe of Nations" that has won a number of adherents on the Right for its defense of the deutschmark as against a single European currency.

In general, German attachment to European institutions has diminished. The Bundesbank has made it abundantly clear that it will not sacrifice the deutschmark on the altar of European unity. Voter hostility to a European super-state has forced Kohl to strike Churchill's phrase "United States of Europe" from his speeches. Though Kohl has attempted to quash debate on the EU, his own party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), has begun to show some distinct unease about European unity; and Kohl's foreign policy adviser, Michael Mertes, has recently written in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* that using "Europe" as a synonym for "Western Europe" was a "semantic self-deception."

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Kohl himself has begun to call for a European federation, not a super-state.

The new German strategy is to force the European Union to look East—and North. Germany has led the move to expand the EU by adopting Austria and the Nordic countries as a first step toward including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. On January 1, 1995 Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Norway are scheduled to join the EU. The confidence with which Germany proceeded during the negotiations over their entry into the EU is striking. Foreign Minister Kinkel rode roughshod over the Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Panaglos, who formally held the six-month presidency of the EU. Kinkel threatened Spain that he would "break its spine" if it continued to resist Norwegian entry. Finally, Britain and France both caved in to Germany's demand that the number of votes required to block European-wide decisions rose from 23 to 27.

This last change will diminish France's power in the EU and reduce the subsidies that Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy have enjoyed. Until now, the EU has presided over a substantial transfer of wealth from the North to the South. Germany has contributed two-thirds of the entire net transfer totalling DM133 billion. Given the costs of putting Eastern Germany back on its feet, the Germans have little enthusiasm for further massive EU outlays, and German ire in this respect is particularly directed at France. The publisher of *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, has accused the French prime minister Edouard Balladur of having the goal of "destroying Germany economically" and has stated that the problem with the Germans is that "we never allow ourselves to do what the French do"—i.e., assert national interests. In March the demand of the French ambassador to Germany for "clarity" about German foreign policy aims set off a diplomatic furor. A sign of the new German assertiveness came when Kinkel called in the ambassador and dressed him down. Though Kinkel's exact words have not been revealed, the meeting became a *cause célèbre* in Germany and France. Such an affront would have been unthinkable before unification.

The French themselves are no longer able to disguise their fear of a new German hegemony. It first became clearly evident when President François Mitterand traveled to East Germany in the summer of 1989 and exhorted East Germans not to embrace the Federal Republic. France is trying to block legislation that would enlarge Germany's representation in the European parliament as a result of the accession of the German East. In July 1993 the highly respected General Pierre M. Gallois issued a broadside in *Le Monde* against the rise of a German Europe. Quoting former Foreign Minister Roland Dumas' declaration that Germany and the Vatican had "accelerated" the crisis in the Balkans, General Gallois went on to accuse Germany of triggering it as well. Most recently, the clash between Bonn and Paris over "deepening" versus "widening" the EU has heightened French fears of German economic and military predominance. The French should be grateful; things could easily be worse from their point of view. Just as Bismarck "moderated the ardor of the Pan-Germanists," wrote General Gallois, so Kohl is currently "tempering" the push for a premature expansion into the East.

French apprehensions of the old "*incertitudes allemandes*" are not unjustified. Germany is using the widening of the EU as a means of emancipating itself from France. The new EU members will permit Germany to create a Northern bloc, whose new members are acutely aware of their debt to Germany, and they may look to Berlin rather than Paris for direction. While Kinkel himself referred to enlargement modestly as a "balancing of the community," *Der Spiegel* crowed that it created a "new power center" in Europe. The expansion of the EU from 12 to 16 members marks a farewell to the prospect of a European superstate dominated by France. It was no accident that at the fes-

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tivities celebrating the entry of Sweden and Austria only one European delegate was missing: French minister Alain Lamassoure.

The creation of a new Northern bloc of voters may be a prelude to bringing in the East. Germany has already taken a number of steps to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The sources of this success are in the original policy pursued by Germany toward the Soviet Union. The *Ostpolitik* followed by Brandt and his aide Egon Bahr had the aim of ending fears in the East of a "revanchist" Germany, of atoning for Nazi Germany's war crimes, and of ending the long-standing isolation of East Germans. Though this *Ostpolitik* was marred by a wobbly posture towards the Soviet Union, it proved successful beyond the wildest German dreams. The accomplishment of *Ostpolitik* was that it lulled Gorbachev into envisioning a new Europe marked by ever-increasing cooperation rather than competition. Gorbachev believed that little Gorbachevs would pop up all over Eastern Europe and follow a third way between communism and capitalism. Instead, he ended up losing the Soviet empire and reunifying Germany.

After unification Germany became formally sovereign when the Soviet Union ratified the Treaty of Moscow on March 15, 1991. Germany has focused on expediting the return of the former Red Army to the Soviet Union, a process which should be completed by the end of August 1994. Already sixty percent of the Soviet forces have been repatriated. In addition, Germany is intent on ensuring that further waves of the so-called *Volksdeutsche*, or ethnic Germans, do not return from Russia to Germany. There are at least 2 million ethnic Germans living in Russia and the other CIS states. Bonn has signed treaties with the other former East European countries regulating immigration.

Whereas East Germany was the junior partner to Moscow, united Germany is now being courted by Russia.[3] In May, against the opposition of Japan and the United States, Kohl endorsed the idea of making Russia a member of the G-7 group. Whether this honeymoon will last remains to be seen. Now that its borders have been pushed East, Germany is the most exposed country in Europe to upheaval in Russia and Eastern Europe. The most obvious implication of Germany's push to include the Visegrad three—Poland, the Czech republic, and Hungary—into NATO is the creation of a *cordon sanitaire* around Russia. NATO may well remain an anti-Russian alliance.

Germany, then, is creating an old-fashioned sphere of influence in the East, in which Central and Eastern Europe form a vital market for German goods and provide cheap labor for German mnaufacturers. The entry of Austria into the EU will almost certainly result in a de facto *Anschluss* between the two nations. Poland may supplement Austria as a partner of the Germans. Jochen Thies, the editor of the conservative newspaper *Die Welt*, has suggested that the EU might use Berlin as a headquarters for integrating the East: "Germans and Poles would be given the opportunity for a full reconcilia-

[3]In a recent interview in *Der Spiegel* (April 25, 1994), Boris Yeltsin said that Russia "would welcome it if the Germans were in the position to send their soldiers as peace troops (in Bosnia) and not only in Yugoslavia." Yeltsin approves of an amendment to the German constitution to permit the dispatch of German peace-keeping forces abroad. "Our army will finally withdraw from German soil at the end of this year. As a kind of counterpart the German army could be stationed together with the UN peace troops in the CIS lands and take over an important and difficult mission. We are all Europeans in the end." Asked if there could be a special Russo-German relationship in the future, Yeltsin replied, "Russia and Germany are each the largest nations in Europe. How they relate to each other has a decisive impact on the fate of the entire continent."

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tion, rather like the one that occurred between Germany and France in the 1960s." Similarly, former chancellor Helmut Schmidt declared in 1991 that Poland could become as significant a partner for Germany as France. Even the "Königsberg question" has popped back up after forty years of circumspect silence: in January 1994 CDU and CSU parliamentarians circulated a paper urging that the former East Prussian city (which became a Russian enclave after World War II) be transformed into a free-trade zone for the Germans, while the right-wing Republican party has called for the "completion of German unity."

Whatever the future of Königsberg, trade with the East is already booming: in 1993 German firms achieved a growth rate of 13.4 percent in trade with the East. Exports to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria reached a high point of 3.4 billion deutschmarks. Poland has almost overtaken Russia as Germany's biggest trading partner in the East. Exports to the region make up six to seven percent of foreign trade for the Germans and a mere two percent for France. As Hans-Christian Reichel, a senior official at the Economics Ministry, has put it, "We can't deny that we have connections in Eastern Europe. It's paramount for us."

Germany is not focusing solely on expanding its economic interests in the East. NATO and the United Nations are the instruments through which it is working to legitimize its own use of military force. Intent on obtaining a permanent seat on the UN security council—Kinkel has said "that's where the music is played"—the Germans will not abandon any of the institutions supposed to contain their power, for there is no incentive for them to do so. Instead, they will attempt to use these institutions to fulfill their own aims. The goal of Defense Minister Volker Rühe, for instance, was to set the precedent for so-called "out of area" use of German troops in Somalia. Rühe intends to create two special German fighting units for UN "blue helmet" missions. The German military has begun to demand command positions in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps.[4] The chief of the defense ministry's policy planning staff, Vice-Admiral Ulrich Weisser, who has called for a "return to normality," takes an expansive view of German security interests: the new military White Book prepared under his direction was toned down by the Foreign Ministry which struck out phrases such as the German interests in "maintaining free world trade and unobstructed access to markets and raw materials in the entire world."

Most recently, Kinkel has begun to talk of stationing combat units of the *Bundeswehr* as well as German policemen and government bureaucrats in the former Yugoslavia, in order to rebuild Mostar and Tuzla. Kohl was delighted when in March Boris Yeltsin called him first to confer on NATO's ultimatum on Sarajevo, before calling President Clinton. Later Kohl took credit for the success of NATO's bombing threat: "it had above all to do with my influence." Kohl went on to declare that, as one of the "great powers," Germany should host a peace conference on the Balkan war and help "guarantee" an accord between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.

Despite its confident talk of its great power status, in the Moscow Treaty Germany once more renounced the development or possession of nuclear and chemical weapons. This means that Germany will continue to rely on the United States as its principal ally, and that—at least in the short run—the Germans are likely to perceive their role in terms of what George Bush called a new "security partnership." But a

[4]Until unification, Germany was officially denied operational control over the *Bundeswehr*; now planning has begun to reestablish a *Führungskommando*, a general staff, which would create a national command and control structure and enhance German power at the expense of NATO planning staffs.

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gradual, perceptible diminution in the attachment between Germany and the United States is taking place. With the infusion of leaders from eastern Germany, the self-conscious Atlanticism that held sway during the Cold War is destined to steadily erode. The postwar Federal Republic was very much an American creation. That phase of history has now come to an end.[5] Reunification has meant that the Germans are becoming more German. Germany will remain a friendly but less pliable ally of the United States.

The Revival of the Nation-State

WHAT LIES BEHIND the shift in German foreign policy—behind what Conor Cruise O'Brien has astutely diagnosed as the end of German deference?[6] The collapse of the Yalta framework plays an undeniably important role. Yet these changes are also very much a symptom of upheaval in the domestic German landscape. A consensus between the two halves of Germany can be created only by developing a self-assured patriotism, based on common cultural and political traditions. The key to the new German foreign policy is a renewed emphasis on the nation-state. Far from subordinating itself to a European super-state, Germany—driven by its domestic needs—is fashioning a new national identity for itself.

During the Cold War, many Germans went so far as to deny that they were any longer a nation. The distinguished political scientist Karl Dietrich Bracher captured the prevailing mood when he designated the Federal Republic a "post-national democracy among nation-states." This had the virtue of making an unthreatening FRG appear exceptionally well-suited to effecting European integration. The idea of a post-modern Germany has lingered on among some intellectuals such as Jürgen Habermas who have decried a "D-Mark diplomacy" and called for a *Verfassungspatriotismus*, or a constitutional patriotism. But the new Federal Republic is not a post-national democracy. It is a revived nation-state.The glimmerings of an emphasis on the nation-state were already apparent in the 1980s. On the left arose a pacifist nationalism that attempted to take both Germanys out of the superpower conflict. Members of both the Greens and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) pleaded for a nuclear-free Central Europe. A similar discussion also took place on the national right. Historians like Helmut Diwald called for a reassessment of Germany's ties to the West; and the CDU parliamentarian Bernhard Friedmann caused an uproar in 1987 when he proposed an initiative for overcoming German division. It might be remembered that the current defense minister, Volker Rühe, jumped into the fray when he declared during the debate over stationing short-range nuclear weapons in Germany that "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." The conceit on both the left and right was that Germany had a particular historical responsibility to overcome the German question, in the interests of European peace.

Even more significant was the *Tendenzwende*, or intellectual shift, ushered in by Helmut Kohl upon his rise to the chancellorship in 1982. Kohl deliberately emphasized national symbols during the 1980s: in television addresses to the nation, for example, he was the first chancellor who had the German flag prominently displayed behind him. The 1985 Bitburg debacle was an example of Kohl's ability to botch up his attempted "normalization" of the German nation;

[5]Jochen Thies has noted that the "phase of internationalism created by the Western Allied presence in Germany during the last fifty years is coming to an end. It is now evident that the Germans' growing independence from the once admired American model began as early as the Vietnam war." "Observations on the Political Class in Germany," *Daedalus*, Winter 1994, p. 266.

[6]Conor Cruise O'Brien, "The Future of 'The West,'" *National Interest*, Winter 1992/93.

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and he continues to refer to the Nazi crimes committed "in the name of the German people" rather than *by* the German people.

Part and parcel of Kohl's *Tendenzwende* was the 1987 *Historikerstreit*, or historians' dispute, which centered on the uniqueness of the Holocaust. A number of historians attempted to carry out what they called the "Gramscianism of the Right"—that is, changing politics by influencing the intellectual and political milieu. Historians such as Ernst Nolte depicted the Bolshevik revolution and the Red Terror as a dress rehearsal for the Final Solution. The idea was to deny the uniqueness of the Holocaust, thereby removing the Nazi albatross from around the neck of the German nation. A German conservatism untainted by the moral stain of the past would permit the Germans to assert their interests like any other nation. It is no accident that former Nolte students like Rainer Zitelmann are the most prominent champions of a German turn to the East. In retrospect, the German historians who attempted to deny the singularity of the Holocaust may have lost the immediate intellectual battle, but won the war.

For with unification the climate in Germany turned national. Though Habermas declared during reunification that "if we do not free ourselves from the diffuse notions about the nation-state...we will be unable to continue unburdened on the...path toward a multicultural state," important figures on the left defected from the party line and began to praise the idea of a German nation-state. The left-wing writer Martin Walser pleaded for German unity and asserted that the "nation is the most significant historical occurrence until now." Willy Brandt's widow, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, began to speak of the "imponderability of the people's soul" and she now tours the FRG calling for a new German patriotism. The regard for self-determination and the nation-state was also one of the reasons that the Social Democrats as well as the Christian Democrats pushed for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. All of this has led the leading SPD parliamentarian and publicist Peter Glotz to complain that the "fact that the Left did not even criticize the new nationalism, but instead blessed it ideologically...is unforgivable."

On the right, there has been a perceptible rise in the attachment of German youth to nationalist slogans. The lavishly funded *Junge Freiheit*, a national-conservative student newspaper that lauds Holocaust revisionists and attacks "West-extremism," has achieved a new popularity in schools and universities. Its self-avowed aim is to employ the tactics of the 1960s left-wing student movement on behalf of smashing the taboo against German nationalism.

The most obvious consequence of the renewed stress on the nation has been the antipathy toward further immigration. Since World War II, the FRG has experienced successive waves of immigration. In fact, modern Germany is in a real sense a product of immigration. The first wave consisted of millions of refugees from East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania, and the Sudetenland; the second, of "guest workers" from Turkey; and the third, of refugees from the Third World and the Balkans. In the past two years Germany, with a population of eighty million, has accepted almost one million refugees. In addition, some fifteen thousand Jews have emigrated from the former Soviet Union to Germany, with Berlin alone having an influx of five thousand. It is worth recalling that the United States, with a population of 260 million, accepts only 700,000 legal immigrants a year.

Despite the immigrants streaming toward Germany, Kohl has declared that "Germany is not a country of immigration" and leading CDU parliamentarian Wolfgang Schäuble has asserted that "we gain our identity, not from commitment to an idea, but from belonging to a particular nation, a *Volk*." Yet Germany's low birth rate will force it to import more workers from Eastern Europe and Turkey. The option to

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become German will have to be open for Turks as well as Eastern Europeans. It does not, however, seem likely that Germans will embrace the prospect of a so-called "multicultural" society. Everyone from Helmut Schmidt to Helmut Kohl has rejected this notion. In the fall of 1991, Eckart Schiffer, the CDU expert on foreigners, wrote a position paper repudiating the idea that Germany should emulate Australia or Canada. Though the Bundestag revised the generous asylum law in 1993, the sticking point remains the nationality law defining citizenship by blood. An ethnic German whose ancestors emigrated to Russia under Catherine the Great has an automatic right to citizenship; a Turk who speaks flawless German has almost none. Germany should follow France in making it easier for the German-born resident children of foreigners to gain citizenship (though not necessarily dual citizenship).

The tardiness of German politicians in dealing with the immigration issue may have inadvertently encouraged attacks by the radical right against refugees. Apart from the riots in Rostock in August 1992, the number of assaults have risen to around two thousand per year. The danger posed by the right should not be underestimated. Broad networks have been established across eastern and western Germany by these groups and they receive financing from German lawyers and businessmen. The tone that the right now uses in public has increased in boldness. When in March a Lübeck synagogue was firebombed (the first time a German synagogue was bombed since the Nazi era), Ignatz Bubis, the chairman of the central committee of Jews in Germany, blamed the "arsonists in spirit" on the right for creating a climate for the bombing. Franz Schönhuber, the head of the right-wing *Republikaner* and a former member of the *Waffen-SS*, responded by branding Bubis the "worst rabble-rouser in Germany." It is also significant that the German right has established ties with fascists in Russia and Austria. Meetings between the German National Offensive and the Russian National Unity organization took place in Moscow in February and both groups have organized demonstrations on each other's behalf. It may not even be too much to speculate that a trans-national European right is emerging that will seek to effect its own brand of European unity.

So far, the parties on the German right have made uneven gains in state elections. There are two principal parties, the *Republikaner* and the *Deutsche Volksunion* (DVU), or German People's Union, led by Gerhard Frey, the editor of the *Deutsche National Zeitung*. In April 1992 elections in Baden-Württemberg and Schleswig-Holstein the DVU entered state parliament on the issue of ceding the deutschmark. Coupled with the pressure from the Bavarian CSU, these right-wing parties have succeeded in polarizing the German party system. Sympathy for the far right does not come solely from disgruntled CDU voters. On the contrary, the right-wing parties have also drawn many of their adherents from traditional social-democratic strongholds. In state elections in Hesse the SPD lost more votes to the *Republikaner* than the CDU, while the CDU lost more votes to the Greens than the SPD. The SPD also lost a number of votes in September 1993 elections in Hamburg to the *Republikaner*. The elections to the European parliament in June will be a barometer for the depth of support for right-wing German parties.

The widespread voter disgust with the established political parties suggests that in the so-called "Super Vote Year 1994"—sixteen state elections as the run up to the October 1994 national elections—the most likely result is a grand coalition between the SPD and CDU. The fringe parties should make the greatest relative gains: the Republicans may well enter and the Greens re-enter the Bundestag in 1994. The breakdown of the old three party system—the CDU, SPD, and FDP—into a five party system will push the

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CDU to the right and the SPD to the left. Kohl's crown prince, Wolfgang Schäuble, who speaks of the need to return to concepts such as "the nation" and "the fatherland," has already begun to position the CDU to the right on social and foreign policy issues.

The quietist elements on the German left may push the SPD to focus on Eastern Europe and to follow a German course that is unhampered by ties to NATO. In its latest official party program, the SPD has already stated that "with the end of the East-West conflict NATO has lost its importance as a western defense alliance." Though the SPD candidate for chancellor Rudolf Scharping has strenuously denied that he would follow a neutralist path, the temptation of a German *Sonderweg*, or special path, still holds its attractions for the body of the SPD. Indeed, the Green party, which is a possible coalition partner of the SPD, called in March for the abolition of NATO.

What none of the parties will be able to ignore is that the nation-state enjoys a new popularity among the Germans. Kohl's attempt to combine German unification with European integration has failed. Once Germany recovers from the economic strains engendered by unification, it will not be the tongue on the balance in Europe. It will be the dominant nation-state in a German Europe. German predominance in an enlarged Europe is not necessarily a cause for concern. A Germany that openly pursues its national interests in Europe can be a more reliable and predictable Germany. It may even help to stabilize an otherwise turbulent Eastern Europe. The danger is that the Germans will delude themselves about the consequences of their own actions—or inaction—and about the unresolved tension between morality and power. The challenge for Germany now is to strike the proper balance between self-effacement and self-assertion. □

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Demographic Disaster
The Soviet Legacy

Nicholas Eberstadt

IN MOSCOW IT'S being called "a demographic catastrophe." Preliminary population figures for 1993 are in, and they document a kind of upheaval never before seen in a modern industrial nation during peacetime. Since 1989—when the final crisis of the Soviet Empire commenced—birth rates have fallen by nearly 40 percent, and death rates are up almost as sharply. Survival chances for nearly every segment of the Russian population appear to have worsened significantly over the past four years: according to official numbers, even infant mortality and maternal mortality are on a steady rise. For Russian men, life expectancy has reportedly dropped by at least three years since 1989—possibly even more. "If the mortality rate remains this high in the immediate future," one Russian commentator warned in *Izvestiya* (March 3, 1993), "a third of the generation of youth, who are now 16, will not live until 60." Her projection, however, was based on the death patterns of 1992; conditions have worsened still further since then.

These strange and alarming trends, moreover, are not isolated by the boundaries of the Russian Federation. Quite the contrary: information now being generated by a dozen independent and unrelated state statistical agencies in Eastern Europe and the European regions of the former Soviet Union paint a portrait of an enormous and diverse region gripped by a common demographic convulsion—and one very similar to Russia's. From Leipzig to Vladivostok, it appears that birth rates are plummeting, marriage rates plunging, and death rates soaring.

No one—East or West—predicted that the demise of Warsaw Pact communism would be followed by such violent demographic tremors. Yet these dramatic population trends are very real. When birth and death registration is nearly complete—as it is in all these countries—population data can be easily checked for internal inconsistencies. In general, the quality of the new demographic information looks quite good.[1] In fact, there is good

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[1]The most important exception to this generalization concerns infant mortality figures from Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and most of the former Soviet Union. During the communist era low-birthweight, high-risk newborns were excluded from the infant mortality tally by definition in the USSR, and in practice by those Eastern European states. Paradoxically, current infant mortality numbers from these territories may nevertheless convey an accurate impression of trends in infant survival, insofar as there is no compelling evidence to date that these statistical deficiencies have been remedied.

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reason to believe that the population trends for these post-communist reasons are intrinsically *more* accurate and *more* reliable than their figures on inflation, unemployment, wage levels, or GNP.

If these population trends are genuine, they are also genuinely ominous. For seismic shocks in birth rates and death rates are compelling and meaningful indicators of societies in extreme distress. In and of themselves, moreover, these demographic shocks threaten to complicate or possibly even obstruct the transition to stable, market-oriented democracy for new and fragile states.

During the final decades of the Warsaw Pact Alliance, demographic trends within that collectivity were admittedly in many respects dismal. Death rates, for example, were gradually rising in most of those countries, and abortions commonly outnumbered live births.[2] The Soviet government, in fact, judged the USSR's population situation to be so unfavorable (and politically telling) that it suppressed even routine figures on health and mortality for more than a decade—well into Mikhail Gorbachev's era of "glasnost."

Yet even by comparison with the waning years of Warsaw Pact communism, the trends evidenced throughout the former Soviet bloc since the "revolutions of 1989" have been precipitous and severe. Between 1989 and the first half of 1993, according to official data, the birth rate fell by over 20 percent in Poland; by around 25 percent in Bulgaria; by about 30 percent in both Estonia and Romania; by fully 35 percent in Russia, and by over 60 percent in Eastern Germany (the former GDR). (Marriage rates in most post-communist countries have dropped sharply as well.)

In the past, such abrupt shocks were observed in industrial societies only during wartime. Yet many of these recent demographic jolts are actually more extreme than those associated with total war. On their course toward catastrophic defeat in World War II, for example, Imperial Japan and large regions of Nazi Germany recorded a "mere" 25 percent decline in their birthrates.

If Western Europe currently faces a "birth dearth" (as many analysts on the other side of the Atlantic are arguing), many post-Soviet areas are in the midst of a "birth famine." In recent years, Italy's low birth rate—now apparently the lowest of the European Community, and far below the replacement level—has been widely noted and discussed. Yet birth rates in many post-communist countries—among them, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine—are suddenly lower than Italy's. Western Germany, for its part, has a famously low fertility level—but Eastern Germany's today is only about half that high. Indeed: projecting present rates forward, Eastern Germany would expect an average of well under one birth per woman *per lifetime*.[3]

The falloff in births (and marriages) within the former Warsaw Pact territories has been accompanied by a pervasive upsurge in mortality. Even sturdy age groups within the former Soviet Bloc's more favored locales have been stricken: between 1989 and 1991, for example, death rates in Eastern Germany rose by nearly 20 percent for women in their late thirties—and by over 30 percent for men of the same age. For more vulnerable groups in less protective environments, the situation is grim. In most post-com-

[2]For further information, see my "Mortality and the Fate of Communist States," *Communist Economies and Economic Transformation*, no. 4, 1993, and Henry P. David, "Abortion in Europe: 1920-1991," *Studies in Family Planning*, January 1992.

[3]For more details, see my "Demographic Shocks in Eastern Germany, 1989-1993," *Europe-Asia Studies*, May-June 1994.

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munist countries, death rates among the elderly are reportedly on the rise. Official statistics are registering increases in infant mortality not only in Russia, but in Bulgaria, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Since 1989, moreover, a drop in life expectancy for both sexes—for *women* as well as for men—has been announced not only by the Russian Federation, but by the governments of Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. (When the calculations are finally done, Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, and Ukraine are likely to be added to that list; each of these places has reported a sharp jump in crude death rates since 1989.)

With a plunge in births and an upswing in deaths, the former Warsaw Pact region has suddenly entered into a general population decline. There may be nothing intrinsically worrisome about negative population growth; West Germany fared rather well, after all, in the 1970s and 1980s. But the dimensions of the current imbalance between births and deaths in many post-communist regions are breathtaking. In the first half of 1993, there were four deaths for every three births in Bulgaria; three deaths for every two births in Estonia. Throughout 1992 and 1993, Eastern Germany was burying two people for every baby born. In the first nine months of 1993, according to official figures, Moscow saw two-and-a-half times as many deaths as births; for St. Petersburg, the ratio of deaths to births was nearly three to one. Such disparities were last seen in Russia during Operation Barbarossa and the siege of Leningrad.

WHAT CAN explain the upsurge in deaths throughout the former Soviet bloc since the end of communism? We can begin by listing a few plausible possibilities which can *not* account for it. Today's health deteriorations, for instance, are not simply a steady continuation of unfavorable trends from the last days of the Soviet empire. In the late 1980s—between 1985 and 1989—mortality levels throughout the Warsaw Pact region seemed to stabilize, and even to register modest improvement. Adverse as the legacy of communism may be, current trends mark a reversal, not an extension, of tendencies from the immediate past.

By the same token, while the former Warsaw Pact's environmental problems are being widely discussed, ecological catastrophe as such does not appear to be the driving force behind the post-communist health crisis. To be sure: the dangers posed to nature and to man in these countries by poisoned water, poisoned soils, and poisoned air are real enough. In some specific areas—such as the devastated Aral Sea region in Russia—ecological destruction may have been so intense that it reduced local life expectancy. But such cases are the exception rather than the rule. Perhaps Ukrainian officials may be correct in asserting that 8,000 people died as a result of the Chernobyl disaster (rather than 32, as was claimed by the Gorbachev regime). But such a total must be compared against the 600,000 deaths in Ukraine in 1988—an annual total that has climbed by over 100,000 since then. Similarly, dreadful as industrial air pollution in the Czech Republic may be, public health studies from Bohemia and Moravia suggest that these notorious emissions have had a surprisingly slight impact on local mortality levels. Evidently, things that kill forests do not necessarily kill people.

Cause-of-death statistics from the former communist lands provide clues about the immediate, and perhaps also the underlying, reasons for the jump in death rates throughout the region. (These numbers, of course, are problematic, and must be used with caution; they may be illuminating nonetheless.) According to

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the Russian State Statistical Committee, for example, almost half of the total increase in deaths in the first nine months of 1992 and 1993 was due to a rise in cardiovascular mortality (heart attacks, strokes, and the like). Another quarter of the upsurge was attributed to deaths from "injury and trauma": from one year to the next, suicides were said to be up by 26 percent; murders by nearly half; and deaths ascribed to alcoholism by more than 100 percent. Though the particulars were different in Eastern Germany, the overall pattern was in some respects quite similar: nearly all of the widening gap between Western and Eastern German mortality levels, for instance, is attributed to deaths from heart disease, by injury (including suicide), and cirrhosis of the liver. While it may be too soon to provide a conclusive diagnosis of these national symptoms, they are surely suggestive of extreme—and as yet unrelieved—social stresses.

But the current post-communist population crisis is puzzling—and all the more disturbing—in that it does not, at first glance, seem to be associated with any particular set of social conditions, economic policies, or political arrangements. A leap in death rates may seem all too understandable for Russia—where the medical system has broken down, where antique diseases (like diphtheria) are presently out of control, and where dozens of homeless vagrants perish in train stations every month. Yet death rates are also up in Eastern Germany—where unification has ushered in major improvements in general consumption levels and in the quality of medical care. Poland's adverse demographic jolts coincided with its transition to democratic pluralism and its implementation of "shock therapy"—but Romania, which has assiduously avoided such reforms, experienced comparable trends in births and deaths. Uncertain though specific causes of these demographic upheavals may still be, what is all too apparent is that adjustment to life after communism is proving not just difficult but positively traumatic throughout the entire former Soviet Bloc.

These steep and sudden falloffs in the rates of birth and marriage arguably betoken a pervasive and profound lack of confidence in the immediate future on the part of young adults. Troubling as that might be for what it would indicate about the popular assessment of local conditions and prospects, these particular vital trends are inherently remediable, and not intrinsically injurious. Far more worrisome, are the sudden and broadly based increases in local death rates. They warrant concern on purely humanitarian grounds, but not on those grounds alone. In the modern world, where health progress is all but taken for granted, significant and general increases in mortality *always* betoken either social instability, or regime fragility, or both.

Remember: even during its disastrous decade of "debt crises," the decline of mortality throughout Latin America and the Caribbean appears to have proceeded virtually without interruption. Despite the natural and man-made disasters visited upon the sub-Sahara over the past generation (most recently, the AIDS epidemic), the United Nations estimates that only two or three African countries have suffered any declines in life expectancy over the past three decades—and by the UN's reckoning, all of these setbacks were temporary. Latin America and Africa may offer unexacting standards against which to judge performance for contemporary states, yet mortality trends now appear to be vastly worse in the post-communist societies. There are unavoidable political implications in an inability to cope with health problems that other states and societies treat as routine.

Is it entirely coincidence that *every* communist regime with falling death

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rates is still in power (China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam), whereas *every* communist government reporting long term health reversals has all collapsed? Arguably not. Similarly, it may be more than coincidental that political liberalism appears to be moving forward most smoothly in the Czech Republic (the region of the former Warsaw Pact where post-communist demographic shocks have been mildest) and encountering its most visible electoral setbacks within the grouping of countries where death rates are up most sharply: Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine. Significant deteriorations in health conditions may of themselves generate destabilizing pressures—even for governments that possess nuclear weaponry. And debilitated labor forces augur ill for the productivity increases that will be needed for the transition to affluent market-based economies.

Policymakers in Washington would be well-advised to pay close attention to the population trends of the post-communist regions in the months and years to come. Demography is not destiny—some claims to the contrary notwithstanding. But basic vital statistics may today provide a much clearer picture of the actual social and political situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union than the sort of numbers conventionally used for such purposes. Until stability is achieved and the post-communist landscape becomes familiar to Western eyes, mundane tallies of births, marriages, and deaths can help us make sense of this troubled, confusing, and potentially explosive expanse of the globe. □

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The Hungarians
History Makes a Comeback

Norman Stone

THE HISTORY OF Central Europe is a notoriously difficult subject. It lacks definition, it is endlessly complicated, much is unknown, and it generates battles. Part at least of the motivation of communists in 1945 was to get away from all that history. However, it has got the better of them. History matters, fairly obviously, more than poor old political science.

Hungary, for instance, appears to be undergoing a return of interesting historical patterns involving her internal divisions, and her relationship with the West. She has, to her friend's dismay, recently returned one-time Communists—now called socialists—as the largest party. As I write, it is not clear what will happen: a coalition of former Communists with uneasily allied parties, as in Poland, or a coalition of anticommunists. In the short term, this is a bad result. It means that the "Red Bourgeoisie"—the *nomenklatura* privatizers, who just laid hands on the State's property at dirt-cheap prices, and the old bureaucrats or the people who already in the 1980s had shabby deals outside—are back, and as the British commentator Jonathan Sunley has said, this means bad things. The old system of clients-and-patrons, which developed under communism everywhere, will be back. The effect will be to weaken the State's foundations. Some of this can be ascribed to communism and communists. Hungary in her pre-communist past was not a corrupt country; with all her faults, she maintained the rule of law until 1944.

On the other hand, there is that ineffable Central European political tradition, in which the good guys split into innumerable squabbling parties, and that, in part, explains what has just happened in Hungary. A solid phalanx of former Communists constituted an interest group, supported by the many others who felt cheated by the outcome of 1989—by the flashy rip-off Westerners, the inflation, and the obvious cold-shoulder delivered over Hungary's application to join NATO and the Common Market—can drive into a divided opposition. The one reasonably hopeful sign is that, if this happens, the opposition itself will begin to cohere, and set up what has always been missing in Hungary's past: a united conservative movement, with mass support.

Hungarians are world-beaters at many things, but particularly at pessimism. They invented the expression, "My country, bad or worse"; they will tell you that they have not won a war for the better part of a thousand years. A strain of doom and gloom goes through their literature, and the history of the country supports it.

Hungary's modern history gives few

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grounds for optimism. In 1920, having fought to the very end with Germany against the world, Hungary lost about two-thirds of her area, and became in effect a great metropolis, Budapest, attached to a sort of large golf course. She was occupied by Hitler in 1944, and then by Stalin in 1945. In theory, all of this might have meant a complete collapse of national confidence. However, Hungary is a very strange country, important way beyond what might be warranted by her size. It is a measure of the extraordinary strength of the nation that the emigrants resulting from these experiences—millions of them, world-wide—have hit the Western world with great force. In England and Scotland they have established themselves in the professions and in much else, in such a way that they almost constitute a freemasonry: although the competition from the seventeenth-century Huguenots is quite severe, theirs may count as the most successful emigration, ever. For this is a country that has produced more Nobel Prize winners than Japan. Hungarians can be quite resentful if you say of their civilization that it amounts to "Hollywood and the Bomb" (or in terms of personalities, from Alexander Korda and Zsa Zsa Gábor to Edward Teller and John Von Neumann). But it is certainly true that, from show-business to theoretical physics, Hungarians have made a more powerful mark than any other country in Central Europe.

There is a certain poetry to this. Budapest in the Twenties was a poor, defeated place, and if you were a young scientist, there was very little equipment. Leo Szilárd, for instance, lived in over-heated flats with a failed businessman father and an ambitious mother. He had intensive training in mathematics. But the theoretical physics to which this led was not an attractive career and practical life beckoned. His spell as an engineer in Weimar Germany was not, however, very successful: he and Einstein invented a refrigerator, in the vague hope of making money, but it failed, because it was expensive and made a clanking noise. This failure impelled young Szilárd into nuclear physics, and eventually into a leading role in the making of the atom bomb.[1]

Under communism, Hungary continued to occupy a role far greater than her size warranted. Her independence, in 1989, was the first in a chain-reaction of national emancipations from communism. It had been prepared for some time, and when it came was quite a low-key event. On 23 October 1989, a number of fat, middle-aged men with dead eyes pressed buttons saying "Yes," thereby voting themselves out of political existence. Of course this appeared to be a grand gesture of national liberation, and it was. However, we now know that money changed hands. In the summer of 1989, as East Germans poured through the now-open Hungarian frontier with Austria, West German money went in large amounts to Budapest, which, at any rate in theory, has the largest per capita debt in the world. In any case a new Hungarian Republic was proclaimed, and provisions were made for multi-party free elections. The date itself was not accidental, for it was the anniversary of the revolt of 1956, one of the great landmarks in the history of communism, when, in a parox-

[1]Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atom Bomb*, pp. 20-21. Rhodes suitably acknowledges the poetry of this. However, the educational background in Budapest is important, especially as far as the mathematical training was concerned. There were about a dozen truly established high schools, run mainly by the churches. John Lukacs's *Budapest 1900* describes some of them. One of the best known, the Fasor High School, has a good official history (Gabor Gyapay: *A Budapesti Evangelikus Gimnazium)*. It was characteristic of old Budapest that half of the pupils in this Lutheran schol were non-Lutherans—mainly of Jewish origin, it can be assumed.

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ysm of wounded pride, Budapest took on Soviet tanks. Outside the parliament building life went on as normal, though there was a change, one that could be seen in other capitals (and eventually in Moscow itself): people walked differently. The unmistakable sign of communism had been that it deprived people of dignity. It was, as someone remarked of John Steinbeck, a sort of inverted Aesop, using human beings to illustrate animal truths. Now, with the end of communism in Hungary, people thought that Hungary could and would rejoin the West where she belongs.

How, five years on, with new elections forthcoming, do things look? Hungary is not an easy country to interpret; there are boxes within boxes. There is Budapest, the center of which is metropolitan Western, and copied from Vienna (in my opinion, Pest, the flat left-bank half, is, along with Glasgow and Sydney, *the* great nineteenth-century city). In the last decade of communism, the central districts of Budapest were groomed as a sort of show-case: evidence that communism did not have to be mournful. Some private businesses, strictly controlled, were tolerated, and the city succeeded, where East Berlin failed, in becoming a sort of showcase. There were decent hotels and restaurants, and journalists or businessmen from the West had an interesting time: "Hungary is like Sweden," said some useful idiot in the late 1970s; a Hungarian had the answer: Swedish taxes levied on Ethiopian incomes. Just the same, something worked. It was a socialist economy, but the market in Budapest had shining fresh vegetables and decent meat. Impressive again, at any rate to many European commentators, was the fact that Hungarian dissent at this time did not involve displays of religious fervor. Some Frenchmen, looking at the millions of Poles who welcomed Pope John Paul II, dismissed him as a sort of Ayatollah. Hungarians, promoting "reform communism" at least from the mid-1970s, seemed to be much more acceptable. So Hungarian Newspaper Article Mark One emerged: a gush about "goulash communism."

Since 1989 we have had Hungarian Newspaper Article Mark Two. It sets out to create alarm about the re-emergence of nationalism and antisemitism. The government that took power after the proclamation of an independent republic was of the right—the Hungarian Democratic Forum. It talked the language of religious morality—there were many dignified old men in it who spoke sententiously about the wrongs that the country had suffered in this century—and it was the voice of the provinces, not of metropolitan Budapest. Prime Minister Antall was decent but uncharismatic: no anecdotes there. The government took an interest in the Hungarian minorities over the borders to north, east, and south—especially the two million Hungarian-speakers of Romania, who had had a bad time of things in the 1970s and 1980s. Abroad, there were alarms at a rebirth of Hungarian nationalism.

Then there is the question of antisemitism. This was a very ugly story, but one that can be interpreted in different ways. In Budapest, unlike every other Central or Eastern European capital once occupied by the Nazis, Jews survived—perhaps half a million, of whom half emigrated to Israel after the war. The conservative Hungarians who had run the country before 1944 were often antisemitic, but not in a murderous way. A quarter of the population of Budapest had been Jewish—divided between assimilated, often inter-married, middle-class professionals, and businessmen (with fabulous villas in the hills of Buda) and much poorer, barely assimilated garment-trade elements, concentrated around the *Dohány utca* synagogue in Pest (it is now being restored, with a memorial, by Tony Curtis, whose ancestry is Hungarian).

There had been legislation against

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Jews—a *numerus clausus* in higher education—even in 1920, and then further efforts to define, and discriminate against, them just before war broke out in 1939. When Hungary went to war against the Soviet Union in 1941, Jews were conscripted into labor battalions and, once in them, often had a bad time. However, there were limits, and lives were mainly safe until March 1944, when the Nazis occupied the country. Then, the yellow star was introduced, the Jews of the provinces were rounded up and transported, and those of Budapest were confined to a ghetto area around the *Dohány utca* synagogue. After a deluge of protests from the Vatican, the neutrals, and the Allies, however, deportation stopped. When, in a last desperate fling, the Germans installed a Hungarian Nazi regime, a considerable rescue action was undertaken—false papers, neutral protection (from Sweden through Wallenberg, and even through Franco's Spain), non-Jewish relatives and friends, and parts of the Christian churches came to the rescue.

It is quite possible to argue that Hungary was a deeply antisemitic country, but it is also possible to argue that decent Hungarians did what they could and that a far higher proportion of Jews survived than in any other part of occupied Europe. It could even be argued that, if the Jewish Council itself—the *Vaadah*—had not cooperated with the Germans, more still would have survived.[2] There were dark rumors to the effect that Zionists had allowed the mainly anti-Zionist Hungarian Jews to be slaughtered, so as to promote the Zionist cause. There were also dark rumors that the rich Jews had just bought their way out of transportation, neglecting any chance to save their poorer cousins, who were anyway suspect of communism. After liberation in February 1945, certainly, there was a very strong Jewish element in the Communist Party. It accounted for the four leaders—Matyás Rákosi, Ernö Gerö, Jozsef Révai and Mihály Farkas—who ruled, in the main, until 1956. I have heard people who ought certainly to have known better make quite bitter remarks about the communist affiliation of Jews. If you rejoin that a great many Jews were very good Hungarian patriots and that these antisemitic comments will only make trouble, they agree. For it *is* true that Jews took a prominent role in the uprising of 1956, along with everyone else.

When Hungary again became free in 1989, there were alarms concerning antisemitism, and this became, as I have noted, the stuff of Newspaper Article Mark Two about Hungary in the West. In Budapest, there was a mild panic, especially over the media, in which Jews, all along, had had a prominent and sometimes a very distinguished part. Now that conservative Hungarians were back in charge, would there not be a clear-out? It was not easy for foreign journalists to make anything of this quite complicated country, with its ostensibly impossible language (of which more, anon). It was not easy to place articles about Hungarian questions back home, with editors anxious to avoid bewildering readers. It was notable that the chief opposition party, the Free Democrats, had a preponderance, among its leaders, of metropolitan Jews, fluent (and funny) in foreign languages. They were outspoken free-marketeers. One odd outcome of the recent election is that many farmers voted for them: what this will mean, in terms of a future coalition with or against the former Communists, is at the moment of this writing unclear. Making antisemitism a key issue helped, and so it vaguely belongs in the subconscience of the West. So, though more vaguely still, does the expression 'Hungarian nationalist'. It had a bad press before the War, though, since the country had been grotesquely mishandled by the

[2]Maria Schmidt, *Kollaboracio vagy Kooperacio* (Budapest, 1900).

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West in 1919-20, this was not altogether fair.

Interpreting current affairs in once-communist countries is very difficult—in Russia above all, of course, but also elsewhere. In the five years since 1989, we have seen a return of the communists in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia; in Romania and Serbia, they never lost power, though they changed their names. In what sense are these people still communists, and where are they heading? In an odd way, history is a help, and it is strange to see how old patterns, which you might have thought had been obliterated in the last fifty years, revive. In the case of the Czechs, for instance, there has been a return to the enlightened-bureaucratic tradition of Bohemia, of which President Masaryk, the country's first leader, was an eminent representative. Privatization, 'Europe', and a considerable inflow of investment have resulted, and the Klaus government has organized its affairs with commonsense. The country has stood out so far with considerable success against a return of the communists.

With Hungary, too, there is a return to history. In a way, she has been here before. For most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the country was mostly taken over by the Ottoman Turks. A strip in the west and north-west went to the Catholic Habsburgs, and both the architecture and the modern ways of the inhabitants show this, even now. Across the great plain, it was a different story, with marching armies leaving nothing much standing. Transylvania, now in Romania, was at that time an independent principality, its relations with Austria quite hostile. It was there that Hungarian culture mainly survived, and that culture was very closely associated with Calvinism. To this day, there is a Calvinist streak in Hungary, which distinguishes her from nearly everywhere else in Central Europe. It was the Calvinism of resentful, but energetic provincial places—Scotland, the Boers, even Holland, being cases in point. It disliked fanciful Catholic aristocrats with strings of glossy titles and palaces; but it also disliked the hoards of illiterate, philoprogenitive Orthodox peasants. As happened in, say, Northern Ireland, it was almost completely literate by 1650. The Calvinists in Transylvania were tough and energetic. A senior pastor in Skékely-Udvarhely once said to me: "If it had not been for the Austrians and the Romanians, we'd have developed as the Dutch did, with much technology and the rule of law."

Curiously enough, in Hungary proper, that Calvinist tradition quite easily made its peace with communism. It may have been a common rationalism. In 1947, during the take-over, it was quite possible for communists to play off Catholics and Calvinists, and the latter sometimes detested Catholics more than they detested communists. One of the communists' stooge non-communists, Zoltán Tildy, who became president for a while (he *was* arrested quite soon thereafter), was a pastor; and there were ugly rumors, in Communist times, that the heads of the seminary reported those of their adepts who prayed too fervently. One pastor, the elder Géza Németh, was even expelled by his own church for taking too strong an interest in Transylvania; he became, for a while, an art dealer, but concentrated on the upbringing of his sons—one of whom, Zsolt, is a leader of the Young Democrats and, by all accounts, a likely future leader of Hungary. However, he was defeated in the election, and his party, the Young Democrats, made a much poorer showing than it would have done had the election occurred two years ago. A friend of mine, a grandson of the Comintern, calls it "the Yuppie Party," and so it seems to have been (unjustly) perceived by the voters.

Calvinists and Lutherans were the backbone of the Hungarian independence movement, from the end of the seven-

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teenth century until the inter-war period. Although together only about a third of the country's population, they dominated politics. In this writer's (contentious) opinion, it was this that enabled the Jews of Hungary to become more integrated than anywhere else in Central Europe. However, the religious differences did make for divisions in politics, as elsewhere in Europe around 1900, and frustrated the emergence of a proper conservative party with mass support. It was only in 1989, when the Hungarian Democratic Forum appeared, that a national-minded, mixed-religion party could take over affairs under universal suffrage. However, it suffered strains. It was divided between social-Catholic corporatists, who privatized very, very slowly, and Protestant classical liberals, and it delayed seriously over important steps—not least, a proper removal of obviously compromised elements from the administration, almost all of which carried on, especially in the media, in the same hands. Very late in the day, a purge was clumsily executed in the media, which gave endless bad publicity for no serious return. The Forum was also compromised by the existence of a small extreme-nationalist fringe, with one István Csurka, making antisemitic remarks. Eventually, he was expelled, and his separate party made no running in the election.

And then there is the West, especially Germany. The Germans (and the Austrians) have been all over Hungary. On a personal level, relations are good—German government advisers and businessmen often are extremely impressive, and of course their own performance at home, with the regeneration of the rust-belt Ruhr, is a standing rebuke to this Scotsman, who can see how badly British governments handled similar rust-belt problems in the north of England. In the eighteenth century—another of these ghosts from the past—there had been a similar regeneration in Hungary at Germanic hands. Then, she was know as "Swabian Turkey"—a once-Turkish colony, taken over by south-German Swabians. In a funny way, even the Hungarian language reflects this. In structure and basic vocabulary, it is of course Finno-Ugric, sticking prepositions on the end of words and changing verb-endings according to whether there is an object or not. But there is an unmistakable German influence once you get further into the language. Those ineffably literal-minded Germanic compounds—"picture-putting-into-yourself" for "imagination"—have their Hungarian equivalents, as the compound gets translated bit by bit. My prize goes to "counsellessness"—tanácstalánság, which is the German *Ratlosigkeit* and means "cluelessness." Fiercely Magyar-looking surnames are, similarly, just renderings of occupations, as they are further west. "Juhász" is just "shepherd," and "Kertész" (i.e. Tony Curtis) is "gardener."

HUNGARY IS a Western country, wearing something of an Asiatic fancy-dress, though there are legitimate questions as to how natural the fancy-dress really is. There was an absurd argument around 1900 as to why Jews became such good Hungarians. Was there a blood connection, through the non-semitic Khazars who had once converted to Judaism, and who might be racial cousins of the Hungarians? This generated heat, the antisemites sometimes arguing that Hungarians, from ancient Egypt, were really semites themselves. A whiff of this argument comes up in Arthur Koestler's *Thirteenth Tribe*, a richly preposterous work.

At any rate, Hungary was a western country, not so greatly different from Bavaria, and the peculiar interest in the history of this now small country is precisely the way in which it reflects Western religious divisions. It had the creativity of Calvinism, Lutheranism, Catholicism, and

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their tendency to collide, which accounted for much of its peculiar politics. Faced with a foreign occupant, the immediate tendency was to exploit the foreigner against domestic enemies; only after a while did the nation combine, even then, mainly, because one or other religious group took a dominant role. In my opinion, this is still true.

The politicians are quite divided, and the "socialists" under Gyula Horn have even been singing the *Internationale*. But the reality, coming in fast, is the Germanic conquest. From Vienna, and from the *Bundesrepublik*, much money and many contracts are being made. Whatever the "socialists" do, this process will continue, for Hungary's own political battles are always sorted out by foreign intervention, and this one, this time, is benign.

So what happens? There is one great problem, running through Hungarian history: the absence of a conservative party with a mass base. In the old days, there were magnates with enormous estates, who could simply 'make' elections in these estates. The government, through electoral pressures of various sorts, could do so as well. The result was that Hungary developed a top-heavy governing party, with its own strains and animosities, while the mass of the people remained essentially outside the process. Lack of political experience meant that, after 1945, the anticommunist parties split, and re-split—admittedly, after much provocation by communists. You could even argue—I have not seen this demonstrated once and for all, one way or the other—that these splits enabled the communists to impose totalitarianism.

In a way, this pattern has been recently repeated. The communists have been confronted with a plethora of non-communist parties, from the Democratic Forum through the Free Democrats to the Young Democrats, the Smallholders, the Christian Democrats and now Csurka's nationalists. The Democratic Forum, in power for the last five years, made some mistakes, over-used some of its power (for instance over the media) and was unfortunate, in that neither "Europe" nor NATO showed any willingness to incorporate Hungary.

It is likely that the 'socialists' will not do very well: they cannot very well stop the troubles which cause voters to opt for them, for there is no alternative to privatization, and probably not very much alternative to mild inflation. In other words, there will be a return to conservatism. And what conservatism? The Democratic Forum will have lost some of its fissiparous elements. We ought to see what we have not yet seen properly in Hungary: a coalition of the western-European Christian Democratic kind, with a very strong liberal, free-market wing. This would be a party not unlike Klaus's own, in Prague, and in that case we shall see Hungary joining Europe properly.

I remain convinced that the past of this country, given all of the troubles, occupations, and divisions, is an enormously promising guide to the future. A small country that produces a Bartók, a Biró of ball-point fame, and a Rubik, of cube fame, has something going for it. □

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Ukraine: A Question of Survival

Paula J. Dobriansky

TWO YEARS AFTER its rebirth as an independent state, Ukraine is struggling to survive. The economy is in shambles; Crimea is a political tinderbox; given the results of the parliamentary elections in the Spring of 1994, the prospects for effective government remain uncertain; and Moscow's intentions toward Kiev, at best, are unclear. The very existence of Ukraine is in jeopardy.

In the West, assessments of Ukraine's prospects range from outright pessimism—notably embodied in a recent CIA National Intelligence Estimate which apparently forecasts that economic failure is likely to result in the splintering of eastern from western Ukraine—to more hopeful assessments of Kiev's political prospects, predicated upon optimistic readings of Ukrainian public opinion and the fact that no *oblast* in eastern Ukraine has a Russian majority.

There is less disagreement about the geopolitical and military consequences should Ukraine experience political collapse. Most analysts agree that this would probably entail both a civil war and a Russian-Ukrainian military clash. Indeed, many believe along with Karen Elliot House that "the major security threat to Europe in the near term will be Russia's attempts to reabsorb Ukraine," and that this could result in violence that will dwarf the Yugoslav conflict. Moreover, a collapse of the Ukrainian state would almost certainly mean the end of Russia's democratic experiment and a reversion to imperialism, with dire ramifications for Western security. In Zbigniew Brzezinski's apt characterization, "Russia can either be an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both."

Averting the worst-case outcome in Ukraine will require judicious collaboration among all the major stakeholders: the Ukrainian government and opposition or reformist forces; the Russian government and diverse Russian political and bureaucratic players; and, last, but not least, Western governments. To be sure, both the primary responsibility for Kiev's future and the opportunity to shape it lie with the Ukrainian government and people; actions of other parties, at most, can make Ukrainian success more or less likely.

Different Interests, Different Perspectives

ON THE BANKS of the Dnieper River in Kiev stands a statue of the city's founders—Kiy, Shchek, Khoriv and their sister, Lybid. It is a reminder of the birth of a city and the growth of a nation at the vital strategic and commercial crossroads of Eurasia. Yet the statue itself and the history it

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symbolizes hold different meanings for Ukrainians and Russians.

Most Ukrainians view the past as a story of repeated brutal efforts to subjugate their country, primarily on the part of Russia, but also involving Poland, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey. In this view of things, Ukraine's history has been a record of betrayals, exploitations, suffering and partitions—a process of victimization that was relieved only by two very brief periods of genuine independence: the Zaporizhian Sitch (1648-1654), when the Zaporizhian Cossacks were governed by an elected leader, Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky; and 1918-1920, while the Russians were engaged in a civil war of their own. Kiev—besieged on many occasions by barbarians, Westerners, and fellow Slavs—is a proud symbol of Ukraine's determination to survive and prevail.

Unfortunately, this vision is not generally shared by Russians, most of whom recall with pride the Kievan Rus' period, when Kiev, long before Moscow rose to prominence, supposedly functioned as one of the great Russian cities, alongside Pskov, Novgorod, Suzdal and Vladimir. Russians genuinely believe that, the commonly suffered privations of communism aside, throughout most of its history their country has behaved altruistically toward fellow Slavs in general and Ukrainians in particular. For example, for generations Russian textbooks have depicted the 1654 Treaty of Pereyslavskaya Rada, which secured the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian empire, as a glorious event that freed Ukraine from Ottoman and Polish oppression. Since Kiev is one of the oldest Slavic cities, Ukrainian independence is today a jarring reminder of the collapse of imperial Russia.

As well as being a psychological defeat, the loss of Ukraine has been a serious blow to Russia's economy and has greatly diminished Russia's geo-political clout—something well-anticipated by Lenin who once remarked that "if we lose Ukraine, we lose our head." Given that premise, it is not surprising that in 1918 the Lenin-led government moved to repudiate the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and recapture Ukraine as soon as Germany was sufficiently weakened to allow it to.

Russia still has not reconciled itself to Ukrainian independence, viewing it as a temporary aberration. Polls show that the majority of both the Russian population at large and of democratic politicians see it as a tragic mistake to be corrected. All Russian leaders understand that, for a variety of geopolitical, economic, and even psychological reasons, the existence of an independent and strong Ukraine will greatly limit their options. Consequently, the Russian government has proved perfectly willing to exacerbate and exploit Ukrainian economic problems, while publicly lambasting the Kravchuk government over such sensitive issues as the handling of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, the Black Sea fleet, treatment of Russians in Ukraine and the status of Crimea. Russia's adoption of a muscular foreign and defense policy in the "near abroad," a policy now embraced by Russia's entire political spectrum, from Vladimir Zhirinovsky to Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, further complicates Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainian independence will curb Moscow's ambitions to exert a strong influence not only on developments in the former Soviet Union but on Central and East European developments.

A Troubled Axis

GIVEN THEIR divergent strategic premises, it is not surprising that Kiev and Moscow see the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in a very different light. For Ukraine, it is a temporary arrangement of convenience, primarily designed to facilitate a civilized divorce between Russia and Ukraine. For Moscow, the CIS is a more or less permanent institution, intended to facilitate a painless political transition toward a "union" and legitimize Russian economic, political, and even military dominance over the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Russians are quite candid about their aspira-

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tions in general, and the relationship between the political and economic dimensions of the CIS membership status in particular. Thus, for example, the comment by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin that membership in the CIS economic union would entail a partial loss of both economic and political sovereignty, and the conviction expressed by Yeltsin's press secretary that economic union would "inevitably and logically" be followed by political union.[1]

That Russia does not expect Ukraine to survive and would like to reincorporate it, does not, of course, mean that Moscow is prepared to go to war over the issue or even to run an inordinate risk of an armed conflict. With the exception of a few hardliners like Zhirinovsky and Rutskoi, Russia's political mainstream is content with waiting for Ukraine to fall into its hands; it is also comfortable with eschewing the formal imperial trappings and conceding the semblance of sovereignty to Ukraine, while settling for real hegemony.

To date, the Russian government has been extremely cautious in its behavior. Unless a fundamental political realignment in Russia takes place or massive internal unrest breaks out in Ukraine, it is likely to remain so. At the same time, one cannot exclude the possibility of an unplanned confrontation. Events in Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Baltics, and particularly Moldova demonstrate that Yeltsin's government and the Moscow-based Ministry of Defense do not fully control the Russian military. (Indeed, for several years now, Russia's 14th Army in Moldova has functioned as a rogue force, controlled entirely by its commander, Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed.) In the case of Ukraine, it is possible to envision a confrontation instigated by the Black Sea officers that would draw in both the Ukrainian units stationed in Crimea and rogue Russian troops from the Dniester Republic and the Caucusus.

Crimea poses a special challenge. The strong and intense feelings it arouses in both Moscow and Kiev are best characterized by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's assertion that "Kuwait is to Iraq, what Crimea is to Russia"—and Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk's ominous promise that if "Russia takes Crimea, Ukraine will remain nuclear."

The peninsula was transferred to Ukraine from the Russian federation by Khrushchev in 1954. Ironically, the purpose of the gift was to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Ukraine's reunification with Russia. Crimea's 2.5 million inhabitants are 67 percent Russian, 26 percent Ukrainian, and 10 percent Tatar. Approximately one-third of the population is made up of active duty troops and military retirees, who are generally pro-Russian. On the other hand, the Tatars, who suffered greatly following Stalin's genocidal decision to ship them all to Siberia, clearly view Ukrainian rule as the lesser of two evils.

While the majority of Crimeans originally voted for Ukrainian independence, these days sentiments seem to run toward autonomy within a loose Kiev-based federative structure, if not yet outright independence from Ukraine. In the Crimean presidential elections of January 1994, the pro-Ukraine candidate, Mykola Bagrov, was trounced by the pro-Russian Yuriy Meshkov. On March 27, elections for Crimea's parliament were held concurrently with Ukraine's national parliamentary elections. With the pro-Meshkov and separatist Rossiya Bloc winning 67 percent of the vote (64 of the Crimean parliament's 98 seats), the outcome further consolidated President Meshkov's political control. However, as Myron Wasylyk and Ian Brzezinski have pointed out, "Although Meshkov's control over the Crimean parliament has been strengthened, his political standing in Crimea has shown signs of weakness. Despite [his strong appeals] to boycott the Ukrainian national parliamentary elections, 61 percent of Crimea's population participated." More important, perhaps, is the

[1]Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine: A Year of Crisis," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, no. 1, Jan. 7, 1994 p. 40.

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fact that the Crimean referendum, carried out as an "opinion poll" after Kiev proscribed a full-fledged referendum and taken during the March parliamentary elections, indicated that 74.8 percent agreed that Crimea should have greater autonomy from Kiev; 82 percent supported dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship; and 77.9 percent endorsed giving presidential decrees the force of law.[2]

The dilemma facing Kiev today is how to prevent Meshkov from going too far without provoking massive bloodshed, and thus Russian intervention. An unduly harsh Ukrainian policy of economic blockade — Crimea receives 80 percent of its foodstuffs from Ukraine—would almost certainly be counterproductive. On the other hand, an excessively accomodationist policy—such as allowing Meshkov to secure full Crimean autonomy within a federal structure—might also backfire, by encouraging Crimean leaders to seek more and more concessions from Kiev. Since many former senior CPSU officials —and most Ukrainian leaders fit this description—feel that it was Gorbachev's excessively accomodationist policies toward the Balts, Georgians and ultimately, the Ukrainians that led to the splintering of the USSR, the Kiev-based government clearly wants to avoid a similar experience with Crimea.

The Military: Good and Bad News

CREDIBLE MILITARY capabilities and sound military doctrine for employing them in both war and peace are critical to the survival of an independent Ukraine. Thus far, the record of Ukrainian military policy has been mixed. The Kiev-based government got off to a good start, moving decisively to seize control over former Soviet troops and military installations on its territory, promptly administering loyalty oaths to all soldiers and officers, and returning to Russia those who refused. In the end, some 10,000 officers out of approximately 300,000 were dismissed, either because they refused to take the oath or because there were other questions about their loyalty. While most of the remaining officers are ethnic Russian or strongly Russified Ukrainians, and nearly all conscripts are Ukrainians, the situation differs from that in some other ex-Soviet countries in that ethnic tensions in the military seem to be largely absent or under control.

Ukraine was also fortunate in having a very able military officer, General Konstantin Morozov, as its first defense minister. Under his guidance early on, the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament) articulated a politically compelling version of a military doctrine, which asserts the country's non-aligned status, the independence from political interference of Ukraine's military, and peaceful relations with neighbors. Ukraine also has used its military in peacekeeping operations, exerting a positive influence in the Bosnia conflict.

So much for the good news. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian leadership has proved unable to establish effective civilian control, or even centralized control, over its military assets. The situation is characterized not so much by insubordination as by a lack of experienced and knowledgeable staff officers who can exercise effective leadership. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that in the former Soviet Union all military assets were tightly controlled from Moscow, so that there is relatively little Ukrainian experience of managing forces above the military district level. Thus, local military leaders enjoy considerable autonomy. Additionally, very little exists in the way of a national military strategy, defense planning, defense budgeting or field exercises. Instead, the Ukrainian military has muddled through, maintaining—as best it can in deteriorating economic conditions—the Soviet era equipment and infrastructure it has inherited.

While it is hard to blame the military alone, the state of Ukrainian thinking on nuclear weapons is particularly disquieting. It seems that the military has failed to think

[2]Myron Wasylyk and Ian Brzezinski, "Update on Ukraine," No. 14, April 15, 1994 pp. 3-4.

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through the consequences of Ukraine's continued possession of nuclear weapons: This is a germane issue since even under the January 1994 Tripartite Agreement Kiev would retain some nuclear weapons for years to come. Kiev's high command also neglected either to analyze how to generate optimum deterrence quality from their nuclear arsenal for however long they have it, or to consider how to maximize Kiev's security once Ukrainian denuclearization takes place, by building credible and cost-effective conventional defenses. This state of affairs has harmed both the Ukrainian defense posture and its international reputation.

By proffering numerous assurances that it intended promptly to become a non-nuclear state and then repudiating them or simply not implementing those assurances, Ukraine has created an impression that it is an unreliable diplomatic partner. Ironically, had Kiev originally insisted it wanted to retain a modest ICBM force, while agreeing to dismantle promptly all START-accountable weapons and implementing numerous Confidence Building Measures (e.g., taking its forces off alert status), it probably would have succeeded in gaining a measure of international approval, though certainly not Moscow's acquiescence. Indeed, had the Ukrainian government employed the vernacular of "finite deterrence," it would have made it more difficult for Western governments to criticize it.

By now, of course, these options are no longer viable. While failure in this respect is primarily attributable to Kiev's civilian leadership, the Ukrainian military did not attempt to ascertain how long it would take them to develop a high-quality conventional defense posture and whether, if an indefinite possession of nuclear weapons was politically unfeasible, Kiev could at least retain them for an interim period. Thus, in the end, Ukraine got the worst of all possible worlds—it has paid a heavy political price for retaining nuclear weapons, and has played into the hands of Moscow's anti-Ukrainian propaganda, without deriving much, if any, additional deterrent quality from its nuclear posture.

One of the most serious and divisive military disagreements between Ukraine and Russia is over control of the 300 vessel-strong Black Sea fleet. At least four attempted divisions of the fleet assets and on-shore installations have taken place over the last two years, without quelling the underlying tensions. The most recent accord was signed in Moscow on April 15 by Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk. The deal assigned some 20 percent of the fleet's assets to Kiev, with the rest going to Russia. Ukrainian and Russian fleets would now be stationed separately. Almost immediately, however, the defense ministers of the two countries began to dispute the agreement's key terms. The recent flight of a Sevastopol-based naval research/support vessel to Russia, with Ukrainian forces chasing it across the Black Sea, demonstrated dramatically the dangerous fact that Ukraine does not have the full loyalty of most of the naval officers.

The Missing Economic Reform

ALTHOUGH THE intricate Russian-Ukrainian minuet over security-related issues has preoccupied Kiev, Moscow and Western capitals, the crisis of the Ukrainian economy also has important geopolitical implications. The absence of economic reform and resulting domestic developments serve as a magnet for Moscow's meddling and manipulation. At worst, they may provide Russia with an excuse for military intervention; at best, they furnish leverage for Moscow in its dealings with Ukraine.

Ukraine's economy continues to deteriorate. Indeed, while most countries of the former Soviet Union have ailing economies, Ukraine's economic decline has been the worst of all. Though in recent months inflation rates have fallen, double-digit rates were rampant in 1993. The Ukrainian currency has lost nearly all value. Industrial production has fallen 60 percent since last year and they are printing 25 percent more money than in

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January-February 1993. Nor is there any sign of improvement on the horizon. In the apt characterization of Viktor M. Pynzenyk, the former Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economics, the Kravchuk government approach to economic reform has been one of "shock without therapy."

Several factors have contributed to this sorry state of affairs. Ukrainians inherited a bad situation. The Soviet economy as a whole had been going downhill throughout the 1980s, and in the latter part of the decade decline had been sharp. Another key Soviet legacy was the extreme interdependence between Ukrainian-based enterprises and factories spread throughout the former Soviet Union. Cutting this umbilical cord has proven to be extremely difficult. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian energy sector has been heavily dependent on Russia's oil and gas shipments, its nuclear fuel supplies, and its willingness to receive spent fuel rods and other nuclear waste. Ukrainian factories are long accustomed to subsidized energy supplies. Politically, it has been difficult for Kravchuk and his Kiev-based colleagues to move against powerful regional economic interests, especially in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine which has traditionally enjoyed a close relationship with the neighboring Russian provinces. To add to all this, Russia has proved perfectly willing to resort to economic blackmail, by raising manifold the prices Ukraine is supposed to pay for oil and gas, while continuing to insist on the old pricing structures for Ukraine's agricultural and industrial products.

Kravchuk's government is not free from blame for the mess. Heavily dominated by former party apparatchiks and economic managers, it has failed to craft and implement a comprehensive economic reform program. Indeed, it has neither arrested the decline of the traditional command-and-control economy, nor replaced it with anything more market-driven.

The economic crisis has seriously undermined the popularity of the government. A poll conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Center shows that a majority of Ukraine's population believes that the economy is in a critical or even catastrophic state, and about 84 percent blame the government. That the economic crisis has contributed to growing regionalism and polarization is clear from the preliminary composition and orientation of the new Rada. The center-right Ukraina Democratic Coalition, predominantly Kiev- and western-based, favors Ukraine's integration into European economic structures and the maintenance of a unitary state; the center-left Interregional Bloc for Reforms, mostly based in south and eastern Ukraine, advocates Ukraine's full entry into the CIS' economic union and supports a federal restructuring. The results of the referenda held in both eastern Ukraine (on integration in the CIS economic union) and in Crimea (on autonomy from Kiev) flow largely from the population's discontent with current economic conditions and the Ukrainian leadership's inaction.

Whether ethnic, religious and political divisions can be controlled depends in large part on the economy. The vast majority of Ukrainian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic, geographical, religious or political affiliations, appear to be primarily interested in better living standards, and are willing to give the government some breathing space in which to launch economic reforms. As is most vividly demonstrated by the high voter turnout (75 percent) in the recent parliamentary elections, they want government to address and succeed in resolving the problems that have plagued Ukraine's sovereignty. Economic failure will not only inflame social divisions; if it reaches a level that results in serious civil unrest, it will make Russian intervention more likely.

The Outlook from Washington

UKRAINE IS geostrategically important to the United States for three reasons. First, it provides a large and effective buffer zone—one the size of France—between Russia and much of Central Europe. Should it

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once again fall under Russian rule of whatever variety and cease to perform that function, the political atmosphere of Central Europe would alter radically and for the worse. The problems for America in the region would magnify as its old superpower rival again became a major stakeholder—or at least a perceived threat—there.

Second, the collapse into chaos and internal violence of a country the size and importance of Ukraine would worsen the prospects of stability and democracy in Russia and other adjacent countries. Given the long common border, the likelihood that the disorder would spread into Russia would be high.

Third, Ukraine is at present the third largest nuclear power in the world. It is also the most troubled possessor of those weapons in significant numbers. Insofar as the United States is serious about handling the problem of nuclear proliferation, Ukraine must figure prominently in its calculations.

For a combination of these reasons, the United States is obliged to formulate a coherent and effective policy towards Ukraine. So far it has not done so. Until fairly recently, U.S. policy toward Ukraine was driven almost entirely by the third of the considerations listed. Its imperative was how best to pressure Ukraine into prompt ratification of the START I Treaty, with the dismantling of all remaining Ukrainian nuclear weapons and an accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty soon to follow. Indeed, since the Clinton administration seemed intent on giving Moscow a preeminent place among all post-communist countries of the former Soviet Union, the future of U.S.-Ukrainian relations looked rather bleak. Fortunately, a change towards a more balanced approach seems to have taken place in the last several months.

To begin with, the administration appears to be cautiously reassessing its Moscow-only policy and seems interested in a more active pursuit of close ties with several non-Russian states, including Ukraine. While the U.S. needs to continue a careful and sensitive policy in the nuclear area, one designed to secure Ukrainian adherence to the tripartite agreement on nuclear forces, it also needs to help Kiev deal both with its internal problems and with any possible Russian noncompliant behavior. Serious consideration should be given to allowing Kiev at least a seven to ten year grace period in implementing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such a delay should help accomplish two important goals. First, it would help provide some modicum of deterrence for Ukraine while it sets its house in order and while it is still very vulnerable to Russian pressure. Second, this nuclear interregnum would give Kiev time to develop and construct a creditable conventional defense posture, something that it has failed to do thus far.

Meanwhile, with the recent U.S.-brokered compromise over the nuclear issue bilateral relations have been broadened. As a result of President Kravchuk's visit to the United States on March 4, U.S.-Ukrainian economic ties have been expanded. For example, a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment has been established to lower trade barriers and promote investment; $50 million in additional Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) funding has been made available for investment projects in Ukraine in FY 1994; and the benefits of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences was extended to Ukraine, providing Kiev with duty-free access into the U.S. market for some 4,400 products. Other areas of heightened bilateral cooperation include: science and technology, agriculture, defense conversion, culture and energy. Washington also is now prepared to dispense sizable amounts of economic aid to Ukraine, totaling roughly $700 million in FY 1994 and FY 1995.

We should encourage Ukraine to craft and implement a comprehensive economic reform program and provide any relevant technical assistance. And the United States, which has already acted as an engaged and scrupulously fair broker in negotiations between Moscow and Kiev over nuclear weapons, should expand this approach to

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include other contentious Russia-Ukraine issues—for example, the pricing and payment for Russian oil and gas deliveries.

The U.S. also needs to support Ukraine's efforts to anchor itself firmly within the western security and economic architecture. Initially, given the administration's recent decision to eschew formal broadening of NATO, and to opt instead for the Partnership for Peace (PFP) approach, Washington should strive to imbue PFP, with some substantive content in the form of both staff and field exercises, involving NATO troops and troops from Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. While large-scale military assistance programs would be controversial at this time, there is a variety of low key ways to help Kiev with training, equipment maintenance and modernization, as well as the development of doctrinal concepts and force planning. We can also encourage Central European democracies to cooperate more with Ukraine in the military sphere.

Ultimately, serious consideration should be given to moving beyond the PFP and admitting Ukraine and other Central European countries into NATO. If skillfully pursued, this policy would not cause an open rupture in NATO's relations with Russia, but would enhance the alliance's vitality in the post-Cold War era, while providing an important hedge against Russia's drift towards a neo-imperial, anti-Western posture. Other ways of enhancing Ukrainian legitimacy and international standing include helping them to become more involved with such regional and international organizations as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN. We should also encourage Kiev's continued participation in peacekeeping operations, similar to its involvement in Bosnia and other UN-sponsored ventures.

For this reason, we should strongly support the development of democratic and free market structures. The creation of a civil society and the establishment of rule of law are imperative to Ukraine's independence. Programs for political party development, internships at American newspapers or TV stations, exchanges of young scholars or parliamentarians, educational fellowships at American law schools, TV debates—programs like these have a multiplier effect on encouraging Ukraine's democratic growth.

The situation is critical, but not hopeless. Kiev can ensure the sovereignty and even the prosperity of Ukraine, if it adopts a strategic vision capable of inspiring the nation. That vision must be of a Ukraine which is a key Central European nation and an important stakeholder in Western economic and security systems, and at the same time enjoys a constructive relationship with Russia. To realize this vision, the Ukrainian leadership must devise a comprehensive economic reform package and attract foreign investment; undertake legal and electoral changes that will break the near monopoly on power at the local and regional levels of the old *nomenklatura*, while enhancing the legitimacy of Ukrainian democrats; and pursue firm but sensitive Ukrainization policies that foster national identity without promoting ethnic and religious schisms. With the right set of policies, informed by a sound vision, Ukraine can not only survive but flourish.

An intelligent U.S. policy could bolster these prospects. The United States must continue to make it clear, publicly and privately, the importance we attach to Ukraine being not only a prosperous democracy but a sovereign and independent state with inviolable borders. But ultimately, the fate of Ukrainian independence will be decided in Kiev. □

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$(N)O_3$ Problem

Fred Singer

THE INTERNATIONAL agreement to ban production of chlorofluorocarbons (in wide use as refrigerants under the trade name Freon) by the year 2000, and the 1992 decision to advance this phaseout date by five years, were based mainly on panicky stories in the media about ozone holes, skyrocketing skin cancer rates, blind sheep in Chile, and the travails of plankton in the Antarctic. But the year 1993 saw a new phenomenon in this 20-year-old CFC-ozone depletion story. For the first time, articles in the mainstream press—including the *Washington Post* and *U.S. News & World Report*—acknowledged doubts about the hypothesis that man-made chemicals, principally CFCs, have been destroying stratospheric ozone and that a future depletion would lead to catastrophes for human health and the global ecology.

In response, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club, Greenpeace, and other activist organizations circled the wagons and launched a strong counterattack. Articles by supportive journalists appeared as if on cue in *Sports Illustrated*, *Newsweek*, and two widely read technical publications, *Science* and *Chemical & Engineering News*, both with circulations well over 100,000. These articles were written with obvious inputs from proponents of the CFC-ozone hypothesis and were noteworthy for their ad hominem attacks on skeptical scientists.

It's not surprising that the intensity of this debate is heating up; the production ban is less than two years away and is still being justified by little more than an extreme risk-averse philosophy, i.e. "we're not sure there's a problem but we must do something—just in case." The facts are that the scientific underpinnings for the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the basis for the CFC phaseout policy, are shaky: the data are suspect; the statistical analyses are faulty; and the theory has not yet been validated.

Basically, the much disputed link between the release of CFCs into the atmosphere and the most serious concern, an increase in the incidence of skin cancer, particularly malignant melanoma, is as follows:

1. CFCs, with lifetimes of decades and longer, become well-mixed in the atmosphere, percolate into the stratosphere, and release chlorine.

2. Chlorine destroys ozone catalytically, and thereby could lower the total amount of ozone in the stratosphere.

Prof. S. Fred Singer, on leave from the University of Virginia, directs the Washington-based Science & Environmental Policy Project. He devised the ozone monitor used in satellites and first proposed, in a 1971 research paper in *Nature*, that manmade methane, from cattle raising and rice paddies, could deplete stratospheric ozone.

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3. A reduction in the ozone layer results in an increase in ultraviolet radiation reaching the earth's surface.

4. Exposure to more solar UV radiation leads to a huge increase in skin cancer rates and hundreds of thousands of additional deaths.

Each of these steps is controversial, has not been sufficiently substantiated, and may even be incorrect.

To begin with, there is little question that chlorine is present in the stratosphere, primarily in the form of hydrochloric acid. But the source of this chlorine is in dispute; quasi-theological speculative theory has replaced observations.

One side argues that volcanoes and ocean spray are the major sources of chlorine. Indeed, these natural sources are estimated to put some 10,000 times as much chlorine into the lower atmosphere as do manmade sources. The opposing view, however, holds that nearly all of the natural chlorine is removed by rain in a matter of days, and therefore does not penetrate into the higher atmosphere. These calculations claim that less than one part in 10,000 survives, and that CFCs are the major remaining source, being insoluble in water and therefore not "rained out."

I would distrust both sets of calculations and ask: What do the observations show?

There are only a limited number of data sets bearing on long-term trends of stratospheric chlorine; they are not very adequate, and somewhat contradictory. In 1987, Belgian scientist R. Zander published what was then the most reliable data, obtained by observing the absorption of solar infrared radiation from an instrument located on a Swiss mountaintop. His results were very clear: a rapid increase in the total content of hydrofluoric acid (HF), but no increase in hydrochloric acid (HCl). The interpretation: CFCs penetrating to the stratosphere caused the increase in HF (which does not affect ozone); but the natural chlorine sources overwhelmed the manmade ones, hence no increase in HCL.

Zander's results were roundly ignored by proponents of the CFC-ozone depletion theory. As late as 1993, Professor F. Sherwood Rowland, the co-originator of the theory, in his presidential address to the American Association of the Advancement of Science, published in the June 12, 1993 issue of the journal *Science*, did not reference Zander's 1987 paper. Instead, to support the idea of CFCs as the major chlorine source, he referenced research published in 1983 by scientists Mankin and Coffey of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, which did claim an increase in HCL between 1978 and 1982.

Interestingly, this paper had been severely criticized by Prof. Ronald Prinn in a book edited by Rowland himself in 1988. And although Rowland denied that Mankin and Coffey's paper showed anything but a CFC source for atmospheric chlorine, the authors themselves published their data under the title "Increased Stratospheric Hydrogen Chloride in the El Chichon Cloud," a clear reference to the 1982 volcanic source.

But science marches on. In 1991, NASA researcher Curtis Rinsland and colleagues published their analysis of a data set similar to that of Zander, but taken from a mountain top in Arizona. Rinsland observed the same steep increase in HF as Zander, but also reported a modest increasing trend in HCL, between 1977 and 1990. He concluded that manmade sources do contribute to stratospheric chlorine, along with natural sources.

To sum up, based on the most recent scientific data, CFCs appear to play a role in contributing to stratospheric chlorine, but that fact was not confirmed prior to 1991. Nevertheless the Montreal Protocol to limit and roll back CFC production was signed in 1987, and was further tightened while the published scientific literature

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still showed little, if any, contribution from CFCs to stratospheric chlorine.

The question of whether global ozone depletion is currently underway is another matter bedeviled by doubts about the quality of the data. Belgian researchers D. De Muer and H. De Backer have pointed out that the air pollutant sulfur dioxide can interfere with the ozone measurements. Since both gases absorb UV-B radiation (wavelength of 280 to 320 nanometers) in a similar way, changes in SO_2 can be misread as changes in ozone. Therefore, the decreasing trend of SO_2 as a result of pollution control since the 1960s can simulate a fictitious ozone trend.

Also, the "noisiness" of the record makes it difficult to establish the existence of any small, long-term trend. First, it is necessary to eliminate the large natural variations, especially the 11-year cycle, which correlates strongly with the number of sunspots. Unfortunately, getting rid of the solar-cycle effect is as yet an impossible task, given the shortness of the record and the virtual absence of data on long-term variations of the solar far-UV that produces ozone in the upper atmosphere.

The CFC-ozone depletion theory, which got the policy ball rolling, is itself suspect. The theory did not predict the annual thinning of ozone over the Antarctic—the so-called ozone "hole"—nor did it anticipate and describe the chemical reactions on volcanic aerosols (ash and sulfuric acid) in the lower stratosphere. Even in the upper stratosphere where only gas-phase (homogeneous) reactions take place, the theory predicted much larger changes than have actually been observed. With that kind of track record, it would seem to be a poor basis from which to extrapolate large-scale changes in atmospheric chemistry.

A major fear about a possible ozone depletion—one that has been frequently expressed in the media—is that solar UV-B radiation reaching the surface will increase, typically by 10 percent, with dire consequences for plant and animal life and human health.

There has, of course, been a determined search for a secular increase in UV-B to match the claimed global depletion of ozone. No such trends had been observed until publication in November 1993 of a startling increase in UV-B between 1989 and 1993 over Toronto, Canada. Sherwood Rowland, commenting on the Canadian study in the *Los Angeles Times*, said "Now, at last, we have good data to point to." But closer examination revealed that this "smoking gun" was smoke and little else. The authors had confused a short-lived increase at the end of their record—possibly due to a severe weather disturbance over the region—with a long-term UV trend.

Fears about small changes in UV-B intensity may be ill-founded, in any case. To put matters into perspective: UV-B increases naturally by about 5000 percent between pole and equator, largely because of the change in the average angle of the sun. Therefore, a 10 percent increase at mid-latitudes translates into moving just 60 miles to the south—hardly a source for concern.

Finally, much of the driving force behind the policy to phase out CFCs has been the fear of an epidemic of skin cancer, particularly malignant melanoma, with EPA estimating 200,000 additional skin cancer deaths by the year 2050. But unlike basal and squamous cell skin cancers, which are easily cured growths caused by long-term exposure to UV-B, melanoma rates do not show an increase toward lower latitudes, where UV-B is strongest. And indeed, recent laboratory experiments have now established that melanoma is mainly due to UV-A (320-400 nm), which is not absorbed by ozone (see box on this page). Therefore, melanoma rates should not be affected by changes in the ozone layer.

This important finding undercuts one

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of the main reasons for the Montreal Protocol and all subsequent efforts to eliminate production of CFCs, halons, methyl bromide, carbon tetrachloride, and other important halocarbon chemicals.

The precipitous acceleration of the phaseout, advancing it by five years, will cause serious adjustment problems. Substitutes will eventually be found, though much testing will be necessary to establish their safety and effectiveness. Then there is the huge cost, estimated as over $130 billion in the U.S. alone, of replacing or retrofitting capital equipment that cannot accept the CFC alternatives. With the health and environmental fears still unproven and long-term global depletion itself in question, the American public may well balk at the imposition of a $1300 burden on the average household.

It will be interesting to see whether the new scientific results and a closer scrutiny of the old ones will force a re-examination of existing policies. Chances are they won't. Once policies are set—and especially if they are sanctified by international treaties—they do not change, even if the original conditions no longer hold.

My general conclusion, based on a quarter century of involvement in the ozone controversy, is that policies should not be applied too hastily and might well benefit from a firmer science base. Furthermore, policies should be flexibly constructed so as to accommodate to a science base that inevitably undergoes change as new discoveries are made. While lip service is often paid to these principles, in practice they are outweighed by the precautionary principle ("We must act now, even if we are not sure that this policy will do us any good") and by the "public choice" paradigm ("Policies self-reinforce and entrench themselves as they build up constituencies.") The unfortunate outcome may be an unconscionable waste of resources, a consequent loss of public trust, and a real setback to the environmental effort. □

SKIN CANCER AND OZONE

In a unique experiment, published in the July 1993 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, Dr. Richard B. Setlow and colleagues at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Long Island, New York, tackled the problem of the cause of malignant melanoma. They conducted their experiment on specially bred hybrid fish that are extremely sensitive to melanoma induction. Groups of such fish were exposed in the laboratory to radiation in narrow wavelength bands in the UV-B and UV-A region. In this way, the researchers measured the "action spectrum" (sensitivity of melanoma induction as a function of wavelength). They concluded that in natural sunlight, 90-95 percent of melanoma induction may be caused by wavelengths greater than 320 nanometers—the UV-A and visible regions of the solar spectrum, which are not absorbed by ozone.

If these results are confirmed, then much of the fear associated with ozone depletion disappears, and along with it much of the rationale for the phaseout of the chemicals encompassed by the Montreal Protocol and other international agreements.

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Why Go On Missing the Magazine That Brings You Articles Like These?

- ***The Scandal of College Tuition*** by Thomas Sowell. High-priced colleges collude to charge customers whatever the traffic will bear. When businessmen are caught doing such things, they go to prison.
- ***Immigrants and Family Values*** by Francis Fukuyama. Don't blame recent immigrants for the cultural decay in America. Many of them come to this country with strong, traditional family values and struggle to keep those values intact.
- ***A Statement on the Peace Process*** by Norman Podhoretz. The so-called "peace process" could lead to an unstable Palestinian state stretching from the Iraqi border to just outside Tel Aviv, a weakened Israel, and another war in the Middle East. Pray it doesn't happen.
- ***What the Sex Educators Teach*** by Dana Mack. They teach the pleasures of "self-pleasuring" (to grade-school children) and all the erotic possibilities of sex. Maybe even some possibilities that parents don't know about. But there's rarely a word about love, intimacy, or long-term commitment.
- ***Can American Democracy Survive?*** by Bruce D. Porter. Not if we keep dividing ourselves along partisan, class, ethnic, gender, and ideological lines. We must have *some* values that most people accept and defend, in order to keep functioning as a society.
- ***On Abortion*** by James Q. Wilson. It's a moral issue. If you agree, then it's not unreasonable to put moral pressure on a woman considering an abortion.
- ***Greenhouse Anxiety*** by Jeffrey Salmon. Scientists can become celebrities by pandering to a panic-mongering press. Meanwhile, there's no evidence that we are heading for a crisis of global warming.
- ***Sex & the Feminists*** by Carol Iannone. Feminism itself helps to cause many of the problems that feminists decry—by destroying the fabric of attachment between men and women.


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Masterwork

Robert W. Tucker

Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 1104 pp., $35.00.

DIPLOMACY GIVES every appearance of being Henry Kissinger's last will and testament on the activity to which he has devoted his considerable talents for a lifetime as teacher, writer, and high public servant. It is his summing up (and a long summing up it is). *Diplomacy* has evidently been written as well in the hope that it may influence Americans at a critical turning point in their history. Given the author's conviction about the triumph of Wilsonianism today, this hope is eloquent testimony to the optimism that ultimately informs even the more resolute of pessimists among us.

Diplomacy is also, and perhaps inevitably, a defense of Henry Kissinger's record as a statesman, one of the most celebrated of the age. It is an attempt to explain the deeper meaning of a still controversial chapter in the history of twentieth-century American foreign policy, to illuminate what was of lasting significance in the Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, and to show why that effort remains instructive in fashioning a post-Cold War policy for the United States.

The publication of *Diplomacy* must be regarded as a notable event not only because of the persona of its author but also because of the nature of the work he has undertaken. With the exception of Dean Acheson, none of the nation's secretaries of state since World War II has had the renown, both at home and abroad, of Henry Kissinger. Certainly, none has had the celebrity status and notoriety that have attached to Kissinger. For reasons that need not detain us here, Kissinger has that quality an earlier generation found in a select few of its screen stars: glamour. Glamour, as an earlier generation also knew, is essentially indefinable. It might and does reside in otherwise disparate personalities. Its one common denominator is the ability to evoke fascination. This Kissinger has done in abundance, virtually from the outset of his long career.

That such a figure has taken the time and effort to write a 1100-page book on the theory and practice of diplomacy is rather unusal. To be sure, other former secretaries of state have written books. Almost all who survive the office long enough eventually write their memoirs. But *Diplomacy* is not a memoir (of memoirs, Kissinger has already written at even greater length). It is a brilliant though thoroughly idiosyncratic inquiry into the enduring lessons of diplomacy, laid out by an acknowledged master. As such, it is an enterprise for which there is no real precedent among those who have in the past borne responsibility for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy.

For these reasons, the Kissinger book is a publishing event. Whether it will also prove to be a reading event is another matter. It seems unlikely. The length of *Diplomacy* must inhibit. Its message, when clear to a general reader, must provoke

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(which is, one must assume, the author's intention). Where the Kissinger study is almost certain to have a widespread and attentive audience is in the college and university community. Given its scope, structure, authoritative tone, and argumentative style, *Diplomacy* is a superb teaching tool, a textbook *extraordinaire*, for the use of Kissinger admirers and critics alike. I wish that I had had its equivalent when teaching American diplomacy. Kissinger may regard this prospect with something less than elation. Still, there are worse fates than to exert an influence on a generation or two of students.

The Realm of the Unchanging

DIPLOMACY IS A study of contrasting traditions of foreign policy—the European and the American—traditions that are rooted in equally contrasting visions of the nature of statecraft. The European tradition is embodied in the doctrine of *raison d'état* which advances the claim of the state's autonomy. Statecraft has its own rules and their character reflects the means distinctive to political life and, above all, to foreign policy. Statecraft also has its distinctive ends and their nature is determined by the law of state interest. To the idea of the state's autonomy is added that of the supremacy of the state's vital interests, of its security, independence, and continuity. The supremacy of foreign over domestic policy, of the state and its necessities over civil life, is the inevitable consequence of this ordering. War has always been the *ultima ratio* of reason of state, just as it has always been justified by reason of state when undertaken to preserve the state's security and independence.

The American tradition proceeded from the conviction that this nation had rejected an ancient reason of state, that it stood for something new under the sun, and that its destiny was to lead the world from the old to the new. America would be immune from the dark temptations and the terrible excesses of reason of state as a result of its republican character, the benign circumstances attending its development, and the innate virtue of its citizenry. Although at the outset alone in a hostile world, it would set an example to that world. In place of the dual standard of reason of state, it would have, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "but one system of ethics for men and for nations." In the American scheme of things, the objectives of foreign policy may be properly understood only as a means to the end of protecting and promoting individual freedom and well-being. No end of foreign policy can be seen as morally autonomous. Instead, all the ends of statecraft must be seen as means to the ends of society, which are in turn ultimately the ends of individuals.

The vision informing this outlook—one given its quintessential expression in this century by Woodrow Wilson—does not find in the conflict and rivalry of nations the natural order of things but the perversion of such order. Peace, not strife, represents the natural order; cooperation, not conflict, is the destiny of men and nations. War, the great instrument of reason of state, is seen not only as an evil but as an unnecessary evil (and, in consequence, as either a crime or a punishment).

Diplomacy is the story of the working out of these two traditions, the European since the seventeenth century, the American in the twentieth century. It is not a work of diplomatic history in the conventional sense. Kissinger is not interested in what one clerk said to another. His concerns are of a loftier and more encompassing character. They deal with the eternal dilemmas of foreign policy that confronted the great European statesmen from Richelieu to De Gaulle; they focus on how those who dominated—for better or for

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worse—the modern state system met their challenges; and they analyze the nature of the achievements and the failures of those who played for a moment in history a central role on the world's stage. Though the work of course draws upon the diplomatic record, it does so in no consistent and systematic manner. *Diplomacy* is not only highly selective in its historical treatment, it also reads like nothing so much as a series of epic tales of statesmen: the blind and the farseeing, the merely clever and the profound, the irresolute and the resolute. Kissinger has always been preoccupied with the problem of leadership, the role in history of the great personage, and never more so than in his latest work. *Diplomacy* is as much as anything else a study in leadership—conservative and revolutionary, despotic and democratic. And since leadership is inseparable from the exercise of power, it is also a study of power and its uses.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, *Diplomacy* is an inquiry into the nature of international order and the attempts in the past two centuries to establish such order. The European and the American traditions of diplomacy evoke distinctive schemes of order. Guided by reason of state, European attempts at order have always embodied the principle of the balance of power. In contrast, the essential American scheme of order has rested on the principle of collective security. The choice between these two schemes of order, Kissinger insists, remains as significant today as it was on earlier occasions in this century, after both world wars. Although the order of the Cold War has come to an end, the order of the post-Cold War world remains no more than embryonic. The nature of that order, he believes, is the great issue we should be seriously addressing. In doing so, the study of past efforts to create international order must interest us for the lessons they teach about what we can hope to achieve in the future.

In taking this position, Kissinger clearly assumes that the future will resemble the past, that as between continuity and change in the international system it is the former that will predominate. International politics is the realm of the unchanging. "Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle," he writes, "and have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead." If anything, his argument runs, the developments marking the present system—above all, its fragmentation on the one hand yet its growing globalization on the other—both make order more necessary than ever before and make its achievement more difficult.

If the pattern that has marked state behavior in the past remains essentially unchanged, it follows that the prospects for international order remain what they were in the past (and this despite the greater need for order today). In the past, such order the world has known has either been based on a balance of power among several states or on the domination of one. The irony of the American prospect is that having emerged victorious from the long conflict with the Soviet Union, America is confronted with the kind of world from which it has sought to escape throughout its history. The world of the twenty-first century, Kissinger writes, will be one this country can neither withdraw from nor dominate. Isolation being precluded, America is fated to participate in the international system, though not in the way it participated during the period of the Cold War. For the order of tomorrow, Kissinger is persuaded, will resemble past international orders. Given a world in which power is increasingly diffused, order will rest on a balance of power. But this must prove particularly difficult for a nation that has only had the experiences of

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isolation and domination, neither of which is adequate preparation for becoming merely a nation, even if still a great one, among other nations.

Nor is lack of experience the only problem. Quite another is a national outlook that ostensibly remains as deeply embedded as ever and that can only be altered over time. Whether time, and circumstances, will permit the painful adjustment to an altered vision of statecraft, whether the nation will be receptive to such change even in the light of a different experience, are questions Kissinger does not address. *Diplomacy* is his effort to influence the outcome of what promises to be a long period of national uncertainty over the nation's role and purpose. The old world is called into existence to redress the infatuations of the new. We are urged to heed the lessons of the (European) past in order to meet the challenges of the (American) future.

Idealism—Its Limits and Rewards

DIPLOMACY BEGINS with the triumph of Woodrow Wilson over Theodore Roosevelt, a triumph Kissinger sees as marking a critical turning point in American, and indeed world, history in this century. It is Roosevelt who "understood how international politics worked." "No other president defined America's world role so completely in terms of national interest or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power." But it was Wilson who "grasped the mainsprings of American motivation, perhaps the principal one being that America simply did not see itself as a nation like any other." Whereas Roosevelt "started from the premise that the United States was a power like any other, not a singular incarnation of virtue," and thus subject to the historic ground rules of equilibrium, Wilson's point of departure was America's exceptionalism. "For Wilson, the justification of America's international role was messianic: America had an obligation not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles throughout the world." Those principles—above all, the extension of freedom—defined the nation's role and purpose, just as they provided the ultimate justification of its actions abroad.

Wilson's triumph in American thinking about foreign policy, Kissinger writes, proved to be definitive and enduring. "Every American president since Wilson has advanced variations of Wilson's theme." Although critics have savaged him ever since, "Wilson's principles have remained the bedrock of American foreign policy thinking." They have remained so despite the difficulties encountered in attempting to reconcile them with the necessities imposed by an often hostile and resistant world. And they have remained so, Kissinger argues, despite their being profoundly at odds with the essential principles of successful statecraft.

If Wilsonianism has formed the core of the American foreign policy tradition in this century, if its influence on thought about foreign policy has been all pervasive and if it has often led either to the neglect or even to the denial of our true interests, the question must arise: how have we nevertheless managed to do so well? For we have done well, as Kissinger himself acknowledges at more than one point in his critical study. America's rise to world preponderance in this century has been both swift and relatively painless. The costs of the long period of Cold War were certainly not negligible. Still, by comparison with the price other nations have paid in reaching and maintaining a position of world power, these costs appear almost modest. At least, they do so if one takes the view that the conflict with the Soviet Union was real and not one that was self-imposed.

Realist critiques of American diploma-

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cy have often sought to explain the striking disparity between what is seen as a low quality of diplomatic thought and effort, on the one hand, and nevertheless successful results, on the other, in terms of good fortune. If America has done well, it is because of the great advantages it has enjoyed. But while this explanation undoubtedly carries us a long way, there is clearly more to the account than good fortune. Nor does Kissinger contend otherwise. Indeed, he credits America's successes in the past half century in part to its very idealism and addiction to universal principles. America is the bearer of a diplomatic tradition that is naive. Yet a certain amount of naivete, he observes, seems to be a precondition for great undertakings. The same universalist, ideological approach to foreign policy that was largely responsible for the excesses of containment—above all, to Vietnam—also provided much of the impetus for the creative acts of American diplomacy in the years following World War II.

In part, however, the explanation of why the nation has managed to do quite well—its good fortune apart—must be found in the disparity between its words and thoughts and its actions. The case of Wilson, that fount in this century of the tradition Kissinger criticizes, is illustrative. Wilson rejected in principle the old diplomacy, based as it was on little other than self-interest. Yet this rejection did not extend to America's sphere of influence in the western hemisphere. Quite the contrary, Wilson gave greater scope to a century-old claim than any of his predecessors—Theodore Roosevelt included—had done. It may be the case that in doing so he thought he was forestalling the encroachment of others. Even so, his actions in the Caribbean region scarcely testified to a commitment to banish the ancient law of self-interest.

On a still larger stage, there is surely more than the denial of self-interest and the claim to act as the "disinterested champions of right" in the role Wilson cast for the nation at Versailles. If America would but accept the obligations of the Covenant of the League of Nations, he urged, we would be the "senior partners" in the enterprise. "The financial leadership...the industrial primacy...the commercial advantage will be ours. And other countries will look to us for leadership and direction." The rewards of idealism were to be considerable and they were to be rendered in the traditional coin of the old diplomacy.

These rewards, moreover, would presumably be gained at modest cost. The rejection of the old diplomacy with its balance of power and ever-present threat of war did not spring simply from considerations of principle. It was not moral principle alone that explains Wilson's position that anything was preferable to participation in the traditional system. An unwillingness to pay the price in blood and treasure entailed by participation was equally, perhaps more, important. Often mistaken as evidence of moral purity, its motivation was in fact of a lower order.

IN HIS SUSTAINED critique of America's Cold War diplomacy, Kissinger finds the influence of Wilsonian principles pervasive and significant. Certainly, the influence of Wilsonianism cannot be ignored. But neither can the influence, however unavowed and even disavowed, of a traditional reason of state. The latter tradition, we recall, teaches that in the defense of a state's vital interests—its security and independence—any and all means may be employed. It also prescribes that the determination of the circumstances in which the state may exercise this right be left to the state's sovereign decision.

I do not know of an occasion during the Cold War in which these imperatives of reason of state were denied because of

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an attachment to Wilsonian principles. Kissinger argues that Wilsonianism accentuated the ambivalence in American thought between the *substance* of change threatening the nation's interests and the *methods* of implementing such change. "The implication of Wilsonianism has been that America resisted, above all, the method of change, and that it had no strategic interests worth defending if they were threatened by apparently legal methods." This may be the implication of Wilsonianism, but it clearly did not express Wilson's policy in the Caribbean where strategic interest prevailed over method. The same may be said of Wilson's Cold War successors: an ambivalence in thought did not find a serious expression in action. While committed to the principle proscribing force save in response to the prior, and unlawful, use of force, they were also careful to reserve a freedom of action in determining the circumstances in which the principle was applied. The Cuban missile crisis provided the classic case in which this freedom was exercised to prevent the method of change from legitimizing the substance of change. The movement of Soviet missiles into Cuba, though done with Cuba's consent, threatened America's strategic interests. To remove the missiles, the United States was prepared to resort to force. "[Law] simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate power," a former secretary of state declared at the time, "The survival of states is not a question of law." Although Dean Acheson's candor was considered by many at the time as indiscreet, it accurately expressed the logic of the American position.

The terrifying feature of reason of state has always been the absence of limits to the actions it enjoins to preserve the state's vital interests. It is not the abuse to which the doctrine lends itself that constitutes its most disturbing characteristic, but its refusal to recognize any clear restraints on the measures that may be taken on behalf of the state. In this respect, nuclear deterrence formed the extreme, and perfect, expression of reason of state. In a manner the great European practitioners of reason of state could scarcely have dreamed, deterrence laid bare as never before the demonic nature of this doctrine. Yet it was American statesmen, the epigones of Woodrow Wilson, who first perfected deterrence and who justified doing so in terms of the values a deterrent strategy was presumably designed to protect. To be sure, these values were always seen as transcending the security and independence of the United States. The fate of deterrence was ultimately equated with the fate of freedom everywhere. But this equation did not alter the fact that ends, however ultimate they were judged, were sought by means that had no discernible limits. Kissinger depicts America's Cold War diplomacy as the pursuit of universal principles that were often divorced from considerations of national interest and power (that is, from geopolitics, a synonym for reason of state). The principal military expression of this diplomacy, however, shows instead a determination to defend the core interests of the United States by threatening the use of unlimited power.

Diplomacy reveals its author as more of a believer in the American claim to exceptionalism than one had heretofore suspected. It is not, of course, that Kissinger has himself become a convert to what he sees as the American tradition in foreign policy, but that he has come to credit that tradition as having had, and as still having, a remarkable hold over the nation's thought and action. Woodrow Wilson insisted that whereas other nations have interests, America has principles. Kissinger, apparently, has come to believe this as well (however much he may deplore it). In examining the origins of the American involvement in Vietnam, he writes: "Most

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countries go to war to resist concrete, definable threats to their security. In this century, America has gone to war—from World War I to the Persian Gulf War in 1991—largely on behalf of what it perceived as moral obligations to resist aggression or injustice as the trustee of collective security." So it was in Vietnam, where America's universalist tradition would not permit policy to be determined on the basis of strategic expediency. "When American leaders invoked their nation's selflessness, it was because they genuinely believed in it; they were more likely to defend a country to vindicate principle than on grounds of the American national interest."

This portrayal of American belief and motivation is much too unguarded. It is so even if we take at face value the public statements of American leaders. Those statements make up a reasonably consistent pattern. It is one in which self-interest is not denied but rather identified with interests greater than the national self. In Vietnam, these interests were security and freedom, not only for others but for ourselves. This was the burden of the Johnson Administration's rationale for the war. In his first major address following the beginning of aerial bombardment against North Vietnam, President Johnson declared:

> We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be secure...We are also there to strengthen world order...To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake this confidence...in the value of American commitment, the value of America's word. The result would be unrest and instability, and even wider war.

This theme was echoed on many occasions. Whatever else one may say of it, to regard it as disinterested—as oblivious of national interest—seems misplaced. It is also worth recalling that essentially the same theme formed the rationale of the policy of containment when initiated in 1947. In the historic expression of that policy, the Truman Doctrine stated "that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

If we have not denied interest, it may still be argued that we have had a mistaken view of it. Kissinger evidently thinks this to be the case; it is the real burden of his critique of Cold War diplomacy. Our view of American security interest, he believes, has been undifferentiated. It has been undifferentiated because it has been seen as inseparable from principles deemed universally valid—from order *a la* collective security, from self-determination, from freedom. The result has been an inability to particularize interest (that is, to differentiate it), to tie interest to time and place and, of course, to power. Containment, Kissinger writes, betrayed this defect from the outset. It accounted for much of that policy's rigidity. And it was an unwillingness to differentiate interest that, above all, led to Vietnam.

There is clearly much to be said for this critique. Still, the excesses containment led to had other roots. It is not only a universalistic, ideological outlook that may fail to differentiate interests. A geopolitical approach may do so as well. It did do so on frequent occasions in the course of the Cold War. Indeed, a bipolar power structure seemed to make this result almost inevitable. From the outset of containment, the attempt to distinguish which areas were vital to American security, and thus to differentiate interests, generally floundered when put to a practical test. Both the ultimate stakes and the inner dynamic of the conflict prevented clear distinctions from being drawn between the marginal and the central, the periphery

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and the core. There was always the consideration, difficult to reject, that the periphery would become the core if challenges to it were not dealt with effectively. Kissinger has himself always urged this consideration which is, after all, inseparable from linkage. At the same time, he is reluctant to acknowledge the consequences to which it may well lead. Thus he insists that Vietnam was the result of Wilsonian universalism that "permitted no distinction to be made among the monsters to be slain." Nearer the truth is that geopolitics as well afforded no reliable means for determining which of the monsters had to be slain. The war was as much the result of mistaken geopolitical calculation as it was of a misplaced ideological universalism.

Kissinger understandably views his years in office as a valiant, if ultimately unsuccessful, effort to change an outlook that led to disaster in Vietnam and to the overextension of American power. In Richard Nixon, the nation had for the first time in the twentieth century a worthy successor in foreign policy to Theodore Roosevelt. Yet Nixon is also seen as a believer in American exceptionalism. He was, for Kissinger, the practical idealist who undertook to combine Wilsonianism and *realpolitik*. If he failed in the end, despite a foreign policy that registered some remarkable successes, it was not only because of Vietnam and Watergate but because at a deeper level his approach to foreign policy challenged a perception of the world too strongly held to be relinquished in one brief term. Still, Kissinger speculates that, "Without Watergate, Nixon might have been able to rally the country to his style of diplomacy and show that it was, in fact, the most realistic means of vindicating American idealism."

Kissinger may well be right in this speculation. Certainly, one would have never predicted at the outset of Nixon's second term what would soon be the fate of the new structure of peace. Despite Vietnam, the Nixon-Kissinger policy reformulation had elicited broad domestic support. It seemed only reasonable to assume—as many observers did assume at the time—that once Vietnam was removed from the commanding position it had for so long occupied on the public agenda, this support would become still greater. Then Watergate made its appearance and changed everything. But if Kissinger's speculation is well-taken, what does it say about the obstacles to a foreign policy approach that combine Wilsonianism and geopolitics? Does it not indicate that he has exaggerated these obstacles and that they are neither as profound nor as pervasive as he has made them out to be?

Has the Game Changed?

IN THE WAKE of the Cold War, America has less to learn from the European tradition than Kissinger appears to believe. How relevant, in any event, is that tradition for the American future? Kissinger thinks it remains quite relevant, more so indeed than it was in the period of the Cold War. The world of the twenty-first century, he assumes, will bear a striking resemblance in a number of respects to that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Absent an overriding ideological or strategic threat, conventional national interests will again prevail. Absent as well a condition of bipolarity, the prospect is for a return to a balance of power system reminiscent of this earlier period.

In taking this position, Kissinger is not unmindful of change in the international system. He writes of the present period: "Never before have the components of world order, their capacity to interact, and their goals all changed quite so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally." The substance, method, and, above all, the reach of international relations, he notes, have radically changed. Never before has the international system consisted of major centers of

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power distributed around the entire world, one in which events are experienced instantaneously and simultaneously.

These vast changes notwithstanding, Kissinger foresees an international system in which continuity with the past prevails. The world of the next century will be one dominated, as in the past, by the great powers (Kissinger lists them as the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India). Great power relations will continue to be in the future, as they have always been in the past, the driving force of international politics. Those relations will be characterized as much by conflicting as by common interests. This being the prospect, the need for order will not only persist but, given the changes that have occurred, will be far greater than in the past. In the absence of one dominant state, able to impose its vision of order, Kissinger concludes that this need can only be met by resort to the balance of power. The great task of American foreign policy must be to sustain an equilibrium in both Europe and Asia. In the pursuit of that task, the aspirations of Wilsonianism will have to be partially abandoned and a more conventional concept of national interest openly embraced.

The concluding chapter of *Diplomacy* is devoted to the elaboration of these themes. It is an essay replete with acute observations and sensible prescriptions bearing upon virtually every major issue of American foreign policy. The value of the analysis is not diminished by noting that in the treatment of each issue—whether it is Russia, the North Atlantic Alliance, the Asian powers—the invariable conclusion is that America will have to play the critical role in assuaging the fears, constraining the destabilizing ambitions, and resolving the dangerous conflicts of interest, of the major powers. Still, it must be acknowledged that this is a large order for a state whose power in the coming century is expected to decline relatively. It is this decline, after all, which is at the basis of Kissinger's conviction that America will have to moderate its Wilsonian mission of reforming the world and that a failure to do so threatens to open a gap in American policy "between its pretensions and its willingness to support them; the nearly inevitable disillusionment too easily turns into an excuse for withdrawing from world affairs altogether."

This warning needs to be taken seriously. The reformist urge that has been a powerful motive force for engagement in the past has also been, when frustrated, a powerful force for withdrawal, particularly in the absence of a clear and compelling security threat to offset it. At the same time, Kissinger's is not the only warning that needs to be heeded. If the pursuit of Wilsonianism holds out dangers, so may the pursuit of an ostensibly traditional reason of state. For the latter may prove to be quite as elusive, even illusory, in the world of tomorrow as the former.

How is the balance of power to function in tomorrow's world? This is the great question Kissinger's position must raise. It is a question, however, that he has not answered. We know, of course, how the balance has operated in the past. *Diplomacy* is largely a study, and a profound one, of its operation. "Its goal," Kissinger writes of the balance of power system, "was not peace so much as stability and moderation." But such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested on the threat or use of force. War was intrinsic to the operation of the balance; it was, in Albert Sorel's classic portrayal, "the supreme argument of reason of state...considered right as soon as it was judged necessary."

If the means intrinsic to the balance always left something to be desired, so did the results of its operation. Prudence limited these results. But prudence might sanction almost any results that—while observing the principle of equilibrium—

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held out the promise of success. Again, Sorel has given the memorable description of how the operation of the balance led, in eighteenth century Europe, to the system of great power partitions that "confused the equity of the deed with the equality of the shares, the justice of the operation with the niceness of the balance..." In the nineteenth century, the principle of equal aggrandizement, often termed the principle of compensation, was increasingly satisfied by the acquisition of territory and people beyond Europe.

Although Kissinger acknowledges these features of the historical balance, he thinks they can be largely overcome by a moral consensus of the great powers. His model, invoked on several occasions, is the Congress of Vienna. "It combined legitimacy and equilibrium, shared values, and balance of power diplomacy. Common values restrained the scope of nations' demands while equilibrium limited the capacity to insist upon them." The only prospective basis for a concept of international legitimacy today, however, rests, in the main, on a conception of domestic order that Kissinger is, to say the least, reluctant to endorse. That conception is the principal feature of Wilsonianism. To bar it from entering the front door while allowing it to sneak in the back door will not do. While Kissinger is willing to give a limited scope to Wilsonianism ("That America should give preference to democratic governments over repressive ones and be prepared to pay some price for its moral convictions is beyond dispute."), he is clearly not prepared to make of it the test of legitimacy in the post-Cold War era.

We are thus thrown back on the balance of power as the basis of international order. And once again the question must be put: how will it work in a period when war between great powers promises to be nuclear? We underline *between great powers* since it is the great powers that have sustained the balance in the past, just as it is the great powers, and only great powers, that have challenged and periodically overturned an established equilibrium. All of the great powers today either possess nuclear weapons or could possess them in a brief period (a capacity which makes them the functional equivalent of nuclear powers).

The likelihood is that the balance, as we have known it in the past, will not work. The great powers will continue to have conflicts of interest but they are highly unlikely to resolve those conflicts through war. They are highly unlikely to do so for essentially the same reasons that the United States and the Soviet Union did not do so. The game has changed, for it was the means that distinguished it above all else. The balance of power will persist, it characterizes all politics, but the distinctive meaning and significance the balance has had in the classic European tradition will not. What will take its place in great power relations is likely to remain unclear for some time. □

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The Case for the Prosecution

S. Frederick Starr

Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 575 pp., $24.95.

Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 587 pp., $35.00

EVERY FIELD HAS its lexicon of praise, and for academic history in recent decades it has included words like cool, dispassionate, nuanced, and non-judgmental. No matter how provocative the thesis, the *compleat* historian has been expected to offer it up in the guise of a white-coated clinician speaking ever so calmly, preferably in the passive voice. In presenting one's findings it has been understood that one gains points for being clever, but not for being passionate. It is all rather boring.

These two volumes bear a very different stamp. Martin Malia declares his value-charged thesis in the very title of *The Soviet Tragedy*, underscoring his point with a fulsome dedication to Poland's Solidarity and to "Democratic Russia." Covering the entire sweep of Soviet history down to the collapse of 1991, he blends icy logic and moral anger in a manner that is anything but detached. Richard Pipes' *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime*, the third volume of his magisterial triptych on Russian political culture down to the death of Lenin, poses the core moral and emotional question even more bluntly than Malia: "Can one—should one—view such an unprecedented calamity with dispassion?" Tossing aside his lab coat, Pipes answers no, arguing that "the refusal to pass judgment on historical events rests on moral values, too, namely the silent premise that whatever occurs is natural and therefore right..." Pipes makes it clear that he is not about to offer up a cool and laconic account of a Civil War that cost millions of lives, led to a famine worse than anything Europe had experienced since the Black Death, and, he argues, brutalized the Bolshevik regime beyond all hope of reform.

Both of these historians direct their ample wrath against two targets in particular: first, the Russian Communist Party that in 1918 took the unprecedented step of waging a ghastly war against much of the population over which it ruled, employing in the process both terror and mass murder; and, second, the post-Thaw scholars in the West who, they charge, tortured the historical evidence in an effort to present the system that perpetrated such horrors as having been legitimate except during the era of Stalin, which at any rate has long since receded into the past.

"How could so many have been so wrong about so much for so long?" Malia asks. He is referring in particular to Western politicians, journalists, and the millions of Western "Fellow Travelers" (*poputchiki*) whose faith in Marxist utopia was so strong as to blind them to crimes committed in the name of socialist perfectionism. In covering the same ground, Pipes backs his case with both greater detail and sharper barbs. In a particularly spicy zinger, he faults the revisionist historians and their graduate students for producing a shelf full of "weighty tomes filled with mostly meaningless events and statistics," all presented in a style that he characterizes as "both vacuous and dull." Fighting words!

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Over the three decades spanning the Soviet Union's long twilight, Soviet studies in the West became extraordinarily contentious. On the one side were those who argued that the Soviet regime was capable of reform and self-renewal and was, in fact, in the process of evolving into a condition that could fairly be called both modern and benignly socialist. Centered at Columbia University and the University of Michigan, this school sought to prove that the October Revolution led by Lenin was a normal product of emerging social forces in tsarist Russia but had been subverted for a generation by Stalin. Opposing these notions were a second group, strongly represented at Harvard (Professor Pipes' habitat), whose members denied the inevitability and even the legitimacy of Lenin's revolution and asserted that Stalinism represented the fulfillment of Leninism rather than its betrayal. Inevitably, such an analysis left them with little or no hope for the success of reform in the Soviet Union in the decades following Stalin's death.

To some extent, both camps perpetuated debates that had rung through Russian émigré circles in the 1920s. The former group drew mainly on the Menshevik tradition, with pinches of Bolshevik reformism thrown in for good measure, while the latter drew sustenance from the writings of such liberal thinkers of the late tsarist era in Russia as Peter Struve and Paul Miliukov, as well as from an interesting melange of both conservatives and socialist mavericks. The battle was waged with monographs rather than brickbats. Even though the world views of the leading participants were at issue, nearly all parties favored the low-keyed "scholarly" mode of discourse rather than the more highly charged language of political and moral polemics. Fortunately, no center of Soviet studies was completely homogeneous, and especially at those campuses where both schools were well represented—universities like Princeton, Indiana, and Berkeley (where Professor Malia works)—the dialogue was serious and at times even productive.

The quick rise of *perestroika* and then the precipitous collapse of the Soviet state moved these debates from the seminar room to the evening news. As they grew in urgency, the temperature soared, leading to blistering charges and counter-charges, many of them centering around the concept of totalitarianism. Initially, the outbreak of reformism under Gorbachev strengthened the case of those who saw the USSR as simply another variant of modernity, now freed from the totalitarian pretensions that had earlier disfigured it. As *perestroika* ground to a halt and the final collapse began, however, those who had been arguing against the legitimacy of the communist revolution and considered the system to be irrevocably totalitarian in its aspirations had their day. The books under review epitomize this perspective and represent its highest scholarly achievements.

IN MANY RESPECTS, these two interesting works differ sharply from one another. In his narrative covering seven decades, Professor Malia leaps from polemic to polemic, often, like Cyrano, locking swords with several different foes at once. His *The Soviet Tragedy* has a sharp Gallic edge, and at times reads like a translation from the French. It stands in the same tradition of pungent debate over a still-relevant revolutionary heritage as such nineteenth-century studies of the French Revolution as those of the French scholar-politicians Guizot Leroy-Beaulieu, and especially de Tocqueville. The Parisian historian Alain Besançon, writing of Malia's earlier volume, *Comprendre la Révolution Russe*, in which he first set forth many ideas elaborated in *The Soviet Tragedy*, rightly noted that "*Il pratique l'histoire philosophique.*"

By contrast, Professor Pipes focuses his attention on the half dozen years between the outbreak of the Civil War in 1918 and the death of Lenin in 1924. More down to earth and closely documented, *Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime* is a monument to scholarly *Sitzfleisch* in the same tradition of mas-

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sive dragnet research as Peter Scheibert's sadly overlooked *Lenin an der Macht* (1984). Pipes has mined a staggering array of sources, including neglected Russian newspapers; rare documentary collections issued by Russian émigrés in French, German, and Polish; the works of recent Soviet scholars; and the first newly released papers from Soviet archives. When coupled with his earlier book on *The Russian Revolution* (1990), this volume provides the first full treatment of the revolutionary era since William Henry Chamberlin's informative but very dated *The Russian Revolution* of 1935 and the most comprehensive treatment of this important subject in any language.

Both scholars ground their approach to the Russian revolution in a thoroughly gloomy vision of Russia's tsarist past. Malia does not mince words. He considers the tsarist empire to have been a despotic state that staved off independent initiatives, suppressed civil society, and hence stifled Russian liberal impulses in the cradle. Cut off from the kind of practical activity that fostered the development of constitutionalism orders in the West, the Russian intelligentsia suffered from "an over-rich ideological diet and a chronic intellectual indigestion." This led its members to embrace maximalist solutions to all the issues before them. When power eventually fell into their hands in 1917 they were remarkably ill-equipped to do what was needed and remarkably disposed to do what was not.

Pipes first spelled out his vision of tsarist Russia in his provocative *Russia Under the Old Regime* (1974), in which he described a society starkly different from anything ever seen in Western Europe or North America. Where Russians like Solzhenitsyn and a few Western writers like James H. Billington found a "Holy Russia," Pipes presented the picture of a "patrimonial" state in which an autocratic tsar could treat the realm and its inhabitants virtually as his private property, to be shaped and disposed of according to his personal whim. This in turn stymied the growth of all alternative centers of authority as long as tsarism endured. Pipes contends that Russia came to suffer from an undeveloped bourgeoisie, a peasantry with no sense of private ownership, and a minuscule industrial labor force with little or no class consciousness. All this left the country wide open to control by intellectuals from the moment Nicholas II lost his throne. Again, the intelligentsia sits in the driver's seat. The two scholars come together in the view, expressed by Malia in a 1960 volume on *The Russian Intelligentsia* edited by Pipes, that "in our century the place of property is taken by knowledge."

One may argue—as has this reviewer, among others—that Russian society in 1917 was more developed than this picture suggests. Indeed, if this were not the case, why did the Bolsheviks need to mount so brutal a campaign in order to crush rival parties, pulverize the bourgeoisie, and assert their control over a peasantry that was so unalterably opposed to collectivization that they eventually forced Lenin to back off and regroup his forces with the New Economic Policy? You can't have it both ways. Either Russian society was backward and passive, in which case it could have been conquered with far less violence, or it was in certain respects quite developed, in which case the bloodshed and terror employed in subduing it appears more comprehensible.

Whatever view one takes of the antecedent situation, however, it is clear that in October, 1917, an ideologically charged elite from a political counter-culture assumed power and undertook to reshape the entire society "from above." In contrast to Pipes, Malia concedes that by 1917 Russia could claim more than a few genuine workers and an authentic revolutionary movement, but he asserts that in the end both of these social groups were completely reshaped by the Bolsheviks, rather than *vice versa*. Pipes, by contrast, underscores that industrial workers in late imperial Russia constituted a mere two percent of the population. They

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were "numerically too insignificant to play a major role in revolution," he argues, and "remained peasants at heart, as did the soldiers who helped overthrow tsardom in the first place."

Such considerations lead both scholars to conclude that it was not the social and economic "base" of Russian society that determined the character of the political and ideological superstructure, but the reverse. At a time when nearly all young Sovietologists were mining Moscow archives in an effort to glean evidence that the wellsprings of Russia's revolution flowed "from below," these two senior scholars insist that the key to the Bolshevik's history lay in the fact that it was shaped "from above." Malia calls this "inverted modernity." Pipes speaks of a "vacuum" of popular social forces, which intellectuals with more ambition than practical experience rushed to fill.

Having committed the cardinal heresy of denying that the Russian Revolution was defined by social forces "from below," both authors proceed to judge with great severity the Marxist intellectuals who guided events "from above," as well as the specific ideas and programs they championed. At this point, however, a significant difference between them emerges. Pipes acknowledges that Marxism contains both libertarian and authoritarian strains, and argues that the tradition of patrimonial rule in Russia suppressed the former and forced the latter to the fore. Consequently, he places great emphasis on the domineering personality of Lenin, and particularly on the bloodthirsty streak in his personality that was so clearly manifest in directives and memoranda that the Bolshevik Founder penned during the Civil War. Thus, in Pipes' view, Russia corrupted Marxism.

Malia, by contrast, argues that Marxism corrupted Russia. Its essence, he claims, is not positive but negative, since its goal from the outset was never anything more concrete than to introduce a condition of "non-capitalism," e.g., the suppression of market forces, private property, and capitalism. Having been defined in terms not of what it was but what it was not, Marxism, writes Malia, was in its very essence an absurdity. Given this, "the only practical way to realize the Marxist purpose in Russia or anywhere else was through Leninism; and the only practical way to complete the Leninist project was through Stalinism. The alternative to this road was to abandon the whole dream of Marxist socialism."

But what about Russia's "patrimonial" heritage? In several closely researched chapters Pipes details the revival of an all-controlling patrimonial autocracy between 1918 and 1920 under the regime of "War Communism." He argues that War Communism was not simply an unfortunate tactic necessitated by the brutal conditions of civil war but the systematic application of Lenin's Marxist utopianism through traditional Russian methods, revived and updated. Malia rejects this out of hand, and in a recent review of Pipes' earlier volume, *The Russian Revolution*, goes so far as to denounce the idea of a revived patrimonialism as "bizarre." On rather fragmentary evidence he claims instead that War Communism antedated the Civil War and arose not as a practical response to crises but as a working out of the inner necessity of Marxism itself. "War Communism, he writes, "was no aberration, but the crucial episode that first revealed to the Bolsheviks who they in fact were."

What, then, was the contribution of Russia's tradition of "Oriental despotism"? Having given up on the hope of finding agencies of transmission of despotic habits from the old regime to the new, Malia concludes that the main contribution of traditional Russia to the Leninist project was that it left the country with "a lack of social and cultural antibodies sufficiently strong to resist [Marxism]." This surely contains more than a germ of truth, but by this point this reader begins to grow dizzy from all the *"l'histoire philosophique."*

In the eyes of their critics, the para-

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mount sin committed by both scholars is their wholesale and unapologetic resurrection of the notion of "totalitarianism." Coined in Italy in the early 1920s, this term has given rise to a whole industry of Sovietological polemics, pro and con. Suffice it to say that both Pipes and Malia embrace this much-criticized notion with in-your-face gusto, and Malia in particular invokes it to explain what he sees as the utter futility of all communist reform from Tito and the Prague Spring down through *perestroika*. Pipes also invokes totalitarianism, but not as a *deus ex machina* that suspends the need to explain, but as a description of the specific outcome of the Civil War. He reaches this point by an interesting and unexpected route.

In a detailed analysis, Pipes shows how the outcome of the Civil War was never in doubt. Indeed, he insists, the Russian Civil War would probably not even have taken place had it not been for British (read Churchill's) armed intervention in the crisis. Once the war erupted, however, leaders of the anticommunist White forces demonstrated astounding incompetence from start to finish. They lost the backing of the non-Russian peoples by insisting that Russia resuscitate its colonial empire. The Bolsheviks also wanted to restore the old borders and more, but their widely ballyhooed slogans against imperialism enabled them to appear briefly as champions of national liberation, in short, to work both sides of the street. With respect to land distribution, the rights of labor, civil liberties, and most other important domestic issues facing Russia, the White generals believed quite reasonably that these should be left to a Constituent Assembly to address. On this basis, they foolishly took no public stand on these urgent matters. The Bolsheviks may have tried to be all things to many people, but the Whites were nothing to all people. No wonder that large numbers of men from the rather apolitical officer corps of the tsarist army signed up with Trotsky and the Reds, who had the greatest asset of all in that they controlled the Russian heartland from day one. Meanwhile, the White generals failed even to control their own fighting force, with the result that they appeared to tolerate the many anti-semitic outrages committed by soldiers under their command.

If the Whites were so stunningly ineffective, why were all the brutalities of War Communism necessary? Surely, it was not simply to assure a Bolshevik victory. Pipes responds to this by garnering massive evidence to the thesis that Lenin's objective between 1918 and 1920 was not merely to establish Bolshevik power but to use that power to establish communism. He insists that Lenin took his Bolshevism seriously as a blueprint for the future. To this end he obliterated the bourgeoisie, destroyed the Church, tried to export the revolution beyond Russia's borders, abolished private property and money, took control of culture, and attempted to re-enserf the peasantry in collective farms. Nor was Lenin flying solo. Trotsky, Stalin, and Nikolai Bukharin, the darling of Gorbachev and all those who in the 1980s envisioned a kinder and gentler communism, all climbed aboard the bandwagon of utopian transformation, which they expected to achieve through violence and terror under the policy of War Communism.

Pipes' Civil War thus pits Bolsheviks not just against Whites but against Russian society as a whole. This brings him to the doorstep of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921-29. Revisionists in both Russia and the West have idealized this program and the resulting respite as a genuine alternative to both War Communism and Stalinist terror. Pipes dismisses it as nothing more than a tactical retreat in which economic liberalization was accompanied by steadily mounting political repression. Malia reaches similar conclusions, arguing that Bukharin's theoretical defense of NEP represented a shift of speed rather than of direction. Both historians can cite ample evidence from Lenin himself and from other Bolshevik leaders in support of their position.

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But what about Stalin? Even if NEP was less an alternative to War Communism than a change of pace, was Stalin not still a usurper who perverted Lenin's legacy? Pipes details Lenin's deathbed attacks on his Georgian comrade-in-arms, but points out that it was precisely due to the patronage and protection of Lenin that Stalin became the only Bolshevik to have served on all three ruling organs of the Central Committee. Thus, he argues, Lenin had firmly installed Stalin as his heir, even if he tried at the last minute to cut him out of the will. Malia goes even further. Minimizing Stalin's personal role, he argues that the rise of Stalin was due mainly to the fact that he understood the nature of Lenin's Party and the logic of the system better than all the other leading Bolsheviks. Thus, Stalin did not betray the Revolution but fulfilled it, because he alone had grasped its true essence. "The problem," Malia concludes, "was not with the driver but with the vehicle."

THIS IS NOT the place to recount the many implications and corollaries that Malia and Pipes derive from their complex and sophisticated analyses of the October Revolution and War Communism. To say the least, they will be considered controversial in some quarters. Pipes, for example, devotes a full chapter to the theme of "Communism for Export," in the process dismissing Lenin's IIIrd Internationale (or "Comintern") as "an unrelieved failure," notwithstanding the fears and outcries of West European conservatives between 1919 and 1943. Yet more debatable will be his long essay on "Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism," in which he cites both direct and circumstantial evidence to support the thesis that Bolshevism and fascism competed for the same constituencies.

Pipes is careful to acknowledge that the genealogy of socialism traces to the Enlightenment while that of National Socialism stems from the Anti-Enlightenment and romanticism. He also notes that much of the documentation on Bolshevik-Nazi interaction is yet to be exhumed from Moscow archives that are only now being opened. But he surely performs a valuable service in drawing the reader's attention to the many areas of commonality between the two systems. Nor can one deny him the malicious pleasure of quoting no less an authority than Nikolai Bukharin to the effect that the Fascists, "more than any other party...adopted and applied in practice the experiences of the Russian Revolution." "Bolshevism and Fascism," Pipes concludes, "were both heresies of socialism."

Malia's later chapters crackle with explosive judgments and *obiter dicta*. Thus, he asserts that the Cold War was inevitable, "given the simple existence of the Soviet Union, and it therefore automatically ended when the Soviet Union collapsed." The American policy of containment, Malia suggests, had the effect not of reversing Soviet expansionism but of hardening it. Even though the Kremlin's use of the Red Army against reformers in Berlin, Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw between 1953 and the 1980s appeared aggressive and threatening to the West, Malia convincingly suggests that these actions were all "in fact defensive and conservative." Finally, he sees the USSR's war in Afghanistan as having been fought not over oil and geo-politics, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and others contended at the time, but over "a senescent ideological concern for the enviability of the frontiers of socialism" that prevailed among key members of Brezhnev's Politburo. Any one of these theses would warrant a full monograph.

What, in conclusion, are we to make of these two books, which in their very different ways draw a line in the sands of what used to be called Sovietology? Predictably, they have been hit by a barrage of vituperation from critics in Europe (particularly in Germany) and the United States. In their frontal attack on the communist tradition in Russia and on socialism generally, these volumes deliberately inflame one of the most sensitive spots

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in the modern body politic. By no means have all the reactions been critical, however. Suffice it to say that in Russia itself both volumes are being received with the special enthusiasm that wells up in normal people when they discover that the experts have discovered what they themselves knew or suspected all along. There have been laudatory reviews, translations, and invitations for Malia and Pipes to come to Moscow as visiting dignitaries. All this must give rise to a sense of cognitive dissonance in the authors themselves.

It is easy to see all this as simply an emanation of contemporary politics, whether at the national and international level or at the level of academic trench warfare. It is all this, of course. To deny the legitimacy and viability of the Soviet regime, as both authors have done, was for decades the surest way to get one's self branded a pariah even by political moderates. And it is also relevant that until very recently most of the more exacting and methodologically innovative research on Soviet history was dedicated to the revisionist cause, which challenged both of these propositions. Beyond this, Professor Pipes has yet to be excused in some academic circles for his 1981-82 service as an advisor on Soviet affairs to President Reagan's National Security Council, nor has Professor Malia been forgiven for the tone of triumphalism that suffused his brilliantly argued essay of 1990, "To The Stalin Mausoleum." So the politics of today have helped shape the reception to both of these books.

Yet it is grossly unfair and simply wrong to dismiss or embrace these two extraordinary studies because they support or undercut the political prejudices of the moment. Both arise from, and are deeply rooted in, traditions of scholarly analysis that date back more than a century. Not to appreciate their deeper intellectual sources is to diminish their significance and to trivialize their fundamental theses.

Pipes' trilogy on the Russian Revolution stands squarely in the so-called "state school" of Russian historiography and is in fact the most fully elaborated and sophisticated example of this approach to appear in our century. Tracing its origins to the post-Napoleonic era, when Nikolai Karamzin published his *History of the Russian State*, this theory holds that the chief force for political, social, and cultural development in Russia has been the autocratic government. The many apparent contradictions of Russian history become intelligible, it claims, when the all-powerful tsar and his administration, rather than Russian society, are placed at the center of events. It is worth noting that Professor Pipes began his career by publishing a pioneering analysis of Karamzin's thought; this was in 1959, when Khrushchev's Thaw was barely underway. Inevitably, Karamzin's thesis quickly called forth a rebuttal in the form of a six volume work by Professor Nikolai Polevoi aptly entitled *History of The Russian People*. Here was the first revisionist, replete with *sotto voce* attacks on autocracy (read totalitarianism) and arguments on the need to view Russian development from the "bottom up" rather than from the "top down." The debate has gone on ever since, and has provided the core paradigms through which both Russians and Westerners have perceived the history of Russia.

Malia's emphasis not on institutions but on ideas also claims a rich background that traces directly to theorists of autocracy and their critics in the 1840s and indirectly to seventeenth century polemics that arose at the time of the schism in the Russian church. Every reader of Dostoevsky has encountered this approach, which is elaborated in such otherwise highly diverse volumes as Nicolas Berdyaev's *The Russian Idea* (1947) and Leszek Kolakowski's *Main Currents of Marxism* (1978). Even where it acknowledges the existence and power of social forces, as Malia emphatically does, this school in the end maintains that modes of thought and intellectual currents are decisive—e.g., that ideas count. Again, it is not inappropriate to

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point out that Malia's first book was an intellectual biography of the pioneer Russian socialist Alexander Herzen, who was himself part of the intensive intellectual *milieu* of Moscow in the 1840s, when many of the framework ideas on the process of Russian development that we still live with took form.

So it is not enough simply to praise or damn these volumes because we like or loath their implications for contemporary politics. They should be judged for what they are: grandly ambitious efforts to get to the historical essence of Russia's experiment in communism. For now, the attacks on the studies by Malia and Pipes have taken more the form of indignant fulminations than of serious responses. Not one of those who disagrees with Malia has put forward an alternative vision that is equally comprehensive, and not one of Pipes' many critics has mustered all the revisionist studies and monographs to form a convincing rebuttal to his synthesis, with its statist emphasis. Until then, all the anger is premature, bearing as little resemblance to a serious rejoinder as a menu does to the meal that is supposed to follow.

For now, the prosecution has presented a formidable case, carefully researched and brilliantly argued. It has responded to most, if not all, of the arguments put forward by the defense and laid down a number of new points to which the defense will have to offer a plausible response if it wishes to prevail. It is time, therefore, for the scholarly defenders of the historical legitimacy of the Russian Revolution, of the viability of the Leninist tradition, of the notion that Stalin was an aberration of the system rather than of its fulfillment, and of the capacity of the system to evolve, to take the stand and make a case as comprehensive and as plausible as what has been presented by Malia and Pipes in their astonishing and important books. For now, the scholarly jury is out, even though it is clear that the broader public has sided increasingly with the prosecutor. □

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Bedazzled

Eric Jones

James Fallows, *Looking at the Sun* (New York: Pantheon, 1994). 528 pp., $25.00.

FIFTY YEARS AGO, possibly to the day, the Yankee trucks came roaring through my home town, scattering hard candy in all directions. I could show you the place on the street where I was hit. The G.I.s colonized southern England, seeming to spend their time handing out gum and hosting children's parties. American generosity appeared inexhaustible, while the most lavish war-machine the world had ever known was helping to flatten Hitler, not to mention Tojo. I can scarcely believe that by 1987 a soon-to-be Prime Minister of Japan, Noboru Takeshita, could be joking about a dollar so weak that American sailors were no longer able to afford bar-girls. They could only stay on base, laughed this charmer, and give each other AIDS.

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Nor, apparently, can James Fallows quite believe this turn-around. In earlier writings he celebrated what he called "the American talent for disorder," the individualism which makes up Americanness and from which a resurgence ought to spring. In *More Like Us* (1989) he occasionally hinted at irritation with Japanese airs of superiority and racism. Today he is even more alarmed about the effectiveness of Japan's disciplined nationalism. But most of all he is infuriated by our inability to look at the Risen Sun, the blinkered means whereby we reassure ourselves that Japanese economics must be riding for a fall.

The confining assumptions of Western economic theory tell us that people are motivated by individual aspirations; they imply that governments will besmirch any part of the economy their sticky fingers touch. The Japanese and other successful Asians neither believe these things nor act on them. Surely they cannot triumph and, if they do, this must be by some alchemy that will soon turn gold to lead. Friedrich List, the nineteenth-century German economist whose work they use to justify their approach, must be a charlatan. If he were important you would have heard of him. Maybe you would have studied his tomes in college.

The content and implication of *Looking at the Sun* are very different things, even to the author's eyes. The bulk of the book is a long-run history of Japan and a tour of several Asian countries, some influenced by the Japanese and others (like the Philippines and Burma) which bob like corks in the wake of the East Asian Miracle. All this is annotated from a wide, scholarly reading, especially on Japan itself, though it makes no dry academic treatise. There is a garnish of autobiographical reporting, each passage knitted into what becomes a sober, worried, tract. But inside all this reportage lies the message that the West will continue to misunderstand the Japanese by interpreting their behavior in terms of individualism or the free market, and especially by failing to recognize how important List's economics seems in East Asia.

The book is thus a *cri du coeur* aimed both at general readers and what are called for want of a better word, or any word, policy wonks. American economists are soundly told off for letting theoretical purity get in the way of taking Asian state corporatism seriously. At the extreme, as the Sachs-niks disastrously showed in Russia, American economists seem to believe that society's institutions will automatically adjust to any major shift in relative prices. To think that this will take place, quickly and costlessly, one would surely have to belong to what Fallows calls America's ahistorical society.

Will economists change their views? "No," snapped a colleague to whom I was expounding the pleasure of reading Fallows' text, "the subject is self-referring." Without doubt it is conformist. Economic history, portrayed here as an antidote, has in reality been taken over and turned into a wasteland of econometric history. But readers other than economists may still take note. That will be useful if it makes the policy debate better informed, though a little unfortunate if it encourages those who are already disposed to populism or protectionism.

Besides the survey of economic nationalisms in Asia we are given an extended treatment of how Japan cornered the semi-conductor industry—Japan rather than Japanese firms—despite an interlude of recovery in Silicon Valley. What is missing is anything more than a few words on China or its relations with Japan. For an author so impressed with the hangover of the Asian past this omission is surprising. James Fallows seems willing to accept the sanguine analysis he quotes from MITI, which proclaimed as recently as spring 1993 that, "Chinese political risk is zero."

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I doubt that the Japanese really believe this. It would be too obvious an Achilles' heel.

These various chapters are designed to support the line that Asia's main strength is centered in Japanese industry, which is in turn a front for the Japanese state. The point is made that Japan is the main buyer, main seller, main investor and main donor of aid as far as Southeast Asia is concerned. Even the countries that seem to be doing well are portrayed as more threadbare than they appear, not really recipients of advanced technology from Japan, and lacking real depth as capitalist countries. The impression is given that their economies are merely, in Kunio Yoshihara's phrase, "ersatz capitalism." For the book's purposes, the true Asia is Japan. Nevertheless, none of this material lies at the book's heart.

THE CORE IS about interpretation. It is about how to grasp that in dealing with Japan or South Korea we face competitors who do not start from our individualistic assumptions nor care whether they end up where we want to end up, with greater choice and boundless increases in personal welfare. The core is about recognizing that, for the Japanese and others, economics is the continuation of nationalism, maybe of war, by other means. Fallows' insistent purpose is to establish that Western societies, especially the United States, have been using inappropriate mental tools to understand this. The wrong tool-kit boils down to neoclassical economics; a failure to think in terms of national rather than individual goals; no sense of history; and an ignorant blank as regards Friedrich List. The significance of anyone whose thought underpins the East Asian Miracle should be obvious, and yet—Friedrich Who?

Mr. Fallows never heard of List during his training in economics at Harvard and Oxford. Ten years earlier I did hear about List at Oxford—ironically in a course by the visiting Harvard economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron. But the economics profession was already consigning history to the dustbin of history, so to speak, and the Fallows' experience has since become the norm. Nowadays in my own classes only an occasional German exchange student has so much as heard List's name. My economist colleagues never mention him to the students. Five out of nine dictionaries of economics in my university library do not, well, list List, and although the library has better holdings of his works than James Fallows scathingly reports of MIT, their usage is only marginally greater. Not so in Tokyo, Osaka, or Seoul, a fact which leads Fallows right into economist-bashing, that is to say, into bashing English-speaking economists for turning List into an unperson, occluding him as the Soviet Encyclopaedia might have done.

List vaunted the productive powers of the state above the satisfying of individual wants. He was in favor of development through investing in the great new project of his day, the railroad. The irony is that he picked up many of his ideas in the United States, largely from the Irish political exile turned Philadelphia publisher and protectionist, Mathew Carey, and his economist son, Henry. Within three years of setting foot on the western shore of the Atlantic, Mathew Carey published his *Brief Examination of Lord Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the United States* (1791). Henry Carey was an influential writer in his day. List was mixing with both of them between 1825-1832.

The particular strand of interventionist-protectionist thought harks back to early nationalism and the victory for Hamiltonian Protectionism, which was arguably as much the source of nineteenth-century American strength as the manufacturing efficiency of the "American System." Aaron Burr's bullets could not stop Hamiltonianism; big projects and

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protective tariffs served such powerful interests. While the boot was on this foot, it seemed to increase the American stride, though mostly what it did was influence the direction in which the United States strode. Triumphalist accounts of American expansion risk giving the impression that because growth was fast it was optimal: the good is enemy of the best.

The individualist ethic of English-language economics is derived in principle from Adam Smith—the "cosmopolitan theorist" as List stigmatized him—and is now enshrined in ahistorical models, the more algebraic the better. It is axiomatically pro-competition, pro-free trade, and resolves that whatever suits the individual consumer is right and proper. It is concerned with optimal allocation rather than the trajectories of national growth. There is little glimmering that the Japanese are up to something quite different. To caricature the matter, if they were, the "laws" of economics would ensure that, like some heavier-than-air machine, the Japanese economy could not fly. As it is, Japan must be flouting the laws of thermodynamics, or rather of competitive markets, and can be expected to suffer heat-death sometime soon.

No allowance is or can be made in mainstream Western economics for the way the Japanese form a close-knit tribe concerned with production, not consumption, concerned with maximizing national output and market share, with economics as an instrument of politics, and with the long run rather than this year's profits. The Japanese, for all their thickets of inefficiency in the service sector and Mom and Pop stores, or by means of these very inefficiencies, are avoiding the worst social costs of economic competitiveness. They have clung to a way of keeping such people in work, clumsy though it is and open to pork-barreling. Japan is no fertile ground for some East Asian Ross Perot because it has bought off a chunk of the relevant constituency.

Yet, just as Friedrich List was not really an all-out protectionist but put forward the infant industry argument as a means of getting an economy going, so Adam Smith knew that the nation-state was an effective unit of affairs. As he said, "the great object of the political economy of every country, is to increase the riches and power of that country." Mainstream economics may have abandoned Smith's breadth but the profession still has some "talent for disorder." It is not in any case quite correct to say, as Fallows does, that economists crassly think more is good. They tend to think that more choice is good.

The awarding of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1993 jointly to two economic historians—the most original of the quantifiers, Robert Fogel, and the institutionalist, Douglass North—shows that not all is bigotry. Fogel, for instance, has cut right down to size the supposed "indispensability" of the railroad network of the early United States: List would have hated him. As to List's own work, it is not to be expected that economists will be bowled over. There is an element of diatribe involved and no rich body of testable propositions derives from it to compare with the system of Adam Smith or maybe even David Ricardo. This is not to excuse the self-indoctrination and incuriosity in modern economics, but it may make it seem slightly less purblind. An intellectually-rigorous alternative would genuinely stand a chance of capturing the minds of graduate students (it is notoriously harder for established scholars to change). But List's system is not a real candidate because it lacks rigor and is, rather, political economy.

Political economy, of course, matters. James Fallows is right to be scornful of the economics profession to the extent that it has become too incurious to recognize List's rhetorical hold on America's trade competitors. Yet because List symbolizes

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so much for the Japanese and Koreans it does not follow that he adds greatly to analytical understanding. A concept absent from Fallows' exposition of the East Asian model is that of opportunity cost. Interventionism, protectionism, and the state are all very well, but what opportunities do they foreclose?

This book does not perhaps project Japanese history forward far enough to persuade us that the tribal warfare disguised as economic policy in Japan will not eventually prove self-limiting. Great industrial strength, or the strength of great industries, is attainable by any country willing to divert its eggs into particular baskets. Japan has a high savings rate, good education for the bottom tiers of society, well-made and low-priced exports, and all the rest. Its social conformism makes neoclassical economics look extremely broad-church. On the other hand it does not possess a coherent political system. Its people do not have easy working lives, spacious housing, or much by way of social infrastructure. Whether Japanese tribalism can continue to impose relative austerity on them indefinitely is not as certain as the country's present industrial success may imply, brain-washed by their own ethnic theorists though the Japanese clearly are.

Still more unfortunate would be any suggestion that Japanese-style barriers to foreign trade and investment, buffers to prevent companies going bust when they make mistakes, or other nostrums, might be desirable in the West. The United States can do all these things if it really feels the need: look at the rocketing output of the war-time command economy, which gave me my boyhood candy and Hitler and Tojo their comeuppance. Maybe the West should again tote a big stick, but talking softly will still be better than using it. Lasting competitiveness and social peace must come from reforms aimed at fundamentals like educating (and employing) the underclass.

To be fair, James Fallows nowhere recommends that the United States should adopt the Asian model across the board. He knows that this system does not foster creativity or generate new scientific knowledge and is unkind to the weak, minorities and outsiders. "It could not be applied in most Western countries," he finally proclaims, "especially the United States." All he wants is for us to admit that in East Asia a measure of economic control works extraordinarily well, and not to go on clinging to free-market theories that spotlight only the distortions produced by controls. We should not let ourselves be told that we operate in a borderless world—ironically, a phrase made fashionable by a Japanese guru. We should not accept Robert Reich's view that companies are now so international there is no point in favoring the ones head-quartered in the United States; on the contrary, says Fallows, companies create the best jobs where they really belong. Nationalism still counts. How it may best express itself is the question of the hour. □

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1776 and All That

Josef Joffe

Warren I. Cohen, ed.,*The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, 4 Vols., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), $89.95.

Volume One: *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*
Bradford Perkins, 243 pp., $24.95.

Volume Two: *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913*
Walter LaFeber, 252 pp., $24.95.

Volume Three: *The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945*
Akira Iriye, 229 pp., $24.95.

Volume Four: *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991*
Warren I. Cohen, 271 pp., $24.95.

A Breakfast for Bonaparte: US National Security Interests from the Heights of Abraham to the Nuclear Age, by Eugene V. Rostow (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 507 pp., $19.00.

AT FIRST SIGHT, the four volumes of the *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* are a delight to behold. Their covers are nicely designed in red-white-and-blue, as befits a history of the American republic, and none of the slender tomes demands more than an inch of shelf space. Caveat emptor, though. On cracking them open, the reader discovers the fine print, literally. The typeface ranges somewhere between small and tiny, which is good for the paper-producing trees of this world, but not for the eyes. The set obeys standards of correctness in other ways, too—for example, when one author apologizes to "neighbors north and south" for using the adjective "American" to designate things pertaining to the United States. Nonetheless, this quartet is a very useful addition to the library of anybody interested in more than the U.S. foreign policy crisis of the day.

One thing they demonstrate clearly is that Bill Clinton's confused and confusing foreign policy is nothing particularly new. Take Akira Iriye as he reviews American diplomacy between the two World Wars in Volume III: "The Roosevelt administration would not reward Japanese expansion, but neither would it undertake any significant step to push it back." Substitute "Clinton" for "Roosevelt," and "Serbian" for "Japanese," and you have the best one-sentence description of America's policy in the former Yugoslavia. Whence this indecisiveness that so often combines provocation with passivity, that barks without biting? This is an old puzzle that goes back to the beginning of the Republic, flummoxing friends and foes alike. A familiar explanation proceeds by way of the "ideals vs. interests" antinomy.

Ideals—the penchant for human rights, democracy, and international law—have pushed the Untied States toward "Wilsonianism" in word and deed. Interest and reason of state—the cold-hearted calculation of risks and benefits—have propelled it in the opposite direction, shunting aside goodness in favor of discretion. More often than not, folly and righteousness, grandiloquence and sheer greed coexisted side by side, even in

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the breast of the same president. That did not, and does not, make for a consistent, let alone decisive, diplomacy.

Thomas Jefferson, the most fascinating of the Founding Fathers, remains until this day the best exemplar of this Janus-like tradition. Jefferson, the Enlightenment idealist, would accept "but one system of ethics for men and for nations," and hence he postulated that "our interests, soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties." But Jefferson, the realist, deftly maneuvered between the great powers, pitting one against the other, blustering and bluffing, and, in the end, acquiring half a continent from France and Spain, without a war. (This was known as the "Louisiana Purchase.") Again, preaching freedom of trade and of the seas, Jefferson practiced the opposite by unleashing embargoes and economic warfare against Britain while it was trying to fight off Napoleon. This ill-considered move, executed from a position of pitiful naval weakness and hurting the United States far more than the target, would eventually embroil the U.S. in a second war against Britain, the War of 1812.

Yet by New Year's Day, 1814, high-minded Mr. Jefferson proved to be as fine a connoisseur of *Realpolitik* as were Richelieu and Bismarck, when he opined: "Surely none of us wish to see Bonaparte conquer Russia, and lay thus at his feet the whole continent of Europe. This done, England would be but a breakfast....No. It cannot be to our interest that all Europe should be reduced to a single monarchy." As Perkins puts it: "Jefferson strangely combined idealism, even utopianism, with cynical craft." He "seldom allowed Republic principles to interfere with pursuit of the national interest."

Today, Mr. Clinton would dearly like to punish the Serbs for "ethnic cleansing," ruthless conquest and general thuggery. But then, there are interests and costs to be considered. What possible American interest would be served by intervention in the Balkan cauldron? What would "winning" mean in a three-cornered war where Serbs would be targeted today, Muslims tomorrow, and Croats thereafter? Is it worth affronting the Russians? And so, there is both: a handful of bombs here, a show of indifference there, and all wrapped up (as always) in righteous, universalist rhetoric.

Is this American "exceptionalism?" In what is probably the best book of the set, Bradford Perkins answers with a judicious "Yes." The "driving forces in American foreign policy both are and are not like those of other nations." They "include the same emphasis on national self-interest, the same intrusion of the larger culture..." But "each of these forces, or factors, also has a peculiarly American character."

What is so "peculiar" about Americans? Tocqueville, as usual, put it best: "Their fathers gave them a love of equality and liberty, but it was God who, by handing a limitless continent over to them, gave them the means of long remaining equal and free." After making the obligatory bow to correct contemporary thinking by mentioning slavery and poverty in nineteenth century America, Perkins points out what remains true nonetheless. A "higher proportion of landowners" than anywhere else and a "high rate of economic growth...eased the path to republicanism, contributed to national stability, and strengthened the devotion to individualism."

That made for a very different society than in Metternich's Austria or post-Napoleonic France. As well, American society was enormously lucky in that it came to occupy an ideal position in the international system. After the extrusion of Britain, France, and Spain from North America, after easy victories against Mexicans and Indians, the United States did not have to play the nasty, corrupting game of princes and potentates. Without dangerous neighbors, there was no reason to worry about security, balance and advantage. Absent an existential threat, the "primacy of foreign policy" could hardly be wielded, European-style, to blunt the claims of liberty and democracy.

Among the four volumes in the

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Cambridge set, Perkins' *Creation of a Republican Empire* strikes the best balance between the demands of the college market (at which these books are presumably aimed) and the needs of the professional reader. He is not afraid to put a personal stamp on his narrative, and he gently pokes holes in generally accepted notions. Was American isolationism in the nineteenth century really the fruit of "free security," provided courtesy of the British Navy, as C. Vann Woodward has argued? "It is by no means clear," Perkins replies, "that the Continental powers needed the silent discipline of the Royal Navy." Three thousand miles of ocean were enough to keep them sober, especially at a time when they had their hands full with revolutionary turmoil and various smallish wars at home.

Walter LaFeber's *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913* is a very different book, indeed in a category of its own in this company. The other three try to synthesize rather than to proselytize, to balance domestic and external factors, and to eschew the harsh indictment in favor of a mildly critical liberal line. LaFeber, by contrast, seeks to make a forceful case for domestic determinism, one that is inspired by William A. Williams, traditional Imperialism theories and the German school of *Sozialimperialismus*. (The latter sees foreign policy, in particular expansion and war, as a way of deflecting and defusing social unrest at home—akin to Shakespeare's Henry IV, who would "busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.")

It is a tale of "merchants" being "driven abroad by the exigencies of economic depression at home, as well as by the attraction of profits (and settlements) overseas." How does the historian forge a link between economics and expansionism? Usually by mining the public records for the appropriate quotes while judiciously neglecting the contrary rhetoric that is just as plentiful. So we are introduced, for instance, to a certain Mr. Kasson, dragged out from obscurity to serve the author's purpose: "The link between...political discontent in a closed West and the demand for overseas expansion had been made as early as 1881, when diplomatic trouble shooter and trade expert Kasson wrote publicly 'We are utilizing the whole of our continental territory. We must turn our eyes abroad, or they will soon look inward upon discontent.'" And again: "The post-1898 American empire was a product of the pre-1897 chaos at home."

The "American empire" was surely a more complicated phenomenon than this. Rhetoric, especially when lifted from the usual cacophony of American politics, is at best partial evidence. Take the period of the Spanish-American War, which is often seen as the beginning of American "imperialism." On one side, you can listen to Senator Beveridge or Theodore Search, a president of the National Association of Manufacturers, as they harp on the dire need for foreign trade outlets. But on the other side, there are the likes of Senator Gorham and Secretary of State Olney who just as vociferously oppose expansion for the economy's sake.

Whom does one quote? That depends, of course, on the case one wants to make. But even if one established that the almighty dollar and the flag often travel abroad together, the conjunction does not dispose of the issue of causation. We can never quite establish conclusively whether trade follows, or pushes, the flag. Does Big Business merely grab hold of opportunities afforded by expansion, with foreign domination being driven by strategic and political ambitions? Or do those greedy capitalists, beset by underconsumption and surplus at home, force a captive state to conquer markets for them abroad (as Lenin would have us believe)?

Aware of these problems in the Lenin-Luxemburg-Hobson approach, the German *Sozialimperialismus* school has targeted domestic discontent as motor of imperialism, and LaFeber has done likewise. But it is easier to forge this link on paper than in the real world. If "giddy minds" demand "foreign quarrels" as distraction, then we should have observed a lot more of the latter in the dissen-

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sion-ridden run-up to the Civil War or in the miserable years of the Great Depression—which, instead, were marked by the mighty clamor of isolationism.

LaFeber's book is best read as an informative, even fascinating socio-economic history of the United States. As a theory of American foreign policy in the manner of "A makes for X" it suffers from the familiar weaknesses of all such unicausal attempts. History is a many-splendored thing, and—pace Occam, the razor-wielder—it is better to err on the side of over- rather than underdetermination.

In *The Globalizing of America, 1913-45* Akira Iriye harnesses the economic argument in a far more agnostic and judicious manner. Recapitulating the American debate in the wake of World War I, he writes: "All these comments reflected the widespread perception that economics, as opposed to traditional geopolitics, was becoming the dominant force in national and international affairs...." Later on, though, he devotes an entire chapter to "The Emergence of Geopolitics," thus paying due respect to the autonomy of a realm—the state system—that simply will not bend to the reductionism suffusing theories of domestic causation.

Iriye's is an eclectic approach in the best sense of the term: culture, economics and security, ideology and the international system are all allowed to contribute to the story. Iriye also manages to integrate what most treatises on the interwar years handle separately: America's *twin* role as both a Pacific and Atlantic power. Nor does he shrink from calling the reader's attention to opposing views on one and the same issue, e.g., on Hitler's war aims, where he contrasts the surly revisionism of A.J.P. Taylor (*The Origins of World War II*) with the exhaustive two-volume study by Gerhard Weinberg (*The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany*).

The task of integrating the two geographic faces of American policy is, on the whole, also well-managed by Warren I. Cohen, the general editor who has authored Volume IV, *America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991*. Like Iriye, Cohen is an "Asian hand," and so the "Eurocentric" reader will want to pick some nits with him on his treatment of U.S. policy toward Europe during the Cold War. For instance, Cohen opines in a chapter on the Berlin and Cuban missile crises that "The ability of the West German government to frustrate American demands that it enlarge its conventional forces and to obtain nuclear-capable weapons instead demonstrated the lengths to which Washington would go to court the Bonn regime." This is a debatable rearrangement of horses and carts. Bonn received nuclear-capable delivery vehicles (with the warheads under American lock and key) in 1958. But it was the Eisenhower administration that, four years earlier, had proclaimed the "New Look," downgrading conventional manpower in favor of a tactical-nuclear strategy. The Adenauer government, in fact, initially tried to resist tactical nuclearization because that would cut into the political value of its vast conventional contribution (500,000 men). In other words, it was Washington that frustrated Bonn with its new nuclear doctrine, and it was the West Germans who ultimately went along. Nor did Kennedy give Adenauer much of a veto power during the nerve-racking months before and after the Berlin Wall.

Cohen also thinks that the pseudo-nuclearization of West Germany provoked Khrushchev to unleash the Berlin Crisis in 1958. But there is more to this story, too, with causes and pretexts being hard to distinguish. This was the age of Sputnik, and Khrushchev clearly thought he was on a roll. (In 1964, his Politburo was to topple him on the charge of "adventurism.") On the other hand, the strategic bastion of his European empire—East Germany—was hemorrhaging to death, with (ultimately) three millions of escapees slipping into the West via West Berlin. Fundamentally, the Berlin Crisis was about the crisis of East Germany, as the creation of the Berlin Wall to seal the escape hatch with concrete so dramatically demonstrated.

In general, Cohen follows a mildly revisionist line, one that would tilt the balance

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of blame for the Cold War ever so subtly against the United States. But to his credit, he does not ignore the heavy-handed moves by Stalin and successors or obvious systemic features of the conflict. And so, like a latter-day Thucydides, he also represents the Cold War in terms of structural necessity—as the inevitable duel between two giants caught in the familiar "security dilemma" that made each assume the worst about the other.

EUGENE ROSTOW'S *A Breakfast for Napoleon* covers the same ground as does the *Cambridge History*. But Rostow tells the story in order to make a point. His key purpose is not to recapitulate the familiar antinomies of U.S. policy—isolation versus intervention, realism versus idealism, international law versus power politics—but to transcend them. And that is a far tougher assignment than merely interpreting history.

Rostow discharges that task with intellectual courage and felicity of style. How does one crack an antinomy? The best, indeed, the only way is to show that it does not really exist. Rostow argues that the isolationism label properly belongs only to the 1920s, the period of Republican ascendancy. This is when the myth of nineteenth century isolationism was born—actually deliberately crafted in order to justify the revolt against Wilsonianism.

The advocate of abstinence "had to reinterpret American diplomatic history, and transform Washington's farewell address into a pernicious myth." Yet "neither President Washington nor his successors before Harding were isolationists." Between 1783 and 1830, Rostow argues,

> the United States took full advantage of Europe's troubles to enlarge and consolidate the nation....For the rest of the century the United States participated actively in world politics as a neutral, judiciously shifting its support from one great power to another...unceasingly busy in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Far East, and Latin America.

This theme Rostow elaborates skillfully for the next 200 pages—as prelude to his main argument. It can be summed up in two sentences: "No cop, no law. No law, no peace." There is no peace without power, and history has surely proven Rostow right. But power is not enough; there also has to be legitimacy, as expressed by international norms and institutions.

Rostow, the legal scholar, is naturally drawn to the latter. But Rostow, the practitioner who has served in four administrations, knows better. The balance of power does not take care of itself, no matter how often America has fallen prey to its pious hope. International institutions do not flourish on their own. There has to be somebody to maintain the balance and to shoulder the burden.

Who will do so today? Trust in institutions is good, but control by the responsible great powers is better. Since the futures of Russia and China are unclear, "no peacekeeping efforts can be expected to prevail unless the United States, Great Britain, and France, at least, act together." That has been Mr. Clinton's prescription, too, but in practice the call for communal action (e.g. in Bosnia) has ended up as an American cop-out. Hence Rostow adds the obvious: "It is an illusion to think of [international institutions] as a substitute for national diplomacy and national action." This is the best advice Mr. Clinton can get.

Both the *Cambridge History* and *A Breakfast for Napoleon* recapitulate the evolution of American foreign policy. Bradford Perkins *et al.* tell the story as they see it, with a liberal/social history/revisionist bias that ranges from the subtle to the strong. Rostow tells the story to make a point: in favor of American power tempered by prudence and internationalism. Together, these five books add up to the most practical six-inch library on American diplomatic history currently on the market. □

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The Decline of Britain:

MUCH OF Anthony Hartley's piece will commend itself to many British readers. Just as they will recognize in Martin Walker's comment the sour voice of the *Guardian*, a newspaper whose attitudes are part and parcel of the decline and whose "solutions" would accelerate it. I would myself agree with the point made by Hartley and emphasized by Evans-Pritchard that one must look at Western Europe as a whole, and that while the economic problems are similar, Britain may be nearer solving them than most, while her political institutions may prove more stable.

I think that Hartley understates the dire impact upon Britain of its membership of the Community (Union) in two ways. The Union is dominated by the idea of universal state control on behalf of those employed, which is producing the dangerous levels of unemployment that builds up the young, alienated under-class. What Maastricht and its interpretation in Brussels is doing is to compel Britain to follow the same anti-competitive course. This is deliberate. If there is over-protection of people and the environment, Britain must be forced to go along and prevented from exploiting its efficiency or it would be a dangerous competitor. The idea that Britain would lose its European market if it were outside the "Union" is absurd; we buy more from the continent than we sell to it.

Politically I think Hartley underestimates the disincentive to take an active part in public life when Parliament has surrendered so much of its authority to Brussels. If we cannot make our own laws why should we care about their administration?

On education, Mr. Hartley is too kind to the way in which the legacy of Crosland and Shirley Williams has been handled by their Conservative successors. Some attempt has been made to get schooling back on track and to promote studies that would fit in with the needs of the economy as well as culture, but anti-elitism still prevails. The grammar schools have not been restored and selectivity at any level has still to be fought for. Above all the government has followed our continental neighbors in the numbers game where higher education is concerned. Far more students are going to universities—there are far more universities—but since this means the intake is less selective, the standards of the intake are falling. And since the universities are not given funding to correspond with the expansion, their own capacity to handle the problem is being diminished. We may soon lack any universities of world stature. The Labour Party wrecked the schools and now opposes all attempts at improving them. The Conservatives are destroying the universities. And the science base on which all economic innovation depends is under threat.

For all these reasons Michael Elliott is wrong. He says that the American bias towards European unity "may turn out to be a colossal mistake." One has only to look East from Germany to see that it already has so turned out. Britain may be the first to declare its independence; it will not be the last country to do that. There are better ways forward for Europe as well as for Britain. But first we must learn to stand on our own two feet and teach the young what that implies.

Lord Beloff
London

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Democracy and Capitalism:

IN "A QUESTION of Linkage: Capitalism, Prosperity, Democracy," (Spring 1994), Irwin Stelzer addresses a topic of great importance and current interest. For instance, to many people the best argument for a most-favored-nation agreement with China is that it will help make it rich and that, in turn, will eventually make it democratic. This view seems to be held not because of anything specific about China—indeed, China scholars might be skeptical—but because of belief in the nexus between wealth and democracy.

Stelzer contributes more confusion than clarity to this topic. While acknowledging that only capitalism can produce wealth he has trouble with the proposition that wealth produces democracy. There are, as everyone knows, poor democracies, India being the most populous example. And, he observes, "there are pathetically poor dictatorships and immensely prosperous democracies. No linkage is evident." This claim is puzzling, for he quotes the work of John Helliwell who indeed has found a link as have others before him, notably Seymour Martin Lipset. In a celebrated book, *Political Man*, first published in 1959, Lipset found a close tie between levels of income and democracy in Latin America and Europe. But Helliwell directly addresses causation: is democracy good or bad for subsequent economic growth and is wealth good or bad for a later democratic status? The answers: wealth is indeed a good predictor of democracy but democracy is not a strong predictor of wealth; nor is its absence either.

The connection between contemporary wealth and democracy is tight: 27 out of 28 countries with per capita GDPs over $8,000 in 1990 (measured by purchasing power parity and excluding small oil-rich states) had a "free" rating in the Freedom House rating system, a proportion very much higher than for countries with incomes below $8,000. Singapore was the exception, but its wealth is new: with time, more wealth, the growth of a more cosmopolitan outlook, and the eventual departure of its philosopher-king, for good or ill, that society will probably look more like other rich societies (which is not to argue that it will ever be a small replica of the world's oldest democracy). So while, strictly speaking, "prosperity and economic development do not inevitably lead to democratization," that looks like the way to bet. However, no one maintains that this could happen overnight. Although things are moving faster than earlier, it would take many decades.

Stelzer slides into a criticism of a very different proposition: that prosperity not only brings freedom but also peace. He marshals no evidence, but the short of it is that democracies are not inherently peaceful—except towards each other. The fact that modern democracies haven't warred with each other doesn't mean that they don't engage in war. So his caution about an expansionist Russia becoming a threat to its neighbors is appropriate, even if it were democratic. And the chance that an imperialist Russia would also be democratic, especially given the weakness of its democratic traditions and institutions, is low. So perhaps is the likelihood that it would be strongly capitalist either, in which case it would stay poor.

Eric Jones, in "Asia's Fate: A Response to the Singapore School," provides an illuminating and informed assessment of the political prospects for the region. He might usefully have emphasized the emergence of democracy in Northeast Asia. This has occurred in the Asian countries that, in addition to Singapore, have made their greatest economic advances: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Their political habits differ from those of Northwestern Europe and its foreign offshoots, but the differences have narrowed greatly and the trend continues. This Northeast Asian democratic phenomenon is one of the more powerful pieces of evidence in refutation of the Singapore School's view that Asians are intrinsically different.

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The "Singapore School":

THERE ARE no windmills in Singapore. But this does not stop the intrepid Professor Eric Jones from charging off in the wrong direction for a vigorous bout with a straw man of his own creation (Asia's Fate: A Response to the Singapore School," Spring 1994). His well intentioned "response"to views that a few Singaporeans (by no means a "School"), among others, have advanced avoids and seriously misrepresents our central arguments.

Yet our point is not impossibly opaque, requiring special erudition to comprehend. It is simply this: Cultural diversity is real. As a matter of empirical record, rights, order and justice are obtained in diverse ways in different countries at different times. The extent and exercise of rights and freedoms must necessarily vary from one culture or political community to another, and over time, because they are the products of the historical experiences of particular peoples.

This is no satanic invocation of the demons of oppression. Of course, repression is wrong and unhealthy. Growth both promotes and is promoted by the ability of the individual to live with dignity. Singapore has never believed that human rights should be traded off for economic success. Singapore has prospered because we enjoy many rights and liberties equal to, if not surpassing, those of the West. Not just a high and improving standard of living, clean environment, free elections, honest and constitutional government, but also freedoms such as the liberty to walk the streets without fear, a right denied to many in the West. This requires, on occasion, a firm hand. For experience has equally convinced us that stability is also an imperative for growth and the extension of human rights.

Growth and stability are linked by a subtle dynamic: an unremitting search for an equilibrium between the rights of the individual, the claims of the community to which every individual must belong, and the no less urgent need for governments to govern effectively and for society to develop. No balance between individual liberty and growth can be valid for all countries and for all time. Every society must find its own appropriate equilibrium if it is to progress. The unthinking application of dogma of any kind leads to disaster.

To label this plain and simple point a "School" invests it with a universalist claim that we do not make. Our essential argument is for acceptance of diversity and the freedom for Asian countries, and all others, to be allowed to find their own best social and political arrangements. We do not expect everyone to agree with our solutions. Alas, we are more often than not denied a similar courtesy. Professor Jones, perhaps unconsciously, ascribes to us the universalist and intolerant fantasies that so many in the West themselves harbor.

The good Professor may betray an unconscious Western premise when he writes, with an air of alarm, that "East Asia...will not simply dominate the world economy within a generation but become the model of choice for less-developed countries, in social mores as well as policies. The Less Developed Countries (LDCs) will look East, not West, in ways unwarranted since the early Ming dynasty." And why not? Did God anoint the West the only valid model? Or is the assumption that only the Great-White-Masters are worthy of attention?

Perhaps Professor Jones does not mean to condescend. But such invidious attitudes clearly all too often permeate the Western approach towards human rights and democracy in Asia. If Singapore has on occasion spoken out bluntly, it is because we believe Western, especially American, preaching can be more dangerous to Western interests than many Westerners who enjoy posturing on human rights may realize.

Asia and America need each other. We need America to maintain stability for growth. America needs Asian growth to fuel its own economy. And if Asian growth slows down, the impact will be global. The future of Asia will be determined by interactions between

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Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo. These relationships are undergoing adjustments in response to shifts in the post-Cold War balance of power. The question is whether an obsession with human rights aids or hinders this process. We believe the equation in Asia is complex enough without additional avoidable complications. The pious hope that democracies get on better is confounded by Russia—now weak, more "democratic" than anytime in the last seventy years, but still asserting its own distinct (non-Western) interests.

There is reason to suspect that Western attitudes reflect, not hubris, but a demoralization so deep that few dare acknowledge its existence. Many in the West have not yet adjusted psychologically to the post-Cold War world. They are disheartened by the loss of economic competitiveness and seemingly intractable social and political problems. Rather than adapt, their instinct is to insist that others adopt their own problems. They have lost the confidence to believe that their own way of life is worth living without seeing it as obligatory for the entire human race.

Asia is not a psychoanalyst's couch for the West to vent its insecurities and neuroses. China is too big and strong to be coerced or nagged with impunity. Chinese leaders have watched developments in the former Soviet Union and are determined not to suffer the same traumatic instabilities. A clumsy and pretentious focus on human rights and democracy only forces China to define its interests in opposition to the West, when the objective should be to encourage more congruence in foreign policies. And no Asian country will support the imposition of Western institutions and values on China. To insist only forces Tokyo to distance itself politically from Washington, at a time when that critical relationship is already under severe economic stress. Prime Minister Hosokawa, following Secretary of State Christopher in Beijing, has already done so. Is this really what the West wants?

Rather than jousting with invented "Schools," scholars like Professor Jones would do better to examine how the West can recover its own best values and traditions of scientific inquiry, search for rational solutions and willingness to question received assumptions. The West should find the moral courage to ask honestly whether its persistent political, economic, and social problems are not in some degree due to the mutation of many of its own ideals to self-destructive dogmas. Such an admission would open the way for a more reasoned dialogue on human rights between East and West. There is no loss of face in learning from each other. Singapore is not ashamed to acknowledge our continuing debt to the West in many areas. After all, it was perhaps our command of the language of our former colonial masters that accounts for the dubious honor Professor Jones has bestowed on us.

Bilahari Kausikan
Embassy of Singapore
Moscow

Eric Jones replies:

THERE SEEM TO be two main propositions in the comment by Mr. Bilahari. The first is that the "Singapore School" is a figment of my imagination. I can only say that the Singaporean writers on the human rights theme seem to be playing very much the same tune—conspicuously and even dangerously well—on only slightly different instruments. Looking closely at their work this is evident. There is nothing wrong with it.

The second point is that I would object were the less-developed countries to turn to East or Southeast Asian economic and moral blueprints. I certainly would not do so on any point of ethnic principle. Moreover, the imputed reason is that, were I indeed to object, this would be because only the "Great White Masters," now so tarnished, are worthy of my attention. Well, it depends who carries the most conviction for the long term. The West still does so, at least if any human rights are or should be the common property of all peoples,

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and if satisfying them goes hand-in-hand with long-term "best practice" in economic management. We have reached the point where the Singaporeans and I can only agree to differ about what.

Eric Jones
La Trobe University
Bundoora, Australia

U.S. -Russian Defense:

A RECENT REPORT BY a US-Russian team of defense experts (which I was privileged to co-chair) sets forth why and how Washington and Moscow should harmonize their defense policies in the years ahead. James Sherr's thoughtful critique of our report ["A Dubious Partnership," Spring 1994] offers a sophisticated version of an argument which has recently fluttered across editorial pages and journal articles: that the Russian Federation is poised for imperial expansion, threatening important West European and American interests.

This argument may seem plausible because it frequently comes clothed in familiar garments. The imminent Russian imperialism, it is said, will threaten Turkey, lead to the subjugation of Eastern Europe, place Germany in jeopardy of the Kremlin's military might, etc. These points sound plausible because they were actually true for some forty years—when the West had to contain the Soviet Union.

Examined with a sober sense of realism, however, today's complaint about Russian imperialism is really about Russian meddling (Moscow would call it "peacekeeping") in places like Tadjikistan and Abkhazia, spots which had never been on any list of American interests. Suddenly, the United States is supposed to have a vital interest in the preservation of borders that Stalin drew with cunning disregard for the wishes and nationalities of the people affected, borders now delineating independent states that never existed before 1991 or "states" that the United States had comfortably regarded as part of Russia during a hundred years of friendly relations with St. Petersburg.

Since America's manifest destiny in the Crimea and Uzbekistan is not all that compelling, U.S. policy ought to focus on higher priorities in its relations with Moscow. Our report argues that adjustments in defense policies offer the greatest opportunity for building a mutually beneficial partnership, by altering the global military environment in a way that will enhance the security of the United States, its allies, and Russia as well. The principal aim must be to transform the nuclear relationship so that considerations of safety will displace deterrence. The lethal stand-off of Mutual Assured Destruction must be transformed into mutual support for national survival.

How else can we cope with the North Koreas of this world? Surely, we cannot rely on the self-restraint and prudence of every nuclear-armed dictator. When the day comes that a Kim Il Sung uses his weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear establishments of the United States and Russia must not be a threat to each other, for the world's two largest nuclear powers will need each other's support to contain such a crisis.

Nothing is gained, and a great opportunity may be lost, if we now rush to denigrate the objectives of such a military partnership and cavalierly postulate that America and Russia are destined to be rivals. By contrast, if the military planners in Moscow and Washington continue their good work in overcoming Cold War concepts and postures, it will become increasingly harder for a fool like Zhirinovsky to rekindle old animosities and fears. Although our report was issued just before the Russian elections last December had created the Zhirinovsky scare, I would not change a single word today. Except to add, "We told you so, now hurry up!" □

Fred C. Iklé
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Things To Come

Michael Lind

EVERY TIME THAT a politician or commentator calls for a "surgical air strike" by "the international community" as a way of ending "chaos" or punishing an "outlaw state," I think of Alexander Korda's 1936 *Things to Come*. That classic movie, based on the H.G. Wells novel *The Shape of Things to Come,* is not a drama in a conventional sense, but rather an allegorical tableau illustrating the future of humanity as envisioned by an early twentieth century British Fabian socialist. Minus the socialism, the vision of the direction of world politics it purveys remains as influential among the western intelligentsia today as it was when it was made.

In the late 1930s or early 1940s, according to Wells/Korda, a second world war breaks out and rages for half a century. By the late twentieth century, Europe has been reduced to medieval conditions. In a ruined landscape, petty warlords, like the primitive "Boss" played, or over-played, by a young Ralph Richardson, battle their rivals for control of scarce fuel supplies needed to maintain their tiny airplane fleets.

Elsewhere in the world, a new, humane, rational civilization has emerged, with its center at Damascus, near the Middle Eastern oil supplies whose significance for industrial civilization Wells accurately foresaw. This new (and all-Caucasian) order is a benevolent technocratic dictatorship, ruled by a meritocratic elite of scientists and jet pilots. Their leader, the wise, white-haired genius whose name, Dr. Cabal, evokes the Fabian ideal of a disinterested intellectual freemasonry, falls hostage to the Boss. Soon rescue arrives, in the form of a grand aerial armada which, in the father of all surgical air strikes, drops a harmless nerve gas putting the barbarians temporarily to sleep (no one dies except for the Boss, a victim, evidently, of his own obsolescence). On awakening, the savages will be rehabilitated and will join the new world society in the pursuits that are destined to replace war and politics—taming nature and exploring outer space.

I first saw *Things to Come* during the crisis preceding the Gulf War. With the Middle East substituted for war-torn Europe, the story became very contemporary (the Boss, amassing aerial weapons of destruction, invades a tiny neighboring polity to obtain its energy supplies: "Bring me the gas!" he thunders). The romance of air war, as portrayed on TV, was positively Wellsian. George Bush even looked like Dr. Cabal (played in the film by Raymond Massey) when he called for a new world order at the UN (the international organization led by Dr. Cabal is Wings Over the World).

There were differences, to be sure. During the Gulf War, the civilized aeronauts dropped, not a harmless sleeping potion, but fuel-air explosives, similar to napalm, that inflicted an agonizing death by incineration. And the Boss is still in power.

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KEYNES FAMOUSLY said that politicians are usually guided by the ideas of some long-dead economist. They have been more influenced, I think, by half-remembered science fiction, at least since the idea of secular technological progress caught on in the nineteenth century. Certainly the best way to understand the Nazis is to read the science fiction of the late nineteenth century, with its epics of race war, great dictators, battles in the air, superweapons, and eugenics. And the Soviet combination of utopianism, industrialization, despotism, and Lysenkoism owed as much to futurist fantasy as to Marx and tsarism.[1]

Even the most hard-headed realist must have some conception of the probable or desirable future, of the sort that science fiction provides. The cinema makes these visions familiar to multitudes who never read a science-fiction magazine or book. Of these visions, the most familiar, and most influential, is the sort that *Things To Come* symbolized for its day, and that *Star Trek*, in its TV and movie versions, stands for in ours—a world in which mankind, at the conclusion of a terrible global struggle, has come to its senses, abandoned particular national and religious rivalries, and peacefully formed a world government.[2]

This utopian vision has been complemented, rather than contradicted, by the apocalyptic vision represented by *On the Beach* (1959) or, more recently, *The Day After* (1983). Which will it be—World Federation, or Nuclear Apocalypse? As dramas, end-of-the-world films have been spectacular—well, bombs. A subject as depressing as global nuclear war and the end of civilization makes an audience anxious for comic relief. It is no accident that the theme of nuclear catastrophe has inspired two of the classic examples of black comedy in American film—*Dr. Strangelove* (1964) and *A Boy And His Dog* (1975). (In the *Mad Max/Road Warrior* series, and also in the *Terminator* series, nuclear holocaust provides a backdrop to what, for all the "thriller" trappings, is unmistakably a version of slapstick.)

Cinematic successes are even more rare in the case of the sub-genre that takes a totalitarian future as its subject. In a reversal of the usual pattern, in which a science-fiction film is far more influential than the book on which it is based, the two movie versions of *1984* (1956 and 1984) have been little-seen failures. It is the book that contributed "Orwellian," "Big Brother," and "Newspeak" to our vocabulary. The other major example, François Truffaut's film of Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451* (1967), was dead on arrival.

Why did this genre never flourish? Perhaps the movies simply could not match the horrors of Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot. A more important reason, I think, has to do with the ecology of Hollywood. The totalitarian-dystopia genre could never grow to be more than a seedling in the shadow of films about Nazi Germany. The theatricality of the Nazi regime permits directors to wallow in the most visually arresting version of

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[1]This explains, perhaps, why Robert Conquest—a writer and critic of science fiction—could understand the Soviet Union so much better than most Sovietologists.

[2]To my knowledge no one has ever pointed out that Wells' scenario—global air war followed by world federation—follows the sequence predicted by Tennyson in "Locksley Hall" (1860):

> ...Heard the heavens fill with shouting,
> and there rain'd a ghastly dew
> From the nations' airy navies grappling
> in the central blue;
> ...Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer,
> and the battle-flags were furl'd
> In the Parliament of man, the
> Federation of the world.

Reportedly Harry Truman kept a copy of the latter two lines in his wallet, and referred to them as the basis of his vision of the ultimate world order.

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totalitarianism even while condemning it Hitler raving in the bunker has replaced Herod ranting in the palace as the ultimate bit of fustian for an actor (Anthony Hopkins, David Niven, and Alec Guiness did "bunker" movies, and Olivier perfected the stage-Nazi in 1976 in *The Marathon Man*). The dreary grayness of future totalitarianism, as portrayed in 1984—what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil"—has not been able to compete with what might be called the glamor of evil, safely vanquished.

A DECADE AFTER 1984, with communism overthrown or abandoned and no new totalitarianism in sight, the nightmare of a future of warring totalitarian blocs seems more remote than ever (though developments in Asia or Russia could quickly revive it). Recently the movies have been giving us a different kind of dystopia, a future in which the threat is not sterile organization but the coexistence of advanced technology and social decay.

The greatest of the films in this genre is the first—Stanley Kubrick's film of Anthony Burgess' novel *A Clockwork Orange* (1971).[3] Neither *A Clockwork Orange* nor another powerful vision of a future in which tyranny is united with universal incompetence, Terry Gilliam and Tom Stoppard's *Brazil* (1985), has left much of a mark in the popular mind—undoubtedly because both are too uniformly depressing. Recall that their ancestor, Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*, combined a grim prophecy of class conflict in the high-tech capitalist future with a happy ending: lovers reunited, social classes reconciled. Similarly, the most influential modern film in this genre is the most sentimental, *Blade Runner* (1982), Ridley Scott's classic based on a Philip K. Dick novel. *Blade Runner*, in essence, is a sappy cross-racial love story with a happy ending, centered on a tough-but-tender *film noir* detective.

Largely on the strength of its memorable setting in a crumbling, polluted, Asianized Los Angeles (the work of designers Syd Mead and Lawrence G. Paull), rather than its feeble story or cardboard characters, *Blade Runner* has entered popular idiom as short-hand for a particular kind of urban squalor. Anyone with acquaintances in LA is likely to have heard them say, "It's getting like *Blade Runner*"—a statement that puzzles a visitor to that sunny city, which is being transformed by Mexicans, not Asians. What they really mean is "It's getting like *A Clockwork Orange* or *Escape from New York*" (to name only two movies that make much apter metaphors for the LA of the riots). Like George Miller, director of the *Mad Max* movies, the director of *Blade Runner*, Ridley Scott, is an Australian; his vision of a deteriorating, inegalitarian, Asianized western city on the edge of the Pacific is less plausible as a picture of tomorrow's America than the vision of *Rollerball*—a society ruled by a corporate executive oligarchy, who keep the majority passive with a diet of futuristic sports. (Life imitated art when one of the cable channels began running the series *American Gladiators*).

The "new" future, Anarchy, brings us full circle. A vision of squalid anarchy, after all, was at the heart of *Things to Come*. Benevolent technocracy and world federation were held out as the alternative, not to global extinction or totalitarian tyranny, but to simmering chaos. Today, as in the early scenes of *Things to Come*, we live in a world divided between an advanced industrial civilization and the brutal and backward world of the Boss—Saddam, Aidid, Milosevic, Cedras. Unlike in the movies, though, in most of the world Dr. Cabal and his airmen are not going to come to the rescue. □

[3]Kubrick is the master of futurist fables, in several genres, including, in addition to *A Clockwork Orange*, the end-of-the world story (*Dr. Strangelove*) and the neo-Wellsian vision of the technological future and human evolution (*2001: A Space Odyssey*).

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

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

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